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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plainti ffs-Respondents,

vs.
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN
Defendant-Appellant,

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L.
HITE and MICHELLE V. WIDTE, husband and
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Susan P. Weeks
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
FAX: (208) 664-1684

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-02-222
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY
MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANTS
MiITES' "REPLY" BRIEF ON
SECOND REMAND RE: DAMAGES

Plaintiffs,
VB.

D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON
J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants.

I.
INTRODUCTION
On April 1, 2004, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision And
Order On Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues, And Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages. The Supreme Court vacated
the award for damages becau.se such determination was intertwined with

the question of the scope and boundaries of Defendants' easement rights.
This Court has now determined the scope of the prescriptive easement and
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given the parties the opportunity ~o present· argu.ment on whether such
determination changes this Court's April 1, 2004 fmdings and conclusions
on damages.

II.

AMENDED FINDINGS ON DAMAGES

Whites argue that this Court should amend its Fjnding of Fact No.
I. Whites argue there is no credible evidence that supports the Court's
con,elusion that White or Mortensen trespassed on Akers property. This
argument is unrelated to the location of the prescriptive easement. Rather,

it is an argument that this Court this Court should reconsider its decision
based upon the credibility of the evidence received. These arguments have
been made to this Court ad nauseum in several motions to reconsider. For
the same reasons this Court has cited to in response to those previous
motions to reconsider, this argument should be discounted.
The court's finding that the use of tracked vehicles was
unreasonable and not done for the purpose of maintenance was supported
by substantial and competent evidence, albeit disputed. More importantly,

this fmding is unrelated to the location of the prescriptive easement.
The next damage award challenge by Whites is for the $6,0000
which included costs for repairing damage to Akers' curved approach and
restoration to land outside the easement in an, area unrelated to the
prescriptive easement. As cited In the In"ltial brief on :remand, there was
ample evidence in the record that supported such damage award. Further,
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such damage was at the opposite end of the easement from the prescriptive
easement area. Thus, the Court's previous finding was unaffected by the
location of the prescriptive easement on remand.
Next, Whites claim that the Court improperly awarded Akers $1939
for damage to his truck that took place near the west end of the easement
(the opposite end of the easemen.t road from the prescriptive easement,
which is located on the east end of the easement road) when Mortensen
rammed his vehicle. Whites argue that they were engaged in lawful use of
the easement when Akers obstructed passage of a tracked vehicle driven, by
Mortensen. This Court has found otherwise. The tracked vehicle was
driven up an.d down the easement with the intent of destroying and
obliterating the existing easement road in. an attempt to widen it. Once
again, Whites response is yet another attempt to change this Court's
previous fmdings and the argument is unrelated to the location of the
prescriptive easement on remand.

III.
TREBLE DAMAGES
Similar to Marti's argument, Whites claim there wasn't any "no

trespassing" sign posted in the triangle area, and therefore treble damages
on remand is not justified. As argued in the brief flied in reply to Marti's
argument, there is no requirement in the statute or any case law that the
sign be posted at the point of damage. White argues that there should not
be any trebling of damages beyond the

sign~e.

This argument is contrary

to the language at),d intent of the statute which allows the signs to be
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spaced 600' apart in order to allow for an award of damages.

The

limitation argued by White does not B.ppear in the statute or in any case
law.
Vv'hite also argues that Akers should not be awarded damage
beca.use the gate post/fence were owned by him. There is no eviden.ce that
the gate/fence post were on White's property at the time of his purchase.
Thus, he has no ownership interest in them. Akers testified he maintained
these items to prohibit trespassing across the easeme1'l.t road as it was
sometimes mistaken to be a public right of way, and they had been
installed with Peplinski's permission and assistance. HO'Wever, such fact
does not transfer ownership of them to White.

IV.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
White maintains Sherrie Akers is not entitled to damages for
emotion distress because she created the circumstances in which she
found herself and she "brought herself into a confrontation with White or
Whites' employee in each instance". This argument is ridiculous. Sherrie
Akers lived on the property where the acts were occurring. The road was
her ingress/egress to her residence.

She did n.ot bring herself into the

circumstances in which she found herself.

Rather, she lived in the

circumstances created by White and Mortensen. The emotional distress
damages were entirely appropriate. Further, these damages were unrelated
to the location of the prescriptive easemen.t.
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White also claims that Sherrie Akers' distress is unrelated to them.
and caused because she pezjured herself at trial regarding the location of
the prescriptive easement. It is disappointin,g and disturbing to see White's
counsel advance this unwarranted attack on Mrs. Akers.

This Court

accurately and effectively set forth the basis that it found an award of
emotional distress for Mrs. Akers to be proper.

It related to the

inappropriate conduct of the Defendants, prior to and during trial.
Defendant's actions exceeded the bounds of appropriate conduct, even in
light of disputed property rig.hts and the tension of litigation.

v.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
White maintains that this Court's award of punitive damages was
disallowed pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in R, T. Nahas
Co. v. Hu.let, 114 Idaho 23, 752 P.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1988). This decision,

was issued by the Idaho Court of Appeals, wherein it recited to recent
Idaho Supreme Court cases.

In that case, the Court of Appeals entire

holding disallowing punitive damages was:
In the present case, we believe the record lacks
substantial evidence that Hulet's actions were an. "extreme
d.eviation from reasonable standards of conduct" or were the
product of an "extremely harmful state of mind." Hulet
arguably relled upon his water permit in diverting the
water. Certainly Hulet was motivated by monetary gain.
However, stancling alone this is an insufficient basis upon
which to fiDd that the criteria for punitive damages have
been satisfied. Furthermore I the trial court's finding of
"oppressiveness" is not supported by the record. It is true that
Hulet viol.ated the eventually determined water right of a
neighbor. However, at that time the scope of Nah.as' right was
uncertain; it was not adjudicated until the 1981 trial. All of
the acts complained of took place before Nahas had his rights
PLNNTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANTS WHITES "REPLY" BRIEF
ON SECOND REMAND RE: DAMAGES - PAGE 5
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adjudicated. Although we do not suggest that interference
with unadJudicated rights never c:an satisfy the criteria
for punitive damages, we hold that the record in this case

fans short of showing the extreme circumstances required
for such an award.. Compare Village of Peck v, Denison, 92
Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969) (pu,nitive damages properly
awarded against defendants who threatened to disrupt village
water supply by disconnecting water system, putting debris
in springs, threatening to kill persons who attempt to repair
the system, and threatening to build a feed lot near the spring
in order to contaminate the water). Accordingly, on remand.
the judgment must be modified to delete the award of
punitive damages. (Emphasis added.)
R. T. Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 114 Idaho at 29.

In the present case, the reliance on a claimed easement right does
not stand alone. As this Court noted in. its memorandum decision, and as
Plain,tiffs more fully point out in their reply to Marti's opposition brief,
Defendants did much more than rely on their easement rights.
disregarded a court injunction.

They

They disregarded county ordinances.

There were threats of physical violence against Plaintiffs. There were acts
where Defendants tried to incite Plaintiffs to engage in physical violence.
There was purposeful damage to property not necessitated by maintenance
of the easement.

There was an attempt to manipulate the county

prosecutor. There was intimidation of witnesses during trial. This conduct
meets all of the criteria of being oppressive, malicious and outrageous and
takes this litigation outside the normal parameters of a normal easement
dispute.

The location of the prescriptive easement changes none of the

Court's review of this conduct. Thus, the punitive damages should be
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rein,sta,ted on remand.
DATED this 25 th day of January, 2011.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

Sushli P. Weeks
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANTS WHITES "REPLY" BRIEF
ON SECOND REMAND RE: DAMAGES - PAGE 7

04 5
n

07/11

01/25/2011

10:11

PAGE

JVW

208664

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25111. day of January: 2011, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below. and

addressed to the following:
0

U.S. Mai]

GJ/

Electronic Mail

0

Hand Delivered

cY

Teleco,Py (FAX)

Vernon.T. Mortensen
P.O. Box 1922
Bonners Ferry. ID 83805

0

U.S. Mail

0

Ovem.ight Mail

0

Hand Delivered

g/

TeJecopy (FAX)

Robert Covington
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A
Hayden Lake, ID 83835
Fax: (208) 762·4546

Dustin Dejssner
Van Camp & Deissner
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane, WA 99201
Fax: (509) 326-6978
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STArE OF IDAIiO
FILED:

'S

COUNTY OF KOOTENAlt S

ROBERT E. COVINGTON
Attorney at Law
8884 North Government Way, Suite A
Hayden, ID 83835
Tel. 208-762-4545
Fax 208-762-4546
ISB#2312

20r r JAN 25 PM 3: 3&

Attorney for D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V.
White

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV -02-222

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

)

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

SUPPLEMENT AL
AFFIDAVIT OF
MIKE HATHAWAY

)

------------------------------------)
STA TE OF IDAHO

)
SS.

County of Kootenai

)

COMES NOW Mike Hathaway, being duly sworn, on oath, deposes and states as
follows:
1. That I have personal knowledge of and am competent to testify under oath to the facts

hereinafter set forth.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE HATHAWAY

1

2. That I am the Survey Manager of Welch Comer Engineers of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
3. This affidavit is intended as a supplement to my affidavit in this proceeding that was
dated June 30, 2010.
4. In the previous affidavit I referenced a high resolution version of Exhibit B-1 thereto
that as of June 30,2010 I had ordered from the USGS/EROS center but not then
received. Attached hereto as Exhibit B-2 is a magnification of the relevant portion of
the high resolution version of Exhibit B depicting the same area as depicted in Exhibit
B-1 showing the location of the easement road in 1982.

Dated this 25th day of January, 2011. __ ~_1~_
Mike Hathaway

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public for the State of
Idaho on January 25, 2011.

SHARIE MacDONALD
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

~

~~14-~Residing at: ___~~ ___ _
Commission Expires:JJ.t.L~LlLL_

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE HA THA WAY

2

CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of January, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by facsimile
transmission to Deissner, hand delivery to Leander James and mail to
Mortensen:
Leander James
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax: 208-664-1684

Dustin Deissner
Van Camp & Deissner
1707 W. Broadway Avenue
Spokane, W A 99201
Fax: 509-326-6978

And by mail to:
Vernon J. Mortensen
PO Box 330
Naples,ID 83847

Robert Covington

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE HATHA WA Y

3

USGS AERIAL IMAGE
DATED 6-23-82
226-150 471608 10 NUMBER
MAP IS NOT TO SCALE

1DEsiGNE·o·By:······ .... ···· .............. ·
1·oRAwN·By·:..........................·TJF

.......................................................

DWG NAME:
WHITE-EX.
:: ....................................................
:: ....................................................
DATE:
7-12-2010.
: SHEET NO:

1

WELt:H-'" COM
www.welchcomer.com
350 E. Kathleen Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83815

208-664-9382
(toll free) 877 -815-5672
(fax) 208-664-5946

COPYRIGHT 2010
Welch-Comer & Associates, Inc.
This document, and ideas and designs
incorporated herein, as an instrument
of professional service, is the property
of Welch-Comer & Associates, Inc.,
and is not to be used in whole or in
part for any other project without the
written authorization of Welch-Comer
1
& Associates, Inc.
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Susan P. Weeks
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
TelephoJl,e: (20'8) 667-0683
FAX: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
Case No. CV-02-222
AKERS. husband and 'Afife,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

D. 1. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, lNC.;
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J.
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN.
husband and wife,

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT .AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DAMAGES

Defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs by and through their attorney of record here by file this
Memorandum in Response to Defendant Vernon J. Mortensen's to Correct
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion for Reconsideration on
New Trial Issues and Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages.

Although it is difficult to work through Mortensen's

motion given the format and incorrect cites to the record, Mortensen raises one

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
~gARDING DAMAGES: 1
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valid point where a correction is needed in the additional findings flied April 1,
2004. Other than one minor point, Mortensens' motion is without merit.

II.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Turning to the specifics of the requested changes, Mortensen first cites to
the Court's conclusions of law regarding damages, and challenges the Court's
conclusion that: tlThis is not the first time Mortensen has bought property low,
sold quickly for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation because of a
lack of access to that property."

The Courfs conclusion is supported by

substantial and competent evidence in the record.

The court received

testimony that Mortensen was in another access conflict over an easement road
leading to parcels where it was alleged there were illegal splits (subdivisions)
and that Mortensen was still selling parcels knowing there was a dispute about
access Tr. Vol. II, p. 1423, 11. 13-25, 1424-1434; J.435,1l. 1·5.

In tria1 7

Mortensen did not deny he ha.d been involved in other land disputes in
litigation Tr. Vol. I, p. 208, 11. 12-20. Mortensen's own surveying expert, Alan
Kiebert, testified he had worked with Mortensen on 6 projects wherein
Mortensen had sold lots without surveys against Kiebert's advice Tr. Vol. I) p.
1764, 11. 20-25; pp. 1765-1768, p. 1769, 11. 1-16.

Further, Morten,sen

acknowledged he bought the current property at below market value because
he knew there was a dispute regarding the scope of the ea.sement rights of the
party. Te. Vol I, p. 242, 11. 3-8.

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL
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Mortensen takes exception to the Court's Additional Finding of Fact No.
31. The court cited the trial transcript and the testimony supports the finding.
Mortensen's main objection is that the Court did not find his testimony
credible.

It is the Court's prerogative to determine which testimony was

credible. Although the evidence is disputed, the Court's finding is supported
by substantial and competent evidence.
Mortensen also discusses the Court's Finding of Fact No.4. The Court
correctly notes that the Mortensen claims he never requested pernrission to use
the curved approach and Dennis Akers maintains that he gave Mortensen
permission the first time they discussed the matter.

This summary of the

evidence is correct. Akers did testify he gave permission to Mortensen the first
time they met when Dennis blocking the curved approach and Mortensen
asked him to move his vehicle.

Tr. Vol 1, p. 612, 11. 3-25; 613, 11. 1-20.

Mortensen gives the same account of meeting Akers. Tr. Vol I, p. 948, 11. 7-25,
p. 949, 11. -1-23. The only difference in the stories is Akers testified he gave
Mortensen permission to use the curved approach. Tr. Vol I, p. 556 1

n.

11-25;

p. 557, 11. 1-7; 1267,11. 22-25; p. 1269, 11. 1-5.
The court does incorrectly find that the first meeting occurred as a result
of Mortensen placing a card in Akers' door. This finding is incorrect. The card
was placed in the door by Mr. White. Tr. Vol I, p. 560, 11. 8-25; 561, 11. 1-5.
However, this minor error does not change the court's ultimate rmding.
The issue is still one of credibility. Morten,sen testified that he reviewed the

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING DAMAGES: 3
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Tr. Vol I, p. 213, 11. 12-21. The Peplinski

litigation was a settled with acceptance of offer of judgment in October after
Mortensen purchased wherein Akers granted a permission to Peplinski to use
the curved section. Tr. Vol I, p. 978, 11. 16-25; 979-984. Since Mortensen, was
familiar with the litigation, it is likely Mortensen knew Peplinski understood the
use of the curved approach was a permissive one and accepted an offer to
settle where he was granted permission to use the curved approach.
Mortensen seems to believe that because there was a lapse of several
months before he first encountered Akers that his use was not permissive.
However, the fact that Akers did not know that the parcel was sold to Akers
does not shed any light on the issue of permissive use. Akers testified that the
first tim.e he met Mortensen he told him that he would give him permission to
use of the curved approach. Given the timing and topic of the litigation to Mr.
Akers encounter with Mr. Mortensen, it is more credible to believe that Akers
discussed this subject with Mortensen than to believe Mortensen that Akers
never mentioned it to him.
This finding is even more probable given the fact that years later,
Mortensen's purchaser, White, felt it necessary to approach Akers and discuss
the curved approach. If Mortensen believed the curved approach was part of
the original easement, there would be no reason to discuss any potential issues
with White.

Whatever information was exchanged, it was enough to cause

White to approach Akers and request a discussion regarding use of the curved

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRlAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL
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Thus, it a reasonable inference that Mortensen told White

something that lead White to believe he needed to come to an accord with
Akers about use of the curved approach.
Mortensen also challenges the Court's finding that his use of the road
was rare.

Mortensen bases this on testimony of Akers that Mortensen ran

heavy equipment on the property frequently. This testimony doesn't address

the frequency of the use of the road, especially when, the Court heard
(controverted) testimony that Mortensen used the back way for bringing in
equipment. Regarding frequency of use of the road, Bill Reynolds testified that
Mortensen used the land for agricultural purposes and sight seeing and didn't
use it frequently Tr. Vol I, p. 66, 11. 22-25; 67, 68, 11. 1-22.
Mortensen also points out in paragraph 2 of Finding No. 31 that the
Court transposed his name for White's name. The testimony of Sherrie Akers
was that at the time that White was purchasing the property, she received a
telephone call from Stewart Title calling on behalf of Mortensen wanting to
know if Akers would be willing to quitclaim an easement to Mortensen. Tr. Vol
I, p, 413, 11. 23-25; p. 414; p. 415, 11. 1-17. Mortensen claim this minor error

proves the Coures entire fmdings and conclusions are in error and shows an
indulgence to Akers.

Actually, if anyone were to benefit from this error, it

would be White.

Mortensen claims the prejudice to him of the above errors establishes
that n.owhere in the trial transcript is a time or place or event established when
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN1S
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF I.,A W AND
MOnON FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS ~~ w.~GARDING DAMAGES: 5
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Akers gave Mortensen permission to use the curved approach. This statement
is not true. As indicated above, with transcript citations, Akers testified that
when he first met Mortensen in person, which encounter occurred when
Mortensen requested Akers move his vehicle that was blocking the easement,
Akers told Mortensen he was giving him permission to use the curved
approach.
Mortensen also claims that no one testified he excavated on the property.
This statement is not true. Shaun Montee, the contracted excavator, informed

Bill Reynolds that he was hired by White and Mortensen to excavate the upper
road. Tr Vol I, p. 88, 11. 9-25; p. 89, 11. 1-20.
Mortensen also claims the court erred in finding there was excavation on
Akers property. Mortensen's citation to the transcript is not in context. At that
point in testimony, the parties were discussing excavation on White's property
leading to water trespass on Akers property. However, Akers was not testifying
that no excavation had occurred on his property.

Akers testified that the

excavation of the upper road took a little bit off the top of his property. Tr. Vol

III, p. 1201, 11. 1-5.
Mortensen also claims the court erred in Findings of Fact No. 37 that
White and Mortensen entered into a business relationship.

Mortensen

characterized himself as a speculator who improved roads as part of his
endeavors, but didn't build houses.

Tr. Vol I, p. 205,

n.

4-25.

Mortensen

testified that "we" dumped fill dirt (in the triangle area). Tr. Vol I, p. 253,11. 24-
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25; p. 254, 11. 1·20. Mortensen operated the caterpillar that spread the dirt.
Tr. Vol I, p. 254, 1. 25, 255, 256, 11. 1·22. Mortensen testified that the work he
and White did complied with the court's injunction order. Tr. Vol I, p. 265, 11.
5"23.

He and White did work on upper end of road on White's land.

Mortensen claimed he was working with White with his Cat in easement area.

Tr. Vol I, p. 285, 11. 7-22. It was a reasonable inference for the Court to fInd
White and Mortensen were in a business relationship together.

Otherwise,

Mortensen would have had no reason to be involved with White in the acts that
occurred on the easement.
Mortensen also claims that the trial tra.nscript does not support
Mortensen's involvement with any other alleged dama.ges to Akers property.
Bill Reynolds testified they dumped dirt in the triangle area, moved fill on Akers

curved approach and covered part of it, dozed the gate out, tore out a fence
post, busted up the oil finish on the road,. Tr. Vol

I~

p. 96, 11. 7-25; pp. 97 -

114i p. 123, 11. 1-9. Mortensen acknowledged he pulled the fence post and
knocked down the gate. Pulled a gate post, cut the lock on the gate and took
out the gate after cutting the lock. Tr Vol. I, p. 278, 11. 16-25; p. 279, 11. 1-10.
Reynolds testified Mortensen damaged Akers fence with his truck. Mortensen
damaged the fence with his truck. Vol I, p. 118, 11. 21-025; p. 119; p. 12011. 16.

Mortensen claims this Court erred in finding that his damage to Akers
fence with his truck occurred when he intentionally drove into the fence. Trial
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testimony established that Mortensen intentionally drove around a vehicle
parked on the curve approach.

Reynolds characterized this action as a

misjudgment because one could plainly see there wasn't room to go around the
truck blocking the curved approach and the other way was open. Tr. Vol I, p.
177, 11. 4-25, p. 178, 11. 1-15. Mortensen also claimed it was a misjudgment
and that he took this action to keep the peace. Mortensen never explained how
using the blocked curved approach when the other easement route was open
served the purpose of keeping things calm. Tr Vol I, p. 298, 11. 22-25; p. 299,
ll. 1-8; p. 306, 11. 19-25, p. 307,11. 1-2.

Mortensen also claims Finding of Fact No. 38 is incorrect in summarizing
Scott Rasor's testimony in conjunction with Exhibit 74 (subdivision ordinance).
Tr Vol I, p. 458, 11. 20·25; p. 459-461, 462, 11. 1-4. Mr. Rasor also testified the
road did not comply with the county's road approach ordinance. Tr Vol I, p.
455,

n. 8-25, p. 456-457; p. 458, 11.

1-19.

On Finding No. 44, Mortensen again claims there is no evidence he
damaged Akers property.

The excavation, dumping and spreading of dirt,

damage to fence, gate and lock have been discussed previously.

The tree

damage was supported in the record. Tr Vol II, p. 1302, 11. 2-25.
On Finding No. 45, Mortensen's argument that he was not caught in
ex.cavating without the proper permits in place is only persuasive if one
disregards the statement of Mortensen's agent, Shaun Montee, that he was
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excavating on behalf of White and Mortensen. However, the evidence is that he
was working for Mortensen; therefore this finding is supported by the record.
Mortensen also argues that finding number 47 is error that Mortensen
willfully trespassed and willfully damaged plaintiff's property.

The record

supports these fmdings. The damage claims have been briefed to this court in
this brief and in the damage brief on remand previously submitted. Mortensen
was aware that Akers claimed that the use of the curved approach was
permissive. They were aware Akers claimed title to the disputed triangle area.
Despite this awareness, Mortensen chose to move fo:rvvard with his activities
with full knowledge of the claim that he was exceeding his easement rights.
B'urther, Bill Reynolds did not testify he did not think Mortensen was acting
intentionally. In fact, Reynolds testified he inquired of Mortensen why he was
dumping dirt allover the triangle area, and Mortensen replied that Mortensen
was dumping dirt in disputed triangle to force the matter to go to court. Tr Vol
I, p. 162, 11. 20-25, p. 163,

n.

1~3,

Mortensen also claims that Finding No. 48 is wrong in its entirety. It is
not wrong in its entirety.

However, it is incorrect regarding Defendant's

prescriptive easement rights and this court has amended this finding on the
second remand.
Mortensen claims Finding No. 49 is wrong. It is not. Kootenai County
issued two ('stop work" order on this project.
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Mortensen also claims that Finding No. 50 is wrong because it
mischaracterizes Rasor 's testimony. It does not. Tr. Vol I, p. 540, 11. 2-25; p.

541, p. 541,11. 1-11.
Mortensen claims that there is no evidence to support Finding No. 51
that he violated any cou.nty ordinance. As previously discussed in this brief,

the trial court received such testimony.
Mortensen contends there is no evidence to support Finding No. 52 that
defendant willfu.lly engaged in the activities discussed in the findin,gs because
he was in Mexico. The evidence is replete with evidence that Mortensen was
involved in the activities discussed by the trial court. In fact, even in this brief1
Mortensen acknowledges he drove into Akers fen,ce. It is hard to fathom how
he did so while in Mexico.
Mortensen claims that there is no evidence to support Finding No. 53
that he attempted to widen the road or reduce the grade.

As discussed

previously, there was ample evidence that Morten.sen and White both worked
together to achieve these results.

There is certainly no evidence that

Mortensen tried to keep the road in the condition in which it had always been
kept.
Mortensen's claim that Finding No. 54 is incorrect is again refuted by the
evidence previously submitted herein. There is evidence Mortensen attempted
to wide the approach without obtaining an approach permit as required by law.
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Mortensen takes exception to Finding No. 56 and 57 that Akers have
exclusively maintained the easement. Mortensen basically argues the court
must accept his uncorroborated testimony. It does not have to do so and such
testimony was not credible.
Mortensen challenges Finding No. 58 claiming only White was
respon.sible for the excavation that caused water damage. However, as noted
earlier, the excavator was working for White and Mortensen jointly.
Mortensens claim that Finding No. 60 is not supported by eviden.ce is
incorrect. There is a plethora of evidence that defendants interfered with use of
the curved approach and driveway as discussed previously.
The conclusions of the court, other than those related to the existence
and scope of the prescriptive easement, are supported by the above findings.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial cou,rt should grant Mortensen's
motion to correct the findings to change the two mistakes as noted above
(correcting the finding regarding the circumstances of Akers conversation with
Mortensen when permission was granted to use the cUIVed approach and
correcting the portion regarding White leaving the card in Akers' door). Other
than these two minor changes, all other findings and conclusions should
remain the same, except as modified by subsequent findings and conclusions
entered by the court on previous motions to reconsider and amendments and

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATrON ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING DAMA.GES: 11

11/13

0~/11/2011

15:52

PAGE

JVW

208554'

findings made on remand.
DATED this 11th day of February, 2010.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

~ if

By
Susan P. Weeks

ffecL
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1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE 1.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
DA VID 1. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J.
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN,
husband an.d wife~

Case No. CV-02-222

POST·HEARING MEMORANDUM
RE:WHITE'S MOTION TO ADMIT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE RE:
EASEMENT LOCATION

Defendants.
For a second time, White moves this court to allow it to admit addjtional evidence in this
matter to admit newly discovered evidence. This motion was filed on June 30, 2010, after the
briefing on remand was completed, and one day before the oral argument on remand. Akers
objected at the hearing to White's referring to this additional evidence at hearing. This motion
was never calendared for oral argum.ent. White's requested that it be heard at the hearing for
dam.a.ges even though a notice of hearing was never give:n of the motion. Akers agreed to have
the motion heard as long as they were allowed to file a post~heat'ing brief in opposition to the
motion. The following is Akers' post-hearing brief opposing White's motion to allow the
admission of additional evidence consisting of a 1975 aerial photograph from the USGS EROS
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0495

01/04

02/16/2011

11:41

2086641

JVW

PAGE

database depicting the roadway in question and a 1982 aerial photograph from the USGS EROS
database. While Akers do not believe these photographs add much in. the way of assistance to
the
In their motion, White's rely on 1.R.C.P. 11(a)(2) and 59(a)(4) for the basis of admitting

the maps. Neither of these rules authorizes the admission of the maps into evidence at the close
of the case. Rule 11 (a)(2) allows the court to reconsider a decision it has made. It does not
allow for the post trial submission of additio.nal evidence.
Rule 59(a)(4) allows the court to order a new trial when a party has "newly discovered
evidence, material for the party making the applicati.on, which the party could not, with
reasonable diJigence, have discovered and produced at the tria1." Akers oqjects to the court
ordering a new trial in this matter. The evidence submitted is from a governmental source. It
could have been discovered at any time before or during the trial of this matter. White presents
no argument to this Court why he could not have discovered and produced this evidence at trial.
To the extent that White's request is a motion for a new trial, Akers' object to it.
White also cite to case law as authority for the submission of the additional evidence after
trial. Defendants cite to Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961). In this case, an
easement case was remanded to the trial cow1 to set forth with precision and particularity, th.e
origin, course and din1ension, on the ground, of the area affected by a prescriptive easement that
had been established. The Supreme Court granted the trial court on remand the right to take
further testimony respecting the origin, course and dimension. on the ground, of the easement
that had been established. Later, in County o/Bonner VS. Dyer. 92 Idaho 699,448 P.2d 986
(1968) the Supreme Court, citing to the Sinnett case, held that reopening or refusing to reopen a

trial for the purpose of hearing furtJler evidence on a particular issue is within the sound
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discretion of the trial court. In the present case, White has not requested the court to re-open the
trial. Rather, it has asked the court to include in its consideration two aerial photographs that it
claims are clearer than. those presented at trial with a.en.al depictions. While the image m.ay be
sharper, they really do not assist the Court in determining where the road lay with respect to the
property boundaries of each parcel.
It is in. the discretion of this court whether to accept these photographs to assist it in
locating the easement. From Akers perspective, the issu.e is rather moot at this point as the Court
already considered and discussed White's addition.al evidence in its opinion on remand.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2010.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

By

~

1"''1

~~-- if

Sus ... Weeks

&71...,
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THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L
AKERS, husband and wife
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV -02-222
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POST- HEARING
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EVIDENCE RE:

vs

EASEMENT LOCATION

D.L WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC;
DAVID l. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE
husband and wife, and VERNON J.
Mortensen and MARTI E.
Defendants.
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Akers argue that the Idaho rules of procedure create an obstacle in allowing the
admission of new evidence. The Supreme Court however does not approve of
rules being applied rigidly at the cost of practicality and justice.
On their second appeal, Mortensens brought up the issue that Judge Mitchell had
not complied with L.R.C.P. S2(a). Below the Idaho Supreme Court clarifies its
attitude when balancing rules with practicality and justice.
~The

court issued a written memorandum decision that did not expressly state
that the decision constituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither
did the district court adopt the memorandum decision as its findings of fact and
conclusions of law by order. Accordingly/ the Order on Remand did not comply
with requirements of L.R.CP. 52(a) However/ this conclusion does not end our
inquiry."
The Idaho Supreme Court then expressed the need for sensibility, and flexibility
while dealing with rules:

"/d. at 292. 723 P.2d at 836. This conclusion is completely consistent with the
admonition that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Nshall be liberally construed to
secure the just/ speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding. I.R. CP. l(a). Although we expect the trial courts of this state to
comply with our rules of procedure/ the interests identified in I.R. CP. l(a) would
not be served if we were to rigidly interpret I.R.CP. 52(a).
H

The Idaho Supreme Court's message above advocates applying rules liberally to
provide for a

"just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and

proceeding."
In line with what the Supreme Court expressed it follows that drawing on
evidence advantageous to a correct decision would be proper and sensible. Clear
MORTENSEN REPLY BRIEF TO AKERS POST - HEARING MEMORANDUM RE: WHITES MOTION TO
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and abundant evidence adds to the probability that a Court's determination will
be "just". And arriving at just determinations makes for speedy and inexpensive
litigation by avoiding costly appeals.
Akers argue that, "While the image of the Aerial at issue may be sharper, they
really do not assist the court in determining where the road lay with respect to
the property boundaries of each parcel. "
However the Supreme Court believed the aerial photos were very important in
determining the location of the easement road. The Supreme Court relied on the
aerials in conjunction with Richard Peplinskis testimony in arriving at their
conclusions. On the other hand Razors' survey representation of where the road
was in 2002 in section 24 is insignificant to where it was in the year 1966 or even
in 2001. When Razor did his survey, David White had already lowered his
property immediately crossing the section 24 line thus allowing a more southerly
turn than had been possible at earlier times. The Supreme Court stated the
aerials available matched Richard Peplinskis testimony that the road extended in
to Akers property a considerable distance before veering southerly and then
tracing a curve similar to "a shepherd's crook". Clearer images definitely help
define where the road actually was during the critical time the easement was
established. Razors' survey is irrelevant. It was made after White had changed
the lay of the land where Razor determined the road should be.
This Court should also keep in mind that Akers provided this Court with false
testimony claiming the road turned south at a 90 degree angle before entering
their property in section 24 thus robbing Mortensens and Whites of their legal
rightful easement and forcing costly appeals. True to their nature Aker continue
to represent the easement road veering southerly prematurely after entering
their property in section 24 instead of continuing in a straight line for a
considerable distance in line with Richard Peplinskis testimony and the aerial
photo Whites seek to have entered into evidence. The Aerial photos and
testimony of those who used the road when Peplinskis owed the property before
Akers arrived are the foundations of determining the exact route. Razor could
have claimed the road was anywhere he wanted it to be when he surveyed in
MORTENSEN REPLY BRIEF TO AKERS POST - HEARING MEMORANDUM RE: WHITES MOTION TO
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section 24 because all of the property south of where the road is depicted in the
new aerial photos was excavated and compacted with trucks and an excavator.
Akers contend that this Aerial is just like others this Court has in evidence, just a
little clearer. If that is the case then why do they resist having it entered into
evidence? By stipulating to having it entered into evidence Akers would be
saying, "We just want the easement road to be where it has a legal right to be./I
This could have some redeeming benefit for the false testimony they provided
regarding the location of the easement and thus prolonged this case into a ten
year disaster.
Akers argue that White could have gotten this aerial photo earlier; he should have
known where to look. It was always there. That is like telling Columbus he should
have discovered America earlier; he should have known where to look; it was
always there. The same argument applies to Akers. Why didn't they provide the
aerial at an earlier date; after all the purpose of the trial was to establish the
truth? All parties had an equal obligation to provide the best information
available to the court unless there is a prevailing opinion that the purpose of the
court is not to establish the truth but to deceive.
It would appear that at this stage of a ten year lawsuit prolonged by false
information and errors, it would be in the best interest of all to get the facts right
and a correct ruling.
Akers state as follows. "It is in the discretion of this court whether to accept
these photographs to assist it in locating the easement. From Akers perspective,
the issue is rather moot at this point as the Court already considered and
discussed White's additional evidence in its opinion on remand./I
The question should be asked, If Akers are so certain that this new evidence
makes no difference, then why are they fighting it.
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Dated this 18 day of February, 2011

Vernon Jerr( ort0sen Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Vernon J. Mortensen certifies:
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document by the methods indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, 10 83814
Fax 208 664 1684 and Electronic Mail

Robert Covington
8884 N. Government Way, Stc. A
Hayden Lake 10 83835
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Fax 208 762 4546 and Electronic Mail

Van Camp and Deissner
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane, WA 99201

Fax 5093266978 and Electronic Mail

Dated,-)~Ld-I g 20/1
.

I

Vernon J. Mortensen
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
PlaintiffS,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
D.L. WHITE CONST., INC., DAVID L. WHITE )
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife;
)
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. )
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No.

CV2002222

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON REMAND
RE: DAMAGES, and ORDER
DENYING WHITES' MOTION FOR
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON
EASEMENT LOCATION

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

The present issue before this Court is the issue of damages, if any, to the plaintiffs, on
remand from the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. Akers v. Mortensen and White, 147 Idaho 39,
205 P.3d 1175 (2009). The previous award of damages, trespass damages, damages for
emotional distress and punitive damages, was vacated as "the question of damages flowing from
Appellants' [Mortensens' and Whites'] conduct is inseparable from consideration of Appellants'
easement rights." 147 Idaho 39, 48-49, 205 P.3d 1175, 1184-85.
On September 29, 2010, this Court issued its "Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location." At the end of that 21-one page decision,
this Court concluded:
Based on the above, the location of the prescriptive easement across Akers'
Parcel B land is as shown in Exhibit 6 and 7. Akers have proven such by a
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND RE: DAMAGES, AND ORDER ON ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE RE: EASMENT LOCATION
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preponderance of the evidence, even though Akers did not have the burden of proof.
Whites and Mortensens have not proved any contrary location by a preponderance
of the evidence when they had the burden of proof.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the prescriptive easement in favor of Whites
and Mortensens across Akers' Parcel B land is as shown in Exhibit 6 and 7, and as
described in Exhibit C to the Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding
Location of Easement. Exhibit C to the Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand
Regarding Location of Easement is attached hereto. That easement is 12.2 feet
wide.
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement
Location, pp. 20-21. The following procedural history is taken directly from that decision:
This action is before the Court on remand a second time from the Idaho
Supreme Court. The purpose of this remand is to determine the location of the
prescriptive easement as it enters Akers' Parcel B land and turns south onto the
property owned by Whites and Mortensens.
To orient the reader, the land at issue has as its axis the quarter comers of
Section 19 and 24, in Kootenai County. The Akers own the land to the north in two
parcels: "Government Lot 2" to the east, which is in Section 19; and "Parcel B", the
adjacent parcel to the west of Government Lot 2. All of Parcel B is in Section 24.
Immediately to the south of Akers' Government Lot 2 is land owned by Reynolds,
not a party to this litigation. Immediately to the south of Akers' Parcel B land is
land purchased by defendants Whites and Mortensens. This litigation concerns
Whites and Mortensens rights to use a roadway that connects White and
Mortensens' property to Millsap Loop Road. That roadway crosses Akers' property
at the southern edge of Akers' Government Lot 2 near, at or over the northern
boundary of Reynolds' land. It is the exact location of the road as it enters into
Akers' Parcel B that is the subject ofthis remand, specifically, the exact location of
the road as it existed in that area between 1966 and 1980, for prescriptive purposes.
The Court trial in this matter took place over fourteen days of trial testimony
and occurred from September 2002 to May 2004. On January 2, 2003, this Court
filed its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." Later, the issue of
damages was tried to the Court, and on April 1,2004, this Court filed its
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues and
Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages, and Order."
Defendants appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. On December 30,2005, the
Idaho Supreme Court filed its first decision in this case. Akers v. D. L. White
Construction, Inc., et aI., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005).
In that opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed this Court's findings as to
the triangle area to the east. 142 Idaho 293, 299-300, 127 P.3d 196,202-03. The
Idaho Supreme Court reversed this Court's findings regarding an implied easement
from prior use (142 Idaho 293, 301-02, 127 P.3d 196, 204-05) and easement by
prescription. 142 Idaho 293, 303-04, 127 P.3d 196,206-07. The Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed this Court's finding that the express easement defendants had over
plaintiffs' land was 12.2 feet in width in 1966, but expressed no opinion as to the
width or scope of any possible easement by prescription or implied from prior use,
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leaving that issue to be resolved by this Court on remand. 142 Idaho 293,304, 127
P.3d 196,207. This Court was also instructed to revisit the trespass and damages
issue after determining easement rights. 142 Idaho 293, 304-05, 127 P.3d 196,20708.
After the remittitur was issued by the Idaho Supreme Court, this Court held
a hearing on April 19,2006, wherein a briefing scheduled was issued. Additional
briefing was filed and oral argument based upon that additional briefing was
scheduled for June 22,2006. On June 22, 2006, counsel appeared for oral
argument. On September 7,2006, this Court issued its "Order on Remand." At that
time this Court held:
IT IS ORDERED defendants have an easement by
prescription, but not over the portion of Akers' property they
excavated. The easement by prescription is as established prior to
1980, and that is a 12.2 foot wide strip located just inside the
northeast comer of defendants' land, turning south immediately west
of the west boundary of Government Lot 2 (where the express
easement ends) and the east boundary of Parcel B.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants have no implied
easement by necessity.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants are responsible
for damages as previously set forth in the Memorandum Decision
and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order filed April 1,2004, pp. 12-29. The prescriptive easement does
not expand the express easement, and the prescriptive easement over
Akers' land in Parcel B is in a slightly different location than
defendants' excavated on that parcel. Additionally, defendants
placed fill from their excavation on Akers' Parcel B. Accordingly,
even with the finding of an easement by prescription, all previous
findings regarding damages remain.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are the prevailing
party, entitled to costs as proven at a later hearing.
Order on Remand, p. 19. Specifically, this Court found the location of the pertinent
portion of the easement to be as follows:
An alternative reason Akers claim defendants fail on their
claim for an easement by necessity is that at the relevant time period,
1966, the road to which they seek to establish an easement by
necessity upon did not exist, at least not on Akers' land in Parcel B
in the same location upon which defendants have excavated in recent
times. As Akers point out, the road did not exist into Parcel B back
in 1966. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 3-4. Instead, the
road went on to Reynold's land in 1966, and Reynolds is not a party
to this litigation. According to Reynolds, the road was established in
this century by defendant David White. Tr. Vol. I, p. 84, L. 16 - p.
85, L. 24. Reynold's testimony is corroborated by some of the
exhibits. Exhibit 11 and J1 do not show this road along any part of
Parcel B back in 1951 and 1958 respectively. Reynold's testimony
is corroborated by the testimony of William Milsaps, as set forth in
Finding of Fact 21:
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21. * * * Bill Millsaps [sic] was also unclear as to
whether the access road went on to Reynolds'
property or whether it went on to that portion of
plaintiffs['] land west of the western boundary of
Government Lot 2. Thus, in 1966, it is unclear
whether one could access the Millsaps' [sic] 60 acres
without traveling on the right of way outside
Government Lot 2.
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
pp. 7-8, Finding of Fact ~ 21. This Court was not perfectly clear
when it wrote Finding of Fact 26:
26. The curve into the Millsaps' [sic] property at the
west end of the driveway in 1966 was east of its
current location, in Government Lot 2. As stated
supra in Finding of Fact ~ 21, Bill Millsap was
unclear as to the location of that "road" after it left
Government Lot 2. William Reynolds testified that
after the "road" left the west boundary of
Government Lot 2, it turned sharply in a 90 degree
bend then went south, essentially right around the
northwest comer of Reynolds' land. This is
corroborated by Defendants[']s Exhibit D41 (map
from photos taken in 1978) D42 (represented by Mr.
Reagan [former defense counsel] as a 1973 aerial
photo), D43 (represented by Mr. Reagan as a 1973
map) and D44 (represented by Mr. Reagan as a 1973
aerial photo), and thus, this Court finds this to be the
approximate route ofthe "road" in 1966. Mr.
Reynolds testified Peplinski worked on this area of
the road toward the end of his ownership, and in
doing so, caused part of Reynolds' fence to fall
down. Sherrie Akers similarly testified that it was
well after 1980 that Peplinski altered the course of
the road to the west of the western boundary of
Government Lot 2.
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
pp. 8-9, Finding ~ 26. Any lack of clarity by this Court in Finding 26
was clarified in Finding 27.
27. With the Akers' permission, Richard Peplinski
extended the driveway west of Government lot 2 and,
with Akers's permission, used this driveway west of
Government Lot 2 for farming and occasionally
logging in the spring, summer and fall.
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p.
10, Finding of Fact ~ 27. What was testified by Reynolds, what this
Court was persuaded by, and what this Court meant when writing
Finding 26 was the route in 1966 was as shown on Exhibit D42, D43
and D44, but that the road essentially crossed and went south at the
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intersection or four comers formed by Government Lot 2 to the
Northeast, Parcel B to the Northwest, Reynolds' land to the
Southeast, Peplinskis' (now defendants') land to the Southwest. At
the very least, defendants have failed in their burden of proof on the
issue of "apparent continuous use" of this entire route over Parcel B
which they now desire. The road defendants constructed in recent
times crosses Akers land in Parcel B further to the west than it did in
1966. Thus, contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's finding, element
two "apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent"
is lacking in defendants' case on implied easement by necessity.
Order on Remand, pp. 6-8.
Defendants again appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. On June 4, 2008,
the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion. However, no remittitur followed. On
January 22, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its "Substitute Opinion" in this
case. In pertinent part, the Idaho Supreme Court held:
2. The district court erred when it found that Appellants'
prescriptive easement turned immediately south upon entering
Parcel B.
Appellants argue that their prescriptive easement does not
tum immediately south upon entering Parcel B, and instead extends
further to the west around a hill before turning south onto
Appellants' property. The district court found that the access road
on Parcel B, prior to 1980, turned south immediately after entering
Parcel B from Government Lot 2. The district court included an
attached exhibit to its amended judgment that illustrated the
location of Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. After
the prescriptive easement crossed the boundary of Government Lot
2 into Parcel B, the exhibit indicates that the easement turns 90
degrees to the south and enters Appellants' property. However, this
finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
The district court stated that it relied upon a number of
exhibits when it concluded that Appellants' easement turned
immediately south upon entering Parcel B, including Defendants'
Exhibits 42 and 44. However, these exhibits, which are aerial
photographs of the relevant property, indicate that the access road
historically made a more gradual turn resembling a shepherd's
crook rather than a 90-degree tum. Defendant's Exhibit 41, an
aerial photograph from 1978 also shows that the access road made
a gradual turn through Parcel B before entering Parcel A. Perhaps
most telling is Plaintiffs Exhibit 253, which is a photograph of the
shared boundary between Government Lot 2, Parcel B, and Parcel
A, and the Quonset hut on Parcel A. While the photograph was
taken in 2003 (well after the prescriptive easement was established
prior to 1980), it is nonetheless informative. The photograph
depicts a large hill to the south of the access road, which the access
road gradually curves around. We recognize that the
uncontroverted evidence showed that the Akers permitted
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Peplinski to extend the access road further to the west in Parcel B
after the Akers purchased the property. However, the photograph
does not support a finding that the access road previously turned 90
degrees to the south traveling straight up a steep hill in order to
access Parcel A, as would be required if the access road had
immediately turned 90 degrees upon entering Parcel B. In light of
this photographic evidence, we conclude that there is not
substantial evidence supporting the district court's conclusion as to
the location of Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. This
issue must be remanded to the district court for additional fact
finding consistent with this opinion.
Akers v. Mortensen and White, 147 Idaho 39, 47-48, 205 P.3d 1175, 1183-84
(2009). Following that January 22, 2009, opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court,
this Court, aided by briefing and oral argument, issued an order on December 1,
2009, establishing:
1) Plaintiff has the burden of proof on all damage issues.
2) No additional evidence regarding location of the
easement is needed, however, a metes and bounds description of the
location as found by the Court will be necessary to comply with
Idaho case law.
3) The defendants have the burden of going forward (burden
ofproduction) and the burden of persuasion (burden of proof) as to
the location of the easement. Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 97 Idaho 925,
927,557 P.2d 203,205 (1976). While the parties continue to
negotiate an agreed location of the easement, the following applies
absent that agreement.
4) Each defendant will submit a brief regarding location of
the easement, with reference to specific exhibits in evidence and
specific reference to previous decisions ofthis Court or the Idaho
Supreme Court, and such brief shall be due on or before January 15,
2009.
The plaintiffs shall then submit a brief regarding location of
the easement, with reference to specific exhibits in evidence and
specific reference to previous decisions of this Court or the Idaho
Supreme Court, and such briefs shall be due on or before January 22,
2009.
Each defendant shall then submit a response brief, if any, by
no later than January 29, 2009, regarding location of the easement.
Each party is encouraged (but not required) to submit a metes
and bounds description of their claim as to the location of the
easement, along with their briefing.
5) Once the Court determines the location of the easement
(or the parties advise the Court that they have stipulated by
agreement the location of the easement), the Court will establish a
briefing schedule regarding the issue of damages.
Order Regarding Burdens of Proof and Order Establishing Briefing Schedule, pp. 23. On January 21, 2010, this Court extended that briefing schedule, based upon the
parties' stipulation. On January 22,2010, Vernon Jerry Mortensen pro se, filed his
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"Brief of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location of Easement." On March 29,
2010, Whites filed their "Brief of Defendants White Re: Section 24 Easement
Location." On June 17, 2010, Akers filed "Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand
Regarding Location of Easement." On June 24, 2010, Whites filed their "Reply
Brief of Defendants White Re: Section 24 Easement Location." Oral argument was
held on July 1, 2010. At oral argument on July 1, 2010, this Court was made aware
of two additional pleadings filed by Whites the day before. On June 30,2010,
Whites filed an "Affidavit of Mike Hathaway" and a "Motion to Admit Additional
Evidence Re: Easement Location." That motion was not noticed up for hearing. On
July 1,2010, at oral argument, the Court asked Whites' counsel if Whites were
making a motion to continue the hearing scheduled for July 1, 2010, regarding the
easement location. Whites' attorney indicated they were making a motion to
continue the July 1,2010, hearing. Akers objected. Argument was held on Whites'
motion to continue. At the conclusion of that argument, the motion to continue was
denied. In the intervening two months, Whites have not noticed up for hearing their
Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location. Counsel for Whites
also contacted this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and reserved a time on September
29, 2010, to hear a motion to add additional evidence, but no hearing was ever
noticed up and no hearing was held. In case such motion was noticed, this Court
waited for that time reserved for hearing before issuing this opinion. The Court's
waiting for Whites to bring their Motion to Admit Additional Evidence to a head
creates problems for the Court (Article V, Section 17, Idaho Constitution; I.C. § 59502) as this matter has technically been under advisement with the Court since July
1,2010. This Court will wait no longer on the issue of taking additional evidence.
Marti E. Mortensen has not filed any briefing regarding the easement
location, but at the July 1, 2010, oral argument, adopted the ~ubmissions filed by the
Whites.
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement
Location, pp. 1-7.
After that decision was filed September 29,2010, on November 10,2010, plaintiffs filed
"Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages" and a "Notice of Hearing on
Remand Re: Damages" scheduling oral argument for November 24, 2010. On November 17,
2010, defendant Marti Mortensen filed "Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages". On
November 19,2010, plaintiffs filed an "Amended Notice of Hearing on Remand Re: Damages"
scheduling oral argument for January 26, 2011. On January 18, 2011, defendants D.L. White
Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. White, filed "Reply Brief of Defendants
White" and a "Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway". On January 19,2011, plaintiffs filed
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"Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages." On January 24, 2011, two
days before the scheduled hearing, defendant Vernon Mortensen, pro se, filed a pleading entitled
"Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and
Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", an Affidavit
in Support of Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and
Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" and a
"Motion for Shortening Time" to have that "motion" heard on January 26, 2011. On January 25,
2011, plaintiffs filed "Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites' "Reply" Brief on
Second Remand Re: Damages." Later in the day on January 25, 2011, defendants Whites filed
"Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway" and various notices of hearing purporting to
schedule a hearing on White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence and a hearing on a motion
to shorten time on that motion, all for hearing on January 26, 2011. [Recall from the procedural
history reiterated above from this Court's September 29,2010, decision, that on June 30, 2010,
Whites had filed a "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", but failed to
notice such up for a hearing.] A "Motion to Shorten Time" was filed by Whites, but no "Motion
to Admit Additional Evidence" has ever been filed by Whites.
At the hearing on January 26, 2011, which plaintiffs had scheduled for the hearing on
damages, the Court heard argument on that issue as well as the issue of presenting any other
evidence. The Court allowed plaintiffs until February 16,2011, to file a brief on the issue of
presentation of new evidence. Vernon Mortensen requested his motions he had filed two days
before be heard. The Court denied that request, as the Court had yet to read those pleadings
Vernon Mortensen had filed, because counsel for plaintiffs had not yet had the opportunity to
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read those pleadings, and because Vernon Mortensen had failed to clear such with the Court's
Clerk for scheduling purposes.
On February 11,2011, plaintiffs filed "Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues and Additional
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages" (defendant Vernon Mortensen's
motion). On February 15,2011, counsel for defendant Marti Mortensen filed an "Amended
Notice of Hearing: Jerry Mortensen's Motion to Amend Correct Findings" for argument on
March 22, 2011. While it is unusual for one party to notice up for hearing the motion of another
party, such is permitted. On February 16,2011, plaintiffs filed "Post-Hearing Memorandum Re:
White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", and later that day,
Whites filed "Supplemental Citation Re: Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement
Location." On February 18,2011, defendant Vernon Mortensen,pro se, filed his "Reply to
Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re:
Easement Location."
II. WHITES' MOTION TO ADMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
RE: EASEMENT LOCATION.
In Whites' "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location" filed June 30,
2010, Whites made that motion pursuant to l.R.C.P. 11(a)(2) and l.R.C.P. 59(a)(2), and cited
Sinnet v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514 (1961) and County of Bonner v. Dyer, 92 Idaho 699 (1968).

Motion to Admit Additional Evidence, p. 1. Whites ask the Court to admit the "newly
discovered evidence on the issue oflocation of the prescriptive easement" (Id.), and Whites
claim the "newly discovered evidence" consists of two photographs ofthe roadway in question as
it existed in 1975 and 1982 were obtained from a United States Government website:
"eros.usgs.gov." Id., p. 2. Whites claim an even higher resolution of the 1982 photograph was
"available but not yet in the possession of counsel for Whites as it has not been received from the
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USGS/EROS office of the United States Government." Id
Nothing happened for over six months. In the interim period, on September 29,2010,
this Court issued its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Re: Easement Location." On January 19,2011, Whites filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Mike
Hathaway, which attached the aforementioned higher resolution photographs taken in 1982. That
affidavit was signed on January 18,2011. On January 25,2011, Whites filed what appears to be
an identical "Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway", but this one was signed on January 25,
2011.
Plaintiffs made the following legal argument in their "Post-Hearing Memorandum Re:
White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location":
In their [Whites'] motion, White's rely on LR.C.P. 11(a)(2) and 59(a)(4)
for the basis of admitting the maps. Neither of these rules authorizes the
admission ofthe maps into evidence at the close of the case. Rule 11(a)(2) allows
the court to reconsider a decision it has made. It does not allow for the post trial
submission of additional evidence.
Rule 59(a)(4) allows the court to order a new trial when a party has "newly
discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which the
party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial." Akers objects to the court ordering anew trial in this matter. The evidence
submitted is from a governmental source. It could have been discovered at any
time before or during the trial of this matter. White presents no argument to this
Court why he could not have discovered and produced this evidence at trial. To
the extent that White's request is a motion for a new trial, Akers' object to it.
Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement
Location, p. 2. This Court agrees with each point raised by plaintiffs. This Court also agrees that
the cases cited by Whites: Sinnet and County of Bonner, neither direct a new trial nor the
reconsideration based on this "new evidence".
This Court finds Whites have not met LR.C.P. 59(a)(4) [LR.C.P. 60(b)(2) has the same
standard] and its requirement as to the "newly discovered evidence", the Whites "could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial." This evidence is from the United
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States Government. This evidence exists now and it existed at the time of trial which took place
on various dates from September 2002 to May 2004. Due to the protracted nature of this court
trial, the Whites also had the luxury of an inordinate amount of time in that a year and a half
during the trial in which Whites, or any other party, could have found this evidence.
Additionally, this Court has looked at the photographs attached to the Supplemental
Affidavit[ s] of Mike Hathaway, and they certainly are not sufficient to cause this Court to grant a
new trial. Even if there were a legitimate method for this Court to simply review this new
material and reconsider its earlier decision, the photographs would not change this Court's
decision. This Court, in its September 29, 2010, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location, repeatedly stated that the relevant time
period for the easement location was 1966, the year that the dominant parcel was severed from
the servient parcel. That was the pertinent time period as found by the Idaho Supreme Court:
However, we remanded the case due to the lack of findings necessary for the
resolution of the question of whether in 1966, when the dominant estate was
separated from the servient estate, use of the access road through Parcel B was
"reasonably necessary" to the enjoyment of the dominant estate.
Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39,45-46,205 P.3d 1175, 1181-82 (2009), citing Akers v. D.L.
White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196,204 (2005) (Akers 1). Thus, these
photographs of the road in 1975 and 1982 are not taken at the pertinent time period, which was,
and still is, 1966. Also, there were other photographs considered by the Court, which were taken
at times near 1975 and 1986. Thus, the fact that these "newly discovered" photographs are more
clear is of no assistance to the Court. Whites' "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re:
Easement Location" must be denied.
III. DECISION ON REMAND REGARDING DAMAGES.
This is the fourth time this Court has addressed the damage issue. The first was in this
Court's 27-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated January 2, 2003. The
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decision simply found that defendants had trespassed, plaintiffs had been damaged, punitive
damages were warranted, and the extent of all damages to be proven at the second phase of trial
on damages. January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25-27, ~~ 1328. The second was in this Court's 29-page Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration, on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order dated April 1, 2004. The third was in this Court's 20-page Order
on Remand dated September 6, 2006. Order on Remand, pp. 13-16. In that most recent decision,
five years ago, this Court held: "This Court finds most of defendants' actions of trespass involved
activity outside the boundaries ofthis 12.2 foot easement." Order on Remand, p. 13. Nothing has
changed in the past five years in that regard.
This disputed easement has two ends.
One end, the "triangle" area, or the east end, is where this easement begins at its
intersection with Millsap Road. Much of the wrongful activity by defendants against plaintiffs
took place in this "triangle" area. The two Idaho Supreme Court cases and this remand have
nothing to do with the "triangle" area. Thus, as to this area of the easement, none of the damage
issues have changed.
The other end is where, after leaving Millsap Road, traveling west along plaintiffs'
southern boundary, the easement goes up a hill and then at its terminus, bends into defendants'
Mortensens' 260-acre parcel. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
p. 12, ~31, p. 13, ~32. In 2001, defendants Whites purchased from Mortensens the northern 80
acres of Moretensens' 260 acre parcel, and that 80 acres was contiguous to the southern boundary
of Akers' land. Id., p. 14, ~34. On remand, this Court determined the location ofthe easement at
this "terminus" end changed slightly.
The fact that one small portion of the exact location of the easement across Akers' land
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changed slightly due to this Court's decision on remand [the September 29,2010, Memorandum
Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location] does not
change this Court's decision as to damages suffered by the Akers. It is uncontroverted that
White and Mortensen excavated and deposited soil on plaintiffs' land in the area of this slight
change. In other words, the claim simply cannot be made that White and Mortensen performed

all their earthwork within the boundaries of the easement. Such a claim would simply be an
impossibility, and not in any way supported by the evidence before this Court. Also, the work
performed by defendants on this terminus end caused specific damage to plaintiffs caused by
defendants' actions in changing the water drainage of the area. Thus, even if all the earthwork
performed by defendants were within the boundaries of the easement (again, an impossibility),
there was collateral damage caused by defendants' actions.
The Court will examine the arguments made by the parties. But first, because the
location of the prescriptive easement changed only slightly, and this Court now finds that change
has no effect on damages, a review of this Court's most recent decision on the issue of damages,
written five years ago, is in order:

D. DAMAGES.
Defendants argue at length that trespass damages, emotional distress
damages and punitive damages are not appropriate. (Defendants') Brief on
Remand, pp. 9-41. Defendants' argument is premised on their claim they have done
nothing wrong if they have a 25 foot wide easement by prior use or by prescription.
As stated above, this Court finds no easement by necessity and the prescriptive
easement is limited to 12.2 feet. The Idaho Supreme Court wrote: "[T]he question
of whether and to what degree the Defendants' conduct constituted trespass on the
Akers' property is intertwined with the scope and boundaries of the Appellants'
easement." 127 P.3d at 207. This Court finds most of defendants' actions of
trespass involved activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement.
There were wrongs visited by defendants upon the Akers at various points
along this road. The Idaho Supreme Court decision did nothing to disturb this
district court's decision regarding the ownership of the eastern portion of the
roadway, or the express easements along the southern portion of Government Lot 2.
This Court now finds no expansion of that express easement by prescriptive acts of
defendants or their predecessors, and the Court finds no easement by prior use.
Thus, the damages visited by defendants upon Akers along those locations does not
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change. This Court now finds the defendants have a 12.2 foot easement along
Akers' Parcel B. However, as stated above, the use that defendants are allowed is
"confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive period" and "is limited by
the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to which it is put." Idaho Forest
Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 515, 733 P.2d
733, 736 (1987); Citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566,
568,602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979). Thus, defendants had no right to take their 12.2 foot
wide easement and excavate into the earth on Akers' land in their attempt to reduce
the grade of the road to in turn attempt to meet minimum criteria for a subdivision.
This is an express easement for agricultural purposes, that is now extended in length
only, across Akers' Parcel B. It is not extended in width beyond 12.2 feet, it is not
extended in purpose, and it is not extended in defendants' right to excavate. It is
beyond cavil how defendants could have thought that they had any right to perform
such earthwork, when at best they had to litigate to have any prescriptive right
established across Parcel B.
Defendants argue at length that they did no excavation on Akers' land.
(Defendants') Brief on Remand, pp. 18-19. This argument is not supported by the
record. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 681, Ll. 3-6; p. 683, L. 13 - p. 684, L. 2; p. 685, L. 5 - p. 684,
L. 4. Exhibit 24, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 55. Additionally, defendants' argument that
they did no excavation is inconsistent with defendants' argument that the excavation
they did was pursuant to their right to maintain or improve their easement (discussed
immediately below). Finally, this issue has already been decided by this Court in
Finding of Fact 44:
44. On or about January 3, 2002, defendants, without authority or
proper permits, commenced excavation work on plaintiffs' real
property in an attempt to widen plaintiffs' driveway and lower its
grade for access to defendants' housing development. In doing so,
defendants excavated portions of plaintiffs' real property, dumped
dirt and gravel on plaintiffs' real property, damaged plaintiffs' fence,
gate, lock, tree and other parts of plaintiffs' property.
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, Finding of
Fact ~ 44; p. 25, Conclusion of Law ~1O. Defendants argue that since they have an
easement they have the right to maintain the easement. (Defendants') Brief on
Remand, p. 9. Defendants make the same claim regarding the right to make
"improvements" on the easement. Id p. 15. Defendants cited no case law to
support this position. There is no case law which allows what defendants were
trying to do: establish a 60-foot-wide right of way and reduce the grade of a steep
hill so they could get approval for a subdivision over a strip of land that at best they
had questionable easement rights upon. January 2,2003, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 18, Findings of Fact ~ 51-53. That conduct is far
beyond "maintenance". While such conduct amounts to "improvements", it is not
allowed under the law. Idaho Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed
Imporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 515, 733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); Azteck Limited,
Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 568, 602 P.2d 64,66 (1979); Gibbens v.
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977); Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield
Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 628, 277 P. 542, 545 (1929).
This Court has already dismissed defendants' arguments regarding
"improvements" or "maintenance" of the easement, finding as a matter of law:

o
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11. Defendants have a duty to maintain the easement, but do not
have a right to develop the easement beyond the parameters as
defined in the deed reserving the easement. Defendants specifically
do not have the right to widen the driveway surface on plaintiffs'
property, to reduce the grade of plaintiffs' driveway or to lengthen
plaintiffs'driveway.
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25, Conclusion
of Law 1 II.
The Court has previously found as an established fact that Mortensen's bad
actions are not unusual in this case: "Defendant Mortensen has violated the
Subdivision Ordinance on prior occasions and had thereby harmed innocent
purchasers of property." January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, p. 18, Finding of Fact 150.
This Court has previously found that:
Mortensen knew he had access problems when he purchased this
land from Peplinskis. This Court finds credible William Reynolds'
testimony that Mr. Mortensen approached him to sell an easement or
trade some ground so Mr. Mortensen could get into his land through
the easement over the south part of plaintiffs' land in Government
Lot 2, but Reynolds refused. On re-cross examination of Mr.
Mortensen by his own attorney, Mr. Mortensen first denied asking
Reynolds if he could buy some of his property, but then sort of
admitted William Reynolds could be telling the truth about that
conversation.
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 22, Conclusion
of Law 1 7.
This Court finds all damages previously awarded remain. Specifically, all
aspects of this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 1, 2004, pp. 12-29 are reaffirmed.
Order on Remand, pp. 13-16.
The following factual summary written by Akers is completely accurate, and this Court
agrees with the conclusion that follows the accurate factual recitation:
This Court found that Defendants, without authority or proper permits,
commenced excavation work on plaintiffs' real property. Finding No. 44.
Defendants were red tagged by Kootenai County and issued a stop work order.
Finding No. 45. Defendants knew prior to excavation that the scope of the
easement had been at issue between Plaintiffs and Defendants' predecessor in
interest. Finding No. 46. Defendants intentionally ignored Plaintiffs' requests not
to trespass. Finding No. 47. Defendants were cited a second time by Kootenai
County for dumping fill dirt and excavating without a proper site disturbance
permit. Finding No. 49. Defendant Mortensen has violated the subdivision
ordinance on prior occasions and harmed innocent purchasers of property.
Finding No. 50

o5
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Nothing related to the location of the prescriptive easement across Parcel
B changes these findings.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 9.
Defendant Marti Mortensen cites Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 152
P.3d 2 (2006), for the proposition that "When a road easement is developed, the land may be
modified: trees may be cleared, gravel may be laid, and fences may be built." Marti Mortensen's
Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2. Marti Mortensen does not favor the Court with a page
citation, but this is an accurate quote found at 143 Idaho 641, 644, 152 P.3d 2, 4. As noted by
Akers in their briefing, Ransom dealt with an express easement, where this case deals with an
express easement over part of Akers' land, and then a prescriptive easement over a different
portion of Akers' land, and under Idaho law the possible expansion of a prescriptive easement is
much narrower than that allowed under an express easement. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on
Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 2-3, citing Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61 [64-65], 190
P.3d 876, 880, 883-884 (2008). But even as to an express easement, with which one is allowed
to do much more than with a prescriptive easement, the Idaho Supreme Court in Ransom noted
what one cannot do (which actions also describe what happened in the instant case):
While it's not clear from the parties' briefing on appeal or the record, it
appears that problems arose when, in creating the road, Lower pushed dirt onto
other property owned by FaIT West and made cuts onto Farr West's property,
which had nothing to do with the creation or maintenance of the road itself.
Additionally, during construction, Lower blocked off areas where water had
traditionally crossed FaIT West's property, altering the natural flow ofthe water
runoff causing sink holes and sloughs.
143 Idaho 641, 642, 152 P.3d 2,3. And, as the Idaho Supreme Court in Beckstead held:
Recognizing that "[p ]rescription acts as a penalty against a landowner[,]"
this Court has stated prescriptive rights "should be closely scrutinized and limited
by the courts." Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 638, 570 P.2d 870, 875
(1977). The scope of a prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during the
prescriptive period. Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356,359,613 P.2d
367,370 (1980); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638,570 P.2d at 875 (quoting
Bartholomew v. Staheli, 86 Cal.App.2d 844, 195 P.2d 824,829 (1948)). The
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holder ofthe prescriptive easement "may not use it to impose a substantial
increase or change of burden on the servient tenement." Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638,
570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew, 195 P.2d at 829).
As to use, the Prices assert that during the prescriptive period there was no
continuous use of the various means of transportation named in the Becksteads'
complaint: trucks, campers, livestock trailers, four-wheelers, pedestrian traffic,
and heavy equipment needed to improve the Beckstead Property. In the past, this
Court has not required the scope of the easement specify particular vehicles or
types of vehicles that can use the easement; rather, we have characterized
easement uses as residential, agricultural, or recreational. See Brown, 140
Idaho at 443-44,95 P.3d at 61-62. Thus, the scope of the easement should
include any reasonable means of transportation for the character of use made
during the prescriptive period.
146 Idaho 57, 64-65, 190 P.3d 876, 880, 883-84. (bold added). The first paragraph ofthis quote
from Beckstead shows the restrictive nature of a prescriptive easement, which is all Mortensens
and Whites have across the western portion of Akers' land, the terminus end ofthe easement. At
most, the historical use of this prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers' land
was for very occasional use for agricultural purposes only. 'The scope ofa prescriptive easement
is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive period." Id. But Mortensens and Whites
completely ignored this. Mortensens and Whites knew that, at best, all they had was a
prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers' land. Mortensens and Whites knew
there was a serious question as to their ability to access their land across Akers' land because that
is the sale reason why Mortensen was able to buy this land so cheap. January 2, 2003, Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~ 31; p. 17, ~ 48; p. 22, ~ 7. Vernon Mortensen
testified proudly at trial that he had purchased the first 160 acres for $250,000, at "a fraction of
the price", due to the existence ofthe prior lawsuit Akers had with Peplinskis, from whom
Mortensens bought this property. Id., p. 12, ~ 31. After the sale to Moretensens the title
company that wrote the policy in Mortensens' favor wanted to obtain an express easement from
Akers. Id. They were unable to do so. Id. Mortensen then sued his own title company. Id.,

~

33. Mortensens and Whites were all developers. Id., p. 14, ~ 34. Without any required permits,
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Mortensens and Whites excavated to lower the percentage of grade and tried to widen this
easement across Akers' land to sixty feet, which historically had only been 12.5 feet wide. Id., p.
15, ~ 44; p. 18, ~ 53; p. 16, ~ 10. "The holder ofthe prescriptive easement "may not use it to
impose a substantial increase or change of burden on the servient tenement.'" 146 Idaho 57, 65,
190 P.3d 876, 880, 884. That is exactly what Mortensens and Whites tried to do. Unable to get
access legitimately, the Mortensens and Whites bullied their way against Akers to create their
own access. Their reason for doing this was to subdivide at least the 80 acres which Whites
bought from Mortensens into sixteen five-acre parcels. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, ~ 34.
This returns us back to the bolded portion of Beckstead, quoted above:
In the past this Court has not required the scope of the easement specify particular
vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the easement; rather, we have
characterized easement uses as residential, agricultural, or recreational.
146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876,880,884. (bold added). Mortensens and Whites attempted to
take what was at best occasional, seasonal, agricultural use, and attempted to turn it into fulltime, year-round, fairly high volume, residential use. Since Akers were unwilling to simply
"give" Mortensens an easement over the western portion oftheir land, Mortensens and Whites
knew they would have to litigate any prescriptive easement However, instead of choosing the
civil alternative of filing a civil lawsuit, Mortensens and Whites chose to simply start excavating
and widening. Instead of acting civilly, Mortensens and Whites chose to threaten and intimidate
the Akers. And, at least for Mortensens, according to the testimony of Scott Rasor, whom this
Court found to be credible, this was consistent with prior conduct. Vernon Mortensen had
violated the subdivision ordinances on prior occasions and doing so had harmed innocent
purchasers of other properties. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, p. 18, ~ 50; Tr. Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 540, L. 20; April 1,2004, Memorandum
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Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23,

~

31.

This Court found that after the present lawsuit began, Mortensen purchased sixty acres near
Akers' property, subdivided that property into five-acre parcels, sold four parcels and then found
himself in a legal dispute with the adjoining landowner regarding the legality of the subdivision
and access to that subdivision. April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court wrote: "The easementroad dispute regarding access to these 60 acres is substantially similar to the dispute in the
present case in that Mortensen is attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell
parcels of land to innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers with potential
disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District and the Highway District.
Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7." ld. The Court found:
Mortensen has utilized substantially the same development strategy in the past. If
not deterred, he is likely to engage in this conduct in the future. Scott Rasor
testified about Mortensen's prior land development projects that harmed innocent
Idaho land owners. Tr. Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 540, L. 20. Mortensen admitted
he is now developing and selling forty acres near the subject property in spite of
another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L.
24 - p. 1426, L. 7. Even Mortensen's own expert Kiebert testified that he has
testified in litigation on Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he
has worked on subdivision projects for Mortensen before and that some ofthese
projects the parcels Mortensen has sold have not been surveyed, that Mortensen
works too fast in selling lots before they are surveyed, and that he has told
Mortensen that it is not prudent to do that.

April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, p. 24, ~ 31. Thus, this is not Vernon Mortensen's first time to either the
litigation rodeo, or the bullying rodeo. Mortensens and Whites knew that ifthey litigated the
issue of the prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers' land, the best they would
have is a 12.5-foot-wide agricultural easement, and they needed much more than that to
accomplish their subdivision. Bullying was the only option that might prove to be successful. It

o
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was a calculated risk by Mortensens and Whites, and had Akers not filed this lawsuit, no doubt it
would have been successful.
This Court agrees with Akers:
Before Defendant began digging and using heavy equipment across the easement,
the road was a well maintained road. After Defendants "maintenance" efforts, the
road was a disaster and Akers['] property was flooding due to the change in
drainage patters caused by Defendants' excavation.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 3-4.
Without any support for its argument, Marti Mortensen makes the claim that "allowed use
of the determined easement would still have caused water diversion." Marti Mortensen's
Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2. From a factual standpoint, this speculative claim finds
absolutely no support in the record. From a legal standpoint, Marti Mortensen is wrong. The
quote from Ransom immediately above demonstrates that the owner ofthe dominant estate
cannot alter the easement so as to cause a water trespass on the servient estate. 143 Idaho 641,
642, 152 P.3d 2,3. Beckstead tells us the owner of the dominant estate has " ... a duty to protect
the easement so as not to create an additional burden on the servient estate or an interference that
would damage the land, such as flooding ofthe servient estate. 146 Idaho 57, 66-67, 190 P.3d
876,880,885-86, citing Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 455, 95 P.3d 69, 73 (2004).
Defendants exceeded the scope of their easement on the terminus end. Accordingly,
plaintiffs remain entitled to treble damages for "Defendant's willful trespass ... pursuant to I.C.
§6-202." January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 26, ~ 22. Marti
Mortensen claims that "the record does not show that notices were posted along the boundary of
the easements required [by I.e. § 6-202]." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 3.

Whites make the same argument. Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 3-4. There is no
requirement under I.C. § 6-202 that the "No Trespassing" signs be posted along the boundary of
the prescriptive easement or that they be posted where the damage occurred. In Akers' response
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brief, Akers note several points in the record showing the location of "No Trespassing" signs in
various locations: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 13; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 84 and 176;
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 8). Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand
Re: Damages, p. 8. This Court has already decided the issue more than eight years ago:
36. Plaintiffs revoked defendants' permission to use the curved approach and the
driveway west of Government Lot 2 in January 2002. Plaintiffs posted same with "No
Trespassing" signs within 660 feet of each other.
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, Finding of Fact ~ 36;
see also p. 25, Conclusion of Law , ~ 13. (bold added). That finding has never changed in the
intervening eight years. Akers are correct that the language of I.C. § 6-202 simply requires that
the "No Trespassing" signs be located 600' apart in order to allow for an award of damages.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re:
Damages, pp. 3-4.
Marti Mortensen claims: "In this case the Court must determine that the actions giving
rise to punitive damages occurred outside of the now-determined easement." Marti Mortensen's
Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. No citation to the record is given by Mortensen for this claim.
There is no support in the record for that bald assertion. None ofthe "acts" of Mortensens and
Whites changed as a result ofthis slightly different location ofthe easement at the terminus end.
In fact, most of the "acts" of Mortensens and Whites took place at the triangle end of the
easement. Thus, Akers remain entitled to punitive damages for Mortensens' and Whites'
outrageous conduct.
Whites argue that since the easement rights were uncertain in this case, the Idaho
Supreme Court has stated punitive damages are not appropriate, citing R. T Nahas Co. v. Hulet,
114 Idaho [23, 29, 752 P.2d 625, 631 (Ct.App. 1988)]. Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 5-6.
First of all, this was an Idaho Court of Appeals decision, not an Idaho Supreme Court decision.
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Second, as noted by Akers, what the Idaho Court of Appeals actually wrote was:
Although we do not suggest that interference with unadjudicated rights never can
satisfy the criteria for punitive damages, we hold that the record in this case falls
short of showing the extreme circumstances required for such an award.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re:
Damages, pp. 5-6, citing R. T Nahas, 114 Idaho 23, 29, 752 P.2d 625, 631. Whites' counsel has
wholly overstated the holding in R. T Nahas Co. v. Hulet.
While Akers did not cite to the record in making the following recapitulation, the
bracketed citations added by the Court show everything Akers claim is accurate:
Defendants did much more than rely on their easement rights. They disregarded a
court injunction. [Imposed May 8, 2002, made permanent by stipulation on June
5, 2002, and order of the Court June 14, 2002; April 1, 2004, Memorandum
Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, p. 19, ~ 13: "Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on Plaintiffs' real
property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at night, behind Plaintiffs' home,
in an effort to intimidate and frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten
Sherrie Akers"] They disregarded county ordinances. [January 2, 2003, Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, ~ 39] There were threats of
physical violence against Plaintiffs. [April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and
Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20, ~
18; p. 21, ~ ~ 19,20,21,22; p. 22, ~~ 27,28,29] There were acts where
Defendants tried to incite Plaintiffs to engage in physical violence. [Id] There
was purposeful damage to property not necessitated by maintenance of the
easement. [January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p.
15, ~~ 40-45, p. 16, ~ 47] There was an attempt to manipulate the county
prosecutor. [April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20, ~ 17: Defendant
Mortensen misrepresented facts to the Kootenai County prosecutor (making false
claims of material facts) in an effort to persuade the prosecutor to prosecute
Plaintiff Dennis Akers."] There was intimidation of witnesses during triaL [April
1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 21, ~ 24]
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re:
Damages, pp. 6. Vemon Mortensen and David White behaved incredibly boorishly, arrogantly,
and intimidated the Akers and others. This Court found that even at trial:
The Court has personally observed defendant David White while on the stand
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testifying, raising his voice and addressing Plaintiffs in anger and has heard
testimony that he has yelled at Plaintiffs during recesses in the trial while
Plaintiffs were waiting in the hallway in direct contravention of this Court's order
prohibiting the parties from speaking with each other during the trial proceedings.
The Court has watched defendant Vernon Mortensen testify, and has noticed time
and time again, his inability to answer a question put to him, either by the
opposing attorney or his own attorney. At trial on December 15,2004, Mortensen
was asked whether he sold four properties knowing there was an ongoing dispute
over access. Mortensen went on a rant, claiming this was malicious prosecution,
that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed, and that he would not be intimidated by
any of this. He claimed plaintiffs' counsel was trying to extort money from an
insurance company and using us (he and White) as pawns to do so.
April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, p. 22, '26.
In spite of all that, Whites now claim that: "Early in the trial of this case the Court
observed that if an easement existed to White's property, 'there's not going to be any punitive
damages.' (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 364-365)" Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 6. That argument has
no merit. A review of that entire passage shows that it was simply the Court suggesting again to
Akers' counsel, that the issue of the easement and the issue of damages be bifurcated, because
the nature and extent of the easement has relevance to the issue of damages. Tr. Vol. I, p. 364, L.
19 - p. 365, L. 17. That same logic (that the location ofthe easement be decided before the
damage issues) was used by this Court in this most recent round oflitigation following remand
from the Idaho Supreme Court.
Regarding the damages for the emotional distress of Sherrie Akers, Whites argue:
The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation
with White or Whites' employee in each instance in which she claims the incident
caused her distress. One who intentionally creates a circumstance in which she
finds herself emotionally distressed by asserting an unlawful right cannot justly
contend that the person who is engaged in the lawful exercise of their rights has
negligently cause them emotional distress. In this case, Sherrie Akers caused the
circumstances that create any distress that she may have suffered when she chose
to obstruct a vehicle operating on the express easement and when she chose to
testify falsely regarding the location of the easement road at the top of the hill.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 4-5. Whites cite no legal authority for their claim that if
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you bring yourself "into a confrontation", that you are then precluded from emotional distress
damages. Whites cite to no factual basis in the record for this claim. Whites' claim that "The
record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites'
employee in each instance in which she claims the incident cause her distress" is, quite simply,
ludicrous. The Court has reviewed its various findings of fact, and can find no finding that
indicates Sherrie Akers was the aggressor or brought herself into the confrontation. In fact, it is
just the opposite. This Court has found that: "Defendants were confrontational with plaintiff
Sherrie Akers on occasions when she sought to prevent their trespass on her property" (April 4,
2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, p. 18, ~ 3); "Mr. White bullied, threatened and intimidated Sherrie Akers as she tried
to assist the police in their investigation of an occasion when Defendants trespassed" (Id.,

~

4);

D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator purposely ran its dump truck toward Sherrie Akers and
within two feet of her body, acting as though he were going to run over Sherrie Akers on an
occasion when Defendants trespassed" (Id.,

~

5); "During the same time period as above, D.L.

White Construction, Inc.' s operator threatened to run Sherrie Akers off her property and
threatened to dig a three-foot ditch across Plaintiffs' driveway to impede her use of the driveway"
(Id.,

~

6); "Defendants actually impeded Sherrie Akers's access to her work (she is a cardiac

nurse at a Spokane hospital) by intentionally dumping dirt across Plaintiffs' driveway, which
served no purpose other than to block Plaintiffs' ingress and egress" (Id.,

~

7). This Court found:

Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's permanent
injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on Plaintiffs' real property) by
trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to
intimidate and frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers.
Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the last trial days,
David White was found offthe easement, clearly on Akers' land, thirty feet from
their house, that Dennis Akers ran after him and saw White get in his truck, and
when Akers told him "I've caught you again trespassing", white responded "Go to
hell." This is in violation of this Court's prior orders. This Court finds not
credible David White's testimony that he was not on the Akers['] property or the
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road on that night, that instead he was up on the other side of the barn on his own
property. Dennis Akers testified that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop
Road and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. Dennis Akers
testified that several times during this protracted trial, there were outbursts in the
hallway by White and Mortensen. White did not rebut this, nor did Mortensen."

Id., pp. 19-20, ~ 13. Whites' counsel to write: "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers
brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in
which she claims the incident caused her distress", is so far from the truth it amounts to
sanctionable conduct under I.R.c.P. II(a)(l), against Whites' attorney Robert Covington.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)( 1) reads in pertinent part: "The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading,
motion or other paper; that to the best ofthe signer's knowledge, information, and belief
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation." It is simply false for Whites' attorney
to write "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation with
White or Whites' employee in each instance in which she claims the incident caused her
distress." Unfortunately, as shown in the next few paragraphs of this opinion, there is
more sanctionable conduct by Whites' attorney.
Whites attorney also writes:
... Akers established for this series of events a standard of conduct that was
equally or more as problematic as that of White. In a fist fight as in this case,
punitive damages are not appropriate against one party engaged in conduct similar
to that of his antagonist.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. While the second sentence of that passage is simply
argument (albeit without any merit), the first sentence is an assertion offact, which is not "well
grounded in fact". For the same reasons found in the record discussed immediately above, this
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Court finds this statement of fact by Whites' counsel is completely false, unsupported by any
legal argument, and sanctionable.
Whites' attorney provided no citation to the record nor did he cite to any portion of any of
the Court's previous findings to support Whites' claim that: "she [Sherrie Akers] chose to testify
falsely regarding the location of the easement road at the top of the hill." Likewise, Whites'
attorney failed to provide any explanation as to how, even if that were accurate that she testified
falsely (it isn't), how that false testimony could even remotely relate to the emotional distress
issue. This Court found" ... Sherrie Akers to be a very credible witness." Memorandum
Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 30.
Counsel for Akers argues: "It is disappointing and disturbing to see White's counsel advance
this unwarranted attack on Mrs. Akers." Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites
"Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 5. It is an unwarranted attack. It is also a
completely unsubstantiated attack. It is additional sanctionable conduct under LR.C.P. 11(a)(1),
against Whites' attorney Robert Covington.
Whites attorney made the following shocking argument:
The Court improperly awarded Akers $1939 for damage to his truck for an
occurrence that took place within the easement area. Defendants were engaged in
lawful use of their easement when Akers obstructed passage of a tracked vehicle
driven by Mortensen. Defendants were the owners of the dominant estate and
Akers was not permitted to use the easement in a manner that interfered with use
of the easement by owners of the dominant estate. Akers is not entitled to recover
damages that he caused by obstructing lawful use of the easement. This
component should not be allowed to Akers.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. No legal citation is given for this argument. The only
source for this argument that this Court can think of is "Might makes right." What difference
does it make if Akers were parked in the easement, on Millsap Road or the mall parking lot?
You don't run into a truck with a bulldozer, intentionally. Apparently, in the mind of Whites'
attorney, if you have a bulldozer, you can simply move someone else's pickup out of the way if
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you don't like where it is parked. Whether this took place on the easement is not relevant.
Whether this took place on the portion that is an express easement or this took place on the
portion that is an easement by prescription is not relevant. Whites' novel argument finds no
support in the law, within the facts of this case or within a civilized society. While the Court can
understand Whites' counsel trying to minimize the damage for which his client has already been
found responsible, Whites' attorney's factual and legal claims must conform to I.R.C.P. II(a)(1).
In these instances discussed, they do not.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(l) makes imposition ofa sanction mandatory when
the court finds, as this Court does, that an attorney has violated the rule: "If a pleading, motion
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." The unfounded statements by Whites' counsel that Akers' were the
aggressors, that Sherrie Akers testified falsely, that " ... Sherrie Akers brought herself into a
confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance", are especially disturbing in
light of the fact that Whites' conduct contributed to Sherrie Akers' emotional distress. In making
these unsubstantiated statements, Whites' attorney is simply following suit on his clients' bad
acts which began nine years ago, continued through the trial, and is perpetuated by counsel at
present. The rule serves a separate cognizable purpose, focusing upon discrete pleading abuses
or other types of litigative misconduct within the overall course of a lawsuit. State ofAlaska ex
reI. Sweat v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 927, 782 P.2d 50 (Ct.App. 1989). However, this Court must

consider the attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers, and not acts
which are part ofthe trial itself. Koehn v. Riggins, 126 Idaho 1017, 895 P.2d 1210 (1995). In
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evaluating an attorney's conduct in filing a pleading, the district court must determine whether
the attorney exercised reasonableness under the circumstances and made a proper investigation
upon reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal theories before signing and filing the document.
Chapple v. Madison County Officials, 132 Idaho 26, 80, 967 P.2d 278, 282 (1998). This Court

finds Whites' counsel did not make a proper investigation prior to making these false statements,
nor did he exercise reasonableness in writing those false statements and incorporating them into a
brief which he signed. Largely due to the number ofthese false statements, this Court finds they
were interposed by Whites' counsel for the improper purpose of harassment. The difficulty in
determining the appropriate sanction is these false statements by Whites' attorney caused little, if
any, delay, and caused little, if any, additional work by Akers' attorney. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho
520,835 P.2d 1331 (Ct.App. 1992). Accordingly, the monetary amount ofthe sanction in this
case should not be great. This Court awards to the Akers the sum of $2,000.00, imposed against
Whites' attorney directly, as the sanction for the above described conduct.
Marti Mortensen now claims that punitive damages in this case "duplicates" the treble
damages allowed under the trespass action. Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4.
Marti Mortensen appropriately cites Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321
(1993), where the focus should be on whether the defendant has incurred multiple penalties for
the same wrongful act. Although Marti Mortensen does not direct the Court to a page number in
Bumgarner, she apparently is referring to 124 Idaho 629,642,862 P.2d 321,334. Marti

Mortensen, again without citing to the record, argues: "There are no 'distinct acts' here: all the
trespass damages arise from the same conduct that gives rise to the punitive damages." Marti
Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. That claim is not supported by the record. As
noted by Akers:
Defendants were not punished twice for the same wrongful acts. As in
Bumgarner, this Court in granting this [sic] the punitive damages award focused
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on the Defendants' act of subdividing and road building-undertaken in defiance
of applicable ordinances, which acts were distinct from the damage to the road
and property occasioned by the acts of trespass. The Court also focused on
Defendants' action taken in violation of this Court's permanent injunction issued
in the matter. Further consideration was given to the fact that the Defendants tried
to bring prosecution to manipulate the legal system and intimidate Akers and that
a witness, Bill Reynolds, was threatened to influence his testimony.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 11. This Court agrees.
The amounts of punitive damages awarded in favor of Akers and against Mortensens are
different in amount from those awarded against Whites, to take into account the quality and
quantity of their actions. There are a plethora of other actions by both Whites and Mortensens
which warrant punitive damages, but for which statutory damages under the trespass statute, I.e.
§ 6-202 are wholly inappropriate. The trespass damages were purely compensatory. This Court

held: "The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above damage cause
by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is $17,002.85." April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision
and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 27,

~

2. The

purpose of punitive damages is to deter defendant's misconduct, not to compensate plaintiffs for
their losses. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 642,862 P.2d 321, 334. That purpose was specifically
stated by the Court as follows:
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, and award of punitive damage
against Mortensen is appropriate. The harm caused to Akers was physical,
emotion, and not just economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference to
or reckless disregard of the health or safety of others. Mortensen's conduct was
repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and even after Court order in
this case, this was not an isolated incident. The harm resulted from intentional
malice, trickery or deceit. Finally, compared to Mortensen and whoever is
backing this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially vulnerable
in comparison. Campbell states" ... that a recidivist may be punished more
severely than a first offender [because] repeated misconduct is more reprehensible
than an individual instance of malfeasance ... " Id p. 13, citing BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 558, 577 (1996). The amount of punitive
damages likely to deter Defendant Mortensens from engaging in like conduct in
the future is $150,000.00.
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Whites from
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engaging in like conduct in the future is $30,000.00.
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, p. 28,

~~

5,6. Whites simply did not have the track record of similar conduct

in other real estate transactions. Whites were not nearly so brazen in their attitude before the
Court, as compared to Mortensens. Whites seemed to be the follower, with Mortensens the
leader. Thus, the difference in the amount of the punitive damages awards against each couple.
Marti Mortensen claims that "large" (later referred to by Marti Mortensen as "huge")
punitive damage awards are not appropriate in cases such as this because defendants are unlikely
to perform similarly in the future, citing Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 688-89, 496 P.2d 682
(1972). Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, pp. 5-6. First of all, Mortensens need
deterrence, because, as stated above, this has been Vernon Mortensen's modus operandi. There
is no indication in the record that Mortensen will change his conduct in the future absent a
punitive damage award. Indeed, there is every indication in the record that the imposition of
punitive damages in this case is simply a calculated cost of doing business factored in with all of
Mortensens' land acquisitions. Second, Cox states: " ... the social purpose served by exemplary
damages is the deterrence of the defendant and others from like conduct." 94 Idaho 683, 689, 496
P .2d 682, 688. Thus, it is not just the conduct of Whites and Mortensens in this case that is
entirely at issue. It is also the conduct of those similarly situated (buying land cheap because it
has access problems), and similarly disposed (who, subsequently to finding themselves unable to
buy an easement, proceed to bully and intimidate) which must be deterred. Third, the conduct of
Mortensens and Whites in this case are much different than the conduct of Stolworthy in Cox.
Stolworthy bulldozed part of Cox' fence down and Stolworthy ran his sheep across Cox' land on
one occasion. 94 Idaho 683, 684, 496 P.2d 682, 683. Stolworthy at all times admitted the
trespass but denied any malice. The jury imposed $5,000 in punitive damages; the district court
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upheld that award and refused a motion to reduce such. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the
award of punitive damages but felt the district court should have reduced that $5,000 award
down to $2,000 and remanded back to the district court for such result. 94 Idaho 683, 692, 496
P.2d 682,691.

This Court agrees with Akers' argument: "As outlined above, there were

numerous acts in the present case that far exceeded what appeared to be the relatively civil
disagreement that was analyzed in Cox." Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re:
Damages, p. 12. The Idaho Supreme Court in Cox discussed the types of cases in which punitive
damage awards are typically found:
A pattern of factual situations may be discerned in the past cases decided
by this Court which appears to be closely related to the size of the exemplary
damage awards allowed on appeal. We believe the pattern is quite significant and
can be usefully described for the guidance of the trial courts and will help
determine the case at bar. The pattern seems to encompass at least three
categories of situations.
The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business schemes
operated for profit and often victimizing numerous members of the public aside
from the plaintiff. Clearly in such cases the award of exemplary damages should
aim at making the cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomicaL Thus,
for example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant was one
victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of exemplary damages served
to remove the profit factor from the whole scheme. See, Comment, 'Automobile
Dealership Fraud: Punitive Damages,' 7 Idaho L.R. 117 (1970). Cf. Barth v. B. F.
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 CaLApp.2d 228, 71 CaLRptr. 306 (1968).
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v. Denison
decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions endangered the physical wellbeing and health of the several hundred citizens of the town. Where actual
physical harm is threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the
situation rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the plaintiffs
physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive damages award finds
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of
the injury sustained.
The case at bar fits neither ofthese categories. However, a third category
of cases does seem applicable. These cases typically involve non-violent but
nevertheless serious disputes between two parties. Often the dispute centers on an
interest in real or personal property or an interference with a business operation.
Here the action concerned an act of trespass to the plaintiffs' real property but no
lives were endangered and there was no indication the defendant made a practice
of acting in this fashion.
In such situations in the past this Court has not looked favorably on large
punitive damage awards for the apparent reason that the nature of the dispute did
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not warrant a severe penalty to the wrongdoer-an award out of proportion both to
the activity complained of and the damages incurred.
Idaho 683, 691,496 P.2d 682, 690. It is only that third situation in which the Idaho Supreme
Court cautioned the amount of punitive damages should bear some relationship with the amount
of actual damages incurred. Two facts which separate the present case from this third category
must be noted. In that third category, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "these cases typically
involve non-violent but nevertheless serious disputes between two parties." Id. No physical
violence was visited upon the bodies of the Akers, but emotional violence, intimidation and
threats by Mortensens and Whites was visited upon them, even throughout the year long court

trial. Second, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that in that third category, " ... there was no
indication the defendant made a practice of acting in this fashion." Id. While there is no proof
that Whites made a practice of acting in this fashion in other cases, there is ample proof that
David White was consistent in his intimidation of the Akers in this case over the course of a
decade now, in this case. There is certainly proof that Mortensens were very consistent in their
intimidation in this case and in other cases prior to and during this litigation. That is the primary
reason the punitive damage awards are in different amounts as between Mortensens and Whites.
To sum up, there are important facts that separate the instant case from the third category
mentioned in Cox, where the punitive damages should bear some relation to actual damages.
That being the case, this Court finds that in the instant case there is a reasonable relation between
punitive damages and actual damages. In the present case, the actual damages incurred were
$17,002.85 costs of repairs for the multiple trespass damages, trebeled to $51,008.55, and
emotional distress damages to Sherrie Akers in the amount of $1 0,000, while the amount of
punitive damages were $30,000 against Whites and $150,000 against Mortensens.
Moreover, this Court finds the present case has earmarks of all three types of cases
discussed in Cox:
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The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business schemes
operated for profit and often victimizing numerous members of the public aside
from the plaintiff. Clearly in such cases the award of exemplary damages should
aim at making the cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomical. Thus,
for example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant was one
victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of exemplary damages served
to remove the profit factor from the whole scheme.

Id. The present case fits this first category, as Mortensens and Whites conduct was essentially
part of a deceptive business scheme. Mortensens (and later Whites) bought Peplinskis' property
for cents on the dollar due to lack of access or at least questionable legal access. After they
bought the property they then tried to buy access. Failing at that attempt to gain legal access,
they began intimidating Akers. While two people (the Akers) were primarily hurt by the conduct
of Mortensens and Whites, others were involved. Law enforcement was brought in on more than
one occasion, county officials were impacted as zoning orders were violated, and witnesses were
intimidated. Whites and Mortensens are guilty of "repetitive antisocial conduct" prior to this
litigation, which necessitated this litigation, and which continued throughout this litigation. And,
at least as to Mortensens, that "repetitive antisocial conduct" has occurred in other litigation and
in other land transactions which did not result in litigation. This repetitive antisocial conduct
must be made "uneconomical" for punitive or exemplary damages to have any of the desired
effect. In this first category, damages should be "large" or "huge" as now complained about by
Marti Mortensen, as the Idaho Supreme Court wrote: "A generous award of exemplary damages
served to remove the profit factor from the whole scheme." Id. This Court finds the amount of
punitive damages awarded against Mortensens was neither "large" nor "huge", and probably not
even "generous" given the protracted nature of Mortensens' conduct, the severity and frequency
of the intimidation. The award of punitive damages against Mortensens was adequate. The same
is true of the award of punitive damages against Whites.
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v. Denison
decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions endangered the physical wellMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND RE: DAMAGES, AND ORDER ON ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE RE: EASMENT LOCATION
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being and health of the several hundred citizens of the town. Where actual
physical harm is threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the
situation rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the plaintiffs
physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive damages award finds
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of
the injury sustained.

Id. The present case fits this second category as well. Mortensens and Whites committed
"repeated actions" which, while not "endanger[ing] the physical well-being and health of the
several hundred citizens of the town", certainly that conduct endangered the physical well-being
and health of Sherrie Akers and, to a lesser extent, Dennis Akers. This is a case "Where actual
physical harm is threatened ... " In these cases " ... a substantial punitive damages award finds
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of the injury
sustained." Id. As mentioned above, the award of punitive damages against Moretensens was
adequate; it was not "substantial". The same is true of the award of punitive damages against
Whites.
Finally, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Cox: "In arriving at such a [punitive
damage] figure it would seem to be reasonable and good social policy in cases such as these to
grant such an amount that a plaintiff would be encouraged to bring the dispute to the courts for
settlement." Id. This Court finds the amount of punitive damages sufficient to do just that, and
no more. The irony is that had Mortensens and Whites brought litigation to have their easement
rights against Akers decided judicially, prior to their excavation and intimidation, this could
have ended peaceably almost a decade ago. However, peaceable litigation would have ended
with the same result, that being Mortensens and Whites having a 12.5-foot easement, the use of
which, on the prescriptive end at least, cannot be expanded upon beyond its historical,
agricultural, intermittent use. That outcome would have been unacceptable to Mortensens and
Whites given the subdivision they desired to create and the financial reward they intended to reap
from that development.
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Finally, Marti Mortensen argues, based on agency law: "Therefore MORTENSENS
should not be responsible for any punitive damages occasioned by WHITE's conduct." Marti
Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 6, citing Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co, 94
Idaho 335, 487 P.2d 929 (1971). (capitalization in original). Whites make the similar argument,
but going the opposite way:
Mortensen correctly drew the Court's attention to the well settled principle
that a principal is liable for punitive damages based upon the acts of its agent only
in circumstances in which the principal participated, or in which the principal
authorized or ratified the agent's conduct. Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co, 94
Idaho 335 (1971). White personally should not be punished for conduct by
Mortensen or the employee of D.L. White Construction, Inc. where the Openshaw
standard is not met.
The record does not indicate that White participated in or authorized
events described in findings of fact from the April 1, 2004 decision numbered
5,67,8,9,11,12,16,20,24. Punitive damages arising from those findings fail the
Openshaw test and should not be awarded.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 7. It is ironic that nine years after this all started, the two
who were specifically found by this Court to be acting in concert, would now apparently like to
divorce themselves from each other's conduct. This protracted litigation was the result of the
bullying tactics of Vernon Mortensen and David White, and now that the litigation appears to be
winding down, those two appear to be turning on each other, distancing each other from the
other, in an obvious attempt to lessen responsibility for damages caused. In doing so they fail to
realize that damages were awarded for past actions. None of Whites and Mortensens current
arguments change those past actions.
This Court has already found: "As set forth in the Conclusions of Law, defendants
Vernon Mortensen and David White at all pertinent times are jointly and severally liable for
compensatory damages to the Akers' property, for the trebled damages, and for Sherrie Akers'
emotional distress." April 4, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 18, Finding ofFact~ 2.n. This was because: " ... this
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Court finds at all pertinent times they were each 'acting in concert' as defined by [I.C. § 6-803],
in that they were 'pursuing a common plan or design which result[ed] in the commission of an
intentional or reckless tortuous act.'" ld., p. 28, Conclusion of Law,

~

4. This Court's decision is

consistent with Openshaw. Regarding punitive damages, this Court awarded an amount of
punitive damage in favor of Akers as against Mortensens which was different than the amount of
punitive damage in favor of Akers as against Whites. These amounts were not joint and several
as between Mortensens and Whites. This Court engaged in careful analysis as to the factual and
legal reasons given for the punitive damage award against the Mortensens and the different
award against the Whites. Seven years ago, this Court found as a matter of fact:
41. Vernon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai County ordinances
and the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value
of his land development projects. In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has
shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent
North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by this conscious disregard for the
law. As such, it is highly likely that he will continue to harm Plaintiffs and other
Idaho landowners unless he is deterred from engage in like conduct in the future.
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 41. Nothing has changed that finding offact. This
Court discussed Mortensen's assets at length. ld., pp. 23-25, Findings of Fact ~~ 31-39. This
Court then found as a matter of law:
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, an award of punitive damage
against Mortensen is appropriate. The harm caused to Akers was physical,
emotional, and not just economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference
to or reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. Mortensen's conduct
was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and even after Court order
in this case, this was not an isolated incident. The harm resulted from intentional
malice, trickery or deceit. Finally compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing
this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially vulnerable in
comparison. Campbell states" ... that a recidivist may be punished more severely
than a first offender [because] repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an
individual instance of malfeasance ... " ld., p. 13, citing BMW ofNorth America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.W. 559, 577 (1996). The amount of punitive damages likely
to deter Defendant Mortensens from engaging in like conduct in the future is
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND RE: DAMAGES,
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$150,000.00.

ld., p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 5. On the other hand, as to the Whites, this Court found as a
matter of fact:
42. David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated and disregarded
Kootenai County ordinances and the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain,
specifically to increase the value of his land development project. In his actions,
testimony and demeanor he has shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for
the law. He has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by
this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly likely that he will
continue to harm Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is deterred from
engaging in like conduct in the future.

ld., p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 42. Nothing has changed that finding of fact. This Court separately
discussed White's assets. ld., p. 40. This Court then found as a matter oflaw:
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Whites
from engaging in like conduct in the future is $30,000.00.

ld., p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 6. Nothing in this Court's prior award, ratified today by this
decision, is inconsistent with Openshaw. In addition to the multitude of occasions where
Mortensens and Whites acted in concert, this Court has also taken into account the situations
where conduct was purely that of Mortensens or purely that of Whites. This Court has assessed
the differences in their financial situation. This Court has assessed Mortensen differently as a
recidivist due to his conduct in other situations and other litigations. All of which result in
differing amounts of punitive damage awards.
Whites claim this Court:
... did not articulate specific reasons for its award of punitive damages against
Whites, stating only "That the amount of punitive damages likely to deter
Defendant Whites from engaging in like conduct in the future is $30,000. The
trial court did not specify a clear and convincing standard of proof for its findings
of fact with respect to Whites or Mortensens, despite the requirements of Idaho
Code Section 6-1601(9).
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 6. First of all, it is not I.e. § 6-1601(9) that sets forth the
"clear and convincing standard of proof'. That standard is articulated in I.C. § 6-1604(1). Ifin
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fact this Court seven years ago failed to mention that standard, it does so now. This Court
specifically finds that Akers have proven, by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive,
fraudulent, malicious and outrageous conduct (they only needed to prove one type of conduct,
they proved them all) by both Mortensens and Whites, under I.C. § 6-1604(1). This Court seven
years ago, as reiterated in this decision, did articulate specific reasons for its award of punitive
damages against Whites. In addition to Finding of Fact ~42 quoted entirely immediately above,
the Court also found:
13. Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's permanent inj unction
(restraining Defendants from trespassing on Plaintiffs' real property) by
trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to
intimidate and frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers.
Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the last trial days,
David White was found off the easement, clearly on Akers' land, thirty feet from
their house, that Dennis Akers ran after him and saw White get in his truck, and
when Akers told him "I've caught you again trespassing", White responded "Go
to hell." This is in violation of the Court's prior orders. This Court finds not
credible David White's testimony that he was not on the Akers property or the
road on that night, that instead he was up on the other side of the barn on his own
property. Dennis Akers testified that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop
Road and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this.
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, pp. 19-20, Finding of Fact ~ 13.
Finally, at oral argument on January 26, 2011, counsel for Whites, in discussing his
clients' financial situation relative to punitive damages, made the claim that his clients have
"been destroyed by this process." Counsel for Marti Mortensen made a similar argument on
January 26, 2011, explaining the fact that Marti Mortensen has divorced Vernon Mortensen in
the intervening eight years since trial, that "Marti Mortensen would tell you she's broke", and
"Jerry Mortensen is in a substantially bad financial condition." First, there is no proof of this
fact. No affidavits were submitted from the Whites. No affidavits were submitted by Marti
Mortensen. Vernon Mortensen filed a 32-page affidavit on January 24, 2011, but it does not
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reference his financial situation. Second, neither counsel for the Whites nor counsel for Marti
Mortensen, nor Vernon Mortensen,pro se, have bothered to cite this Court to any legal authority
that the financial situation of the perpetrator at the time of remand proceedings is relevant as
compared to the perpetrator's financial situation at the time of the wrongful conduct and the trial.
If it is the conduct of the defendant that is to be deterred, it makes no sense to consider that
defendant's financial situation at any time other than proximate to the conduct. It would make no
sense to consider a defendant's financial situation seven years before the bad conduct. Why then,
as advocated by Whites' counsel and Marti Mortensen's counsel, would it make any more sense
to consider a defendant's financial situation seven years after the bad conduct occurred? There is
nothing in Robinson v. State Farm Insurance, 137 Idaho 173,45 P.3d 829 (2002), or IDJI 9.20.5
that would indicate such an absurd result.

III. ORDER.
IT IS ORDERED White's "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement
Location" is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants are liable for all damages as previously set forth
in the Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order filed April 1,2004, pp. 12-29. The prescriptive easement does not expand the express
easement, and the prescriptive easement over Akers' land in Parcel B is in a slightly different
location than defendants' excavated on that parcel. Additionally, defendants placed fill from their
excavation on Akers' Parcel B. Accordingly, even with the finding of an easement by prescription,
all previous findings regarding damages remain.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are the prevailing party as against Mortensens and
Whites, and Akers are entitled to costs as proven at a later hearing.

o
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are entitled to attorney fees as set forth above. The

amount of prior attorney fees are as previously awarded. The amount of attorney fees subsequent to
the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent Remittitur will be determined at a later hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Akers are awarded the sum of $2,000.00, imposed

against Whites' attorney directly, as the sanction for the conduct described above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' attorney prepare a judgment consistent with

the above Opinion and this Order.
Entered this 18th day of March, 2011.
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,lohn T. Mitchell, District Judge
\
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, only became aware of this Court's most recent
ruling yesterday evening. This Court mailed a copy of its ruling to PO Box 1922,
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83847.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen's address on file with this

Court and with all attorneys related to this Court is PO Box 330, Naples, Idaho
83847. Please take note.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, was shocked to learn that while he was arguing
before this Court to correct the record on the day of March 22, 2011, this court
had already issued its opinion four days earlier, March 18, 2011.

Approximately two months prior to this court writing the above Memorandum
Decision and Order, Vernon Jerry Mortensen filled a thirty plus page Motion with
this Court to correct the record. That motion was scheduled to be heard and was
heard the 22

nd

of March 2001. However, prior to hearing Mortensen's Motion to

Correct, this Court had already filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on the
th

18 of March 2011; this Court based its decision on invented facts nonexistent in
the Trial Transcript provided to this court with guile by Attorneys for Akers, James
and Weeks.
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On the 22

nd

of March Attorney Weeks, counsel for Akers, Attorney Deissner,

council for Marti Mortensen as well as Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se appeared
in this court to argue whether or not facts this court claimed to be correct and
Vernon Jerry Mortensen claimed to be in error were in indeed correct or in error
and in need of correction.

At the time of the hearing Judge Mitchell was confused as to what motion had
been scheduled to be heard. He shuffled through papers and then came to the
conclusion that litigants and Attorneys were there to argue Attorney Covington's
motion to include new evidence.

However, Judge Mitchel had filed a

Memorandum Decision four days earlier denying Attorney Covington's motion to
include new evidence.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, then stood up and

informed the Court that the motion scheduled to be heard was Vernon Jerry
Mortensen's motion to correct the record. Judge Mitchell then permitted Vernon
Jerry Mortensen to present his argument.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se informed this court that he would keep his
presentation short to allow Attorney Weeks, Council for Akers, to respond in
length.
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, explained that the Court's claim that Defendant,
Vernon Jerry Mortensen was a repeat offender; that he had been sued on
previous occasions prior to the Akers litigation regarding matters of easement and
access was incorrect; that there was no evidence in the Trial transcript or Court
record to indicate he had ever been sued.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen then requested Attorney Weeks, council, for Akers
provide this Court with case numbers, names of litigants, the nature of the claims
and the outcomes when it was her time to address the court knowing she could
not because they did not exist.

When Attorney Weeks addressed this court, she simply told Judge Mitchel that
she knew he had had a long day and was tired; she didn't want to trouble him.

If Susan Weeks indeed had facts to support the above claim, she could have
provided at least some in less than a minute or two; ilWell here is a case number,
here are some names of litigants, the nature of the case was this, and the
outcome was this"; and if Attorney Weeks really didn't want to trouble Judge
Mitchell's because he was tired, she could have said she would provide him with
those facts the following day in an email.
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, also told the Court that its conclusion that
Vernon Jerry Mortensen had been subdividing 40 or 60 acres illegally while the
Akers, Mortensen, White litigation was in process was not true nor were this
Court's additional claims true that Defendant Vernon Jerry Mortensen had been
shut down by the county for violations of county codes and innocent buyers were
being harmed because of easement issues.

Again Vernon Jerry Mortensen requested that Attorney Susan Weeks provide this
court with facts to support the above claims; that she simply provide case
numbers of law suits, records of violations, names of county officials who had
shut Mortensen down; names of witnesses you testified regarding the above
matters; what they said and any other information to support the above claims of
this Court. Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, knew she couldn't. They don't exist.

When it was Susan Weeks turn to speak she simply didn't want to trouble Judge
Mitchell because he had had a long day and was tired.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen asked Susan Weeks to provide a single fact to support
Akers' claims; that Vernon Jerry Mortensen was planning a housing development
or ever had, that he had ever excavated on Akers property, or that he had tried to
increase the width of the road to sixty feet or that he and David White were
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partners and who had testified did they say regarding the above claims? Vernon
Jerry knew she couldn't; that information didn't exist in the Trial transcript and
Vernon Jerry Mortensen's testimony refuted all the above claims.

Susan Weeks simply stated she didn't want to trouble Judge Mitchell; he was
tired.

Akers' Attorney Susan Weeks did however make a short statement agreeing that
Judge Mitchell had made an error; he had confused Mortensen for White and
even the years and in essence, contrary to Judge Mitchells, findings of facts, a
meeting between Akers and Mortensen prior to Mortensen purchasing the
Peplinskis property never occurred thus it was impossible for Akers to have given
Mortensen permission to use any part of the access road at a time when the
supposed meeting never occurred and in fact Mortensen, contrary to Judge
Mitchells belief, had told the court the truth that Mortensen and Dennis Akers
had never met until many months after Mortensen had purchased the Peplinskis
property and that meeting occurred when Mortensen went to Akers house and
asked him to remove his truck that was blocking Mortensen's access to his
property.
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Fortunately, Mortensen was able to cite from the record Dennis Akers' testimony
regarding Mortensen's and Aker's first meeting.

Dennis Akers' testimony

supported Mortensen's.

Judge Mitchell's refusal to believe Mortensen's testimony even when supported
by Dennis Akers' testimony, demonstrates the degree of Judge Mitchell's distain
and bias towards Mortensen.

The facts on which Judge Mitchell determined Vernon Jerry Mortensen's use of
the access road including the curved portion was by permission are nonexistent.

This Court has deprived Vernon Jerry Mortensen's right use of the curved portion
of his access road relying on nonexistent facts. Yes Susan Weeks assured Judge
Mitchell that all was well, not to worry, his mistake and all its implications were
minor; of no significance.

In the final paragraph of this court's ruling filed March 18, 2011, two days before
the motion to correct errors was filed, this Court states. "As Akers point out, the
road did not exist into Parcel B back in 1966. Plaintiffs Reply Brief on Remand, pp.
3-4. Instead, the road went on to Reynolds' land in 1966, and Reynolds is not a
party of to this litigation."
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However, Bill Reynolds testified that the access road never entered his land; and
of what relevance was Akers' testimony since Akers hadn't purchased their
property until 1980; the property over which Peplinskis' access road ran. How did
Akers know how things were in 1966?

Akers lied about the location of the Access road. There is no way to soften that
fact.

Because Akers lied and because this Court believed Akers lies in direct
contradiction to the testimony of Reynolds, Richard Peplinskis and aerial photos,
this litigation continues into its tenth year. Yet this Court blames the prolonged
nature of this suit on Defendants bad behavior only supported by Akers'
testimony and Akers are proven liars who intentionally deceived this court. It is
sad that this court continues to praise the Akers as credible witnesses and even
awards them money sanctioned against Whites' attorney Bob Covington for
simply pointing out that Akers had deceived this court with false testimony.

Remove all claims and conclusions supported by Akers testimony and this Court
has no basis of awarding any damages to Akers.

How many times can a Plaintiff blatantly lie before damaging his credibility?
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Akers lies are whoopers and bold considering that they most probably believed
their lies would be challenged by many witnesses, even their own witness, Bill
Reynolds, as well as with aerial photos. Did Akers lies because those lies were
necessary to falsely establish that Peplinskis had no prescriptive easement across
section B, a claim believed by this court resulting in this Court ruling that
Mortensens and Whites were land locked; however the Supreme Court reversed
that decision; after all Peplinskis had used that road for fourteen years prior to
Akers purchasing the land over which the road ran. The rout of the road could be
seen clearly in aerial Photos that corresponded with Richard Peplinski's testimony
which the Supreme Court found credible. This Court ruled that the testimony of
Richard Peplinski was not credible. Again, the fact that this Court believed every
word uttered by Akers and Akers' witnesses but refused to believe Mortensen,
White or their witnesses shows his bias.

In the event an Akers' witness might testify in favor of Mortensens or Whites, that
testimony is ignored by this Court as in the case when Bill Reynolds testified that
the easement road never entered his property.
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Could it be that Akers' attorneys coached Akers as to how to testify falsely in
order to bring Stewart Title to the bargaining table; after all Stewart Title had
insured that easement.

It is peculiar that mediation was order after Akers were awarded a total victory.
Defendants were left without access of any kind and the court granted Akers
punitive damages in an amount to be determined during the damage phase of the
tria I.

Is it possible that Akers and their Attorneys believed Stewart Title would write a
big check and all treachery and this Court's errors would be forgotten?

Is it possible that Akers and their Attorneys are aware of every error this Court
has made, and have even laughed at the ease with which this Court has been
deceived?

Is it moral and just for this this Court and Akers' Attorneys to claim Vernon Jerry
Mortensen is a scoundrel constantly being sued for rouge practices such as
violating county codes and bullying as well as forcing access when no easement
exists.

There is no record in the trial transcript of such happenings or of

Mortensen ever being sued for anything except Akers suing Mortensen claiming
he had no access across their land into his property.
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With the aid of two appeals to the Supreme Court it has been established that
Mortensen always had access to his property and that Akers lied. There is no way
to get around it. If this court believes Akers told the truth then Bill Reynolds needs
to be sanctioned, Richard Peplinskis needs to be sanctioned and the aerial photos
need to be declared fraudulent. Neither Bill Reynolds nor Richard Peplinski had
motives to lie and the Aerial photos speak for themselves.

Information provided to this Court by Akers' Attorneys James and Weeks needs to
be scrutinized as information coming for sources willing to present facts not
contained in the Court record; in other words invented.

Akers Attorneys lied to this Court as Recently as March 22, 2011 when Susan
Weeks told this Court that all the Courts finding were correct except for this
Courts incorrect belief that a meeting occurred when it didn't.

She stated that all other facts Mortensen challenged were correct. She and
Leander James know there are many errors in the Judge Mitchell's various
versions of FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. They provided them
to this Court.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen also pointed out at the hearing to correct the record that
The Supreme Court had determined that the width of the easement was 12.2 feet
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and had supported that decision with Judge Mitchells finding that William Milsap
had testified in an affidavit that the access road was a two track lane while in
reality William Millsap stated that it was his intention that the easement should
be 30 feet wide because of the width of equipment that would be going up that
road and that Ba kers understood that.

Vernon Jerry Mortensen also pointed out that Attorney Reagan, council for
Mortensen and White had tried to get that Affidavit entered into the record
several times because Millsap claimed an easement of 30 feet.

Each effort to

enter that affidavit into evidence was defeated by Attorney James, council for
Akers; with his claim that Millsap's affidavit was hearsay and he could not cross
examine Mr. Milsap because he was deceased.

This Court has wrongfully swayed the Supreme Court in a critical decision by
altering facts from an affidavit that was never entered into evidence; William
Milsaps insisted that it was his intention that the easement be 30 feet wide.
Neither did this court mention Dennis Akers testimony when he claimed that the
easement road was supposed to be 25 feet wide.

A summation of this case as seen by Vernon Jerry Mortensen, Pro se, is as
follows:
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Mortensens sold Whites acreage. Stewart Title insured Whites access but then
contacted Akers inquiring about purchasing a small portion of land on the west
end of the access road.

Akers consulted attorneys and sued Mortensen and White for trespass based on a
belief that Stewart Title would come running with money.

After Whites purchased 80 acres, David White excavated on his property. Dennis
Akers called the county. The county then issued a stop work order and instructed
David White to get a permit before continuing his excavation. David White got
the permit and continued to excavate for several days excavating only on his
property.

Even Dennis Akers testified that the Excavation was on Whites

property.

Had it been on Akers, Akers would have come to the court for an

injunction for White to stop. The law suit had already been filed. This law suit
had nothing to do with David White's excavation. This action was about getting
Stewart Title to write a big check to Akers because Akers believed that Stewart
Title believed Mortensen's and Whites had no legal access.

During the law suit Akers blocked the road on the east end forcing Mortensens
and Whites to drive around a locked gate and other barriers. Mortensen ask the
court for a restraining order. Akers had beaten Mortensen up and dug up the
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area that would have allowed Mortensen and White to get around Akers locked
gate. Akers would not allow Defendants to use the existing road and when
Defendants placed material to the south of the locked gate and other barriers
Akers had placed, Dennis Akers and Bill Reynolds dug it up and dumped it in
Reynolds barn yard. It appears Akers wanted to make a statement to the court
that Mortensen and White were not allowed to use any portion of the road or
access their property. At that time the county issued a stop work order. That
order was directed to all concerned, Mortensens, Whites, Akers and Reynolds. All
had done work in the area. It was Akers and Reynolds who did the excavation.
Mortensen and White simply filled in holes and smoothed the fill.

At the request of Mortensens and Whites there was a hearing, Mortensens and
Whites requested that a restraining order be placed against Akers because he was
refusing to let Defendants use the road and had beaten up Vernon Jerry
Mortensen as well as harassing David White.

This court order that Akers not

block the road and for Mortensens and Whites not to do any work on the road. In
addition Mortensens and Whites were to stay away from each other. It was Akers
who blocked the road and Akers in every instance that approached Mortensens
and Whites. Mortensen never defied this Court's order, an order Mortensen had
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requested, nor did Mortensen ever defy that order and there is no evidence in the
Court transcript that he ever did.

Akers had no right to block the only road leading to Defendants property or to
force Defendants to drive around his blockade and then to dig up the rout
Mortensens and Whites had created in order to get around the blockage. Not
once has this Court mentioned that Akers blocked the road by installing a locked
gate around four months after Akers initiated the law suit. The Supreme Court
actually believes the cause of this lawsuit was Akers Blocking Mortensens' and
Whites' use of the road. Akers filed the lawsuit months before installing the
locked gate.

It appears Akers were telling this Court how to rule with actions

rather than words and seemed fearless of any consequences.

This court responded with an order that Akers not interfere with Defendants
access and that the road be left alone. Mortensen never disobeyed the Court's
order.

This Court bifurcated the trial. First establish easement rights; second, damages.

If Defendants did have easement rights and Akers did lie and interfere with those
rights, then Defendants had damage claims against Akers.
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This court concluded Mortensen and White had no easement rights over the west
end of the access road and granted Plaintiffs punitive damages to be determined
in the damage phase of the trial.

Defendants motioned this Court to reconsider its rUling. This court refused.

Defendants motioned this Court to issue a 54 B certificate to allow an appeal
regarding easement rights. This Court refused. Instead mediation was ordered.

Plaintiffs insisted that Stewart Title be a party at the mediation.

The mediation failed possibly because this court had already taken away
Defendants' easement rights and awarded Akers punitive damages.

Akers'

expectations at mediation were more than likely excessively high.

Without allowing the easement issue to be correctly determined with the aid of
the Supreme Court refusing to issue a 54 B certificate, this court continued on
with the damage phase. This in itself was very biased.

This court then determined and imposed huge damages including punitive
damages against Mortensen basing them on allegations and conclusions
unsupported by fact.
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Defendants appealed this Court's decision and Judge Mitchell was found to be in
error when he concluded, agreeing with Akers false testimony that at the time
Akers purchased their property the access road turned 90 degrees into Reynolds
property without entering Akers' parcel B.

The Supreme Courte determined Defendants did have an easement over the west
end of the road. Testimony and aerial photos support that conclusion.

The Supreme Court remanded this case back to this court to be fixed. Judge
Mitchell fixed it by granting Defendants an easement that did not correspond
with testimony or aerial photos and did not provide viable access.

Defendants appealed again and this time the Supreme Court granted Defendants
a new trial on every issue and a new Judge.

The Supreme Court then provided a substitute decision claiming all parties had
asked for it. Vernon Jerry Mortensen didn't ask for it. Something is askew.

This case was remanded back to this Court with Susan Weeks' assurance that this
Court could and would be objective.

This Court has not addressed the issue of Akers' false testimony and continues to
praise them as credible witnesses and even punished Attorney Covington to the
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tune of $2000 for telling the truth well supported by the record that Akers
knowingly bore false witness in Court. If Akers told the truth then why do
Defendants now have an easement? This court was never willing to allow
Defendants an access of any kind. An easement was imposed on this Court by the
Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court pointed out that Peplinskis had been using the west end of
the access road for 14 years before Akers ever bought the land that contained
that road. That was an obvious fact pointed out to this Court again and again
during trial.

Why didn't this Court see that simple fact and acknowledge its

ramifications and end this non sense nine years ago?

Akers knew the course of the access road at the time they purchased their
property. Aerial Photos demonstrate it and Reynolds testified that the road never
entered his property.

It appears that Akers attorneys provided Akers with the only argument that could

defeat a prescriptive easement on the west end of road even though it was an
absurd argument.

It is baffling how this court bought into Akers' false testimony and still supports it

today.
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It is baffling how this court has built its case against Mortensen with supposed
facts that don't exist in the trial transcript.

It is baffling how Susan Weeks continues to propagate lies that defame Vernon
Jerry Mortensen as she did as recently as March 22

nd
,

2011 when she told the

court that with the slight exception of Akers and Mortensen not meeting as the
Court claimed everything else was correct. She, Leander James and Akers know
all the lies. They created them and fed them to this Court.

To a great extent Leander James' Finding of Fact and Conclusions of law
submitted to this Court without foundation have be accepted blindly by this
Court.

In fact this Court incorporated their many groundless allegations in its

most recent Memorandum Decision and Order before even hearing Vernon Jerry
Mortensens motion to correct the record.

What is being done to the Mortensens is much more egregious than thieves
braking into someone's home and robbing them of a few hundred thousand
dollars, or someone embezzling large sums of money. In this case, attorneys who
are officers of the court have used this Court to unjustly harass, defame, and
cause Mortensens to lose money and time not to mention the stress of the
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ordeal. These abuses cannot be ignored. They have been ever present for ten
years, costly and emotionally draining.

It appears that Akers and their attorneys planned on putting pressure on
Mortensens and Whites so they would put pressure on Stewart Title to write a big
check to stop this unjust litigation and to allow Plaintiffs' and their Attorneys'
tactics to go unnoticed and filed away to never be scrutinized.

It appears Akers weren't satisfied with Stewart Title's offer possibly because this
court had raised the bar by granting Akers a hands' down victory ruling they had
been granted punitive damages in a sum to be established during the damage
phase of the trial and Defendants had no access.

Wouldn't a fair mediation be one conducted prior to one party being proclaimed
the victors in every way with punitive damages and Mortensens and White left
land locked?

It appears that Stewart Title decided it would be less expensive to adjudicate the
prescriptive easement than to deal with Akers.
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It appears that Akers and their attorneys schemed to sue Mortensens and Whites
using this court, providing false testimony, basically that Peplinskis', Mortensens'
and Whites right to access their land was by permission now withdrawn.

Possibly, in minds of Akers, Weeks and James, nothing would come of the false
information they used to baffle this court, after all Stewart Title would put an end
to the nonsense and nothing would come of their misrepresentations and
malicious goals.

It is Vernon Jerry Mortensens belief that this Court has been deceived by Akers
and their Attorneys schemes and has because biased and unable to be objective.

How can this Court allow the defamation of Vernon Jerry Mortensen with
unsupported claims?

How could this court write a forty pages attacking mainly Vernon Jerry Mortensen
before even considering his Motion to correct the record?

PRAYER

Vernon Jerry Mortensen prays for this Court to consider all Akers testimony as
testimony of liars with the objective to deceive this court.
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen prays for this court to consider all allegations of Akers,
Weeks, and James groundless and irrelevant unless supported by specific facts.
How much effort would it take for Susan Weeks and Leander James to provide
any of the below mentioned:

Case numbers of lawsuits, names of litigants, nature of claims, times when he was
ever issued a citation for disobeying country regulation, what where they, who
issued them, what are the names of all these innocent victims, identify when
Vernon Jerry Mortensen disobeyed any Court order, how did he do it?

Why

would Susan Weeks not want to provide these facts unless they just don't exist?

Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, requests this Court to reconsider its entire ruling
based on the fact that Akers have not been truthful and that this courts initial
ruling and sequential rulings were based on lies and unsupported facts and all this
has filtered down to the present time. The initial ruling was a cut and paste of
Leander James' FINDINGS of FACTS and CONCLUSIONS of LAW which for the most
part were never grounded in fact and his claims are untrue. Not only are Akers'
claims untrue, they were refuted by Mortensen and White.

Is it possible that

Akers lied throughout the trial as they did about the location of the access road?
Is it possible that Mortensens and Whites were truthful?
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VERNON J MORTENSEN, PRO

SE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Vernon J. Mortensen certifies:

I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document by the methods indicated below, and addressed to the

following:

Susan P. Weeks

1626 Lincoln Way
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Coeur d' Alene, 10. HAND DELIVERD

Robert Covington

8884 N. Government Way, Stc. A

Hayden Lake 1083835. HAND DELIVERED

Van Camp and Deissner

1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane, WA 99201 U.S. Mail and Electronic Mail

Dated,

LJ/5/ 1/
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Vernon J. Mortensen
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STATE OF lDAHO
County of KOOTENAI
FILED

)
)55

5'- J3 - II

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
D.L. WHITE CONST., INC., DAVID L. WHITE )
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife;
)
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. )
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
)
)
Defrndants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------------------------------

Case No,

CV 2002 222

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
DENYING: 1) DEFENDANT VERNON
MORTENSEN'S "AFFIDAVIT ON MOTION
TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER,
FILED 1-2-3 AND MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER ON
RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL
ISSUES, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DAMAGES AND ORDER
FILED 4-1-04" AND 2) DEFENDANT
VERNON MORTENSEN'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON REMAND RE: DAMAGES.
AND ORDER DENYING WHITE'S MOTION
FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON
EASMENT LOCATION

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

The present issue before this Court is defendant Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and
Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04."
On January 26,2011, this Court held a hearing on damages issues on remand from the
Idaho Supreme Court. On January 24,2011, two days before that scheduled hearing, defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING VERNON MORTENSEN'S MOTIONS

Page I

Vernon Mortensen, pro se, filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", an "Affidavit in Support of Motion to Correct
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and
Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" (all ofthe "argument" by Vernon Mortensen is
found in this 32-page "Affidavit") and a "Motion for Shortening Time" to have that "motion"
heard on January 26,2011. On January 25,2011, plaintiffs filed "Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum
to Defendants Whites' "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: Damages." Later in the day on
January 25,2011, defendants Whites filed "Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway" and
various notices of hearing purporting to schedule a hearing on White's Motion to Admit
Additional Evidence and a hearing on a motion to shorten time on that motion, all for hearing on
January 26, 2011. [Recall from the procedural history reiterated above from this Court's
September 29, 20lO, decision, that on June 30, 2010, Whites had filed a "Motion to Admit
Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", but failed to notice such up for a hearing.] A
"Motion to Shorten Time" was filed by Whites, but no "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence"
has ever been filed by Whites.
At the hearing on January 26,2011, which plaintiffs had scheduled for the hearing on
damages, the Court heard argument on the damage issue as well as the issue of presenting any
other evidence. The Court allowed plaintiffs until February 16,2011, to file a brief on the issue
of presentation of new evidence. Vernon Mortensen requested his motions he had filed two days
before be heard. The Court denied that request, as the Court had yet to read those pleadings
Vemon Mortensen had filed, because counsel for plaintiffs had not yet had the opportunity to
read those pleadings, and because Vernon Mortensen had failed to clear such with the Court's
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Clerk for scheduling purposes.
On February 11,2011, plaintiffs filed "Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues and Additional
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages" (defendant Vernon Mortensen's
motion). On February 15,2011, counsel for defendant Marti Mortensen filed an "Amended
Notice of Hearing: Jerry Mortensen's Motion to Amend Correct Findings" for argument on
March 22, 2011. While it is unusual for one party to notice up for hearing the motion of another
party, such is permitted. On February 16,2011, plaintiffs filed "Post-Hearing Memorandum Re:
White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", and later that day,
Whites filed "Supplemental Citation Re: Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement
Location." On February 18, 2011, defendant Vernon Mortensen, pro se, filed his "Reply to
Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re:
Easement Location."
On March 18, 2011, this Court issued its "Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand
Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement
Location." On March 22,2011, this Court heard oral argument on Vernon Mortensen's "Motion
to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum
Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04." At the conclusion of that
hearing, this Court took under advisement Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04". Then, on AprilS, 2011, Vernon Mortensen filed
his "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and
Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location." Vernon
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Mortensen has yet to schedule a hearing for this motion.
At the March 22,2011, hearing, Vernon Mortensen was openly critical ofthe Court and
counsel for plaintiffs. Mortensen claimed that the Court had found him to be a "repeat offender"
and he disagreed with this Court's findings of credibility. In order to examine these claims, the
substantive portion of this Court's March 18, 2011, "Memorandum Decision and Order on
Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement
Location", must be reviewed:
III. DECISION ON REMAND REGARDING DAMAGES.
This is the fourth time this Court has addressed the damage issue. The
first was in this Court's 27-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
dated January 2, 2003. The decision simply found that defendants had trespassed,
plaintiffs had been damaged, punitive damages were warranted, and the extent of
all damages to be proven at the second phase of trial on damages. January 2,
2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25-27, ~~ 13-28. The
second was in this Court's 29-page Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration, on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order dated April 1,2004. The
third was in this Court's 20-page Order on Remand dated September 6,2006.
Order on Remand, pp. 13-16. In that most recent decision, five years ago, this
Court held: "This Court finds most of defendants' actions of trespass involved
activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement." Order on Remand, p. 13.
Nothing has changed in the past five years in that regard.
This disputed easement has two ends.
One end, the "triangle" area, or the east end, is where this easement begins
at its intersection with Millsap Road. Much of the wrongful activity by
defendants against plaintiffs took place in this "triangle" area. The two Idaho
Supreme Court cases and this remand have nothing to do with the "triangle" area.
Thus, as to this area of the easement, none of the damage issues have changed.
The other end is where, after leaving Millsap Road, traveling west along
plaintiffs' southern boundary, the easement goes up a hill and then at its terminus,
bends into defendants' Mortensens' 260-acre parcel. January 2, 2003, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~31, p. 13, ~32. In 2001, defendants
Whites purchased from Mortensens the northern 80 acres of Moretensens' 260
acre parcel, and that 80 acres was contiguous to the southern boundary of Akers'
land. Id., p. 14, ~34. On remand, this Court determined the location of the
easement at this "terminus" end changed slightly.
The fact that one small portion of the exact location of the easement across
Akers' land changed slightly due to this Court's decision on remand [the
September 29,2010, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order Re: Easement Location] does not change this Court's decision as
to damages suffered by the Akers. It is uncontroverted that White and Mortensen
excavated and deposited soil on plaintiffs' land in the area of this slight change.
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In other words, the claim simply cannot be made that White and Mortensen
performed all their earthwork within the boundaries of the easement. Such a
claim would simply be an impossibility, and not in any way supported by the
evidence before this Court. Also, the work performed by defendants on this
terminus end caused specific damage to plaintiffs caused by defendants' actions in
changing the water drainage of the area. Thus, even if all the earthwork
performed by defendants were within the boundaries of the easement (again, an
impossibility), there was collateral damage caused by defendants' actions.
The Court will examine the arguments made by the parties. But first,
because the location of the prescriptive easement changed only slightly, and this
Court now finds that change has no effect on damages, a review of this Court's
most recent decision on the issue of damages, written five years ago, is in order:
D. DAMAGES.
Defendants argue at length that trespass damages, emotional
distress damages and punitive damages are not appropriate.
(Defendants') Briefon Remand, pp. 9-41. Defendants' argument is
premised on their claim they have done nothing wrong if they have a
25 foot wide easement by prior use or by prescription. As stated
above, this Court finds no easement by necessity and the prescriptive
easement is limited to 12.2 feet. The Idaho Supreme Court wrote:
"[T]he question of whether and to what degree the Defendants'
conduct constituted trespass on the Akers' property is intertwined
with the scope and boundaries of the Appellants' easement." 127
P.3d at 207. This Court finds most of defendants' actions oftrespass
involved activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement.
There were wrongs visited by defendants upon the Akers at
various points along this road. The Idaho Supreme Court decision
did nothing to disturb this district court's decision regarding the
ownership of the eastern portion of the roadway, or the express
easements along the southern portion of Government Lot 2. This
Court now finds no expansion of that express easement by
prescriptive acts of defendants or their predecessors, and the Court
finds no easement by prior use. Thus, the damages visited by
defendants upon Akers along those locations does not change. This
Court now finds the defendants have a 12.2 foot easement along
Akers' Parcel B. However, as stated above, the use that defendants
are allowed is "confined to the right as exercised during the
prescriptive period" and "is limited by the purpose for which it is
acquired and the use to which it is put." Idaho Forest Indus., v.
Hayden Lake Watershed Imporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 515,
733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside
Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 568, 602 P.2d 64,66 (1979). Thus,
defendants had no right to take their 12.2 foot wide easement and
excavate into the earth on Akers' land in their attempt to reduce the
grade of the road to in tum attempt to meet minimum criteria for a
subdivision. This is an express easement for agricultural purposes,
that is now extended in length only, across Akers' Parcel B. It is not
extended in width beyond 12.2 feet, it is not extended in purpose,
and it is not extended in defendants' right to excavate. It is beyond
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING VERNON MORTENSEN'S MOTIONS

Page 5

cavil how defendants could have thought that they had any right to
perform such earthwork, when at best they had to litigate to have any
prescriptive right established across Parcel B.
Defendants argue at length that they did no excavation on
Akers'land. (Defendants') Brief on Remand, pp. 18-19. This
argument is not supported by the record. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 681, Ll. 3-6;
p. 683, L. 13 - p. 684, L. 2; p. 685, L. 5 - p. 684, L. 4. Exhibit 24,
46,47,48,49 and 55. Additionally, defendants' argument that they
did no excavation is inconsistent with defendants' argument that the
excavation they did was pursuant to their right to maintain or
improve their easement (discussed immediately below). Finally, this
issue has already been decided by this Court in Finding of Fact 44:
44. On or about January 3,2002, defendants, without
authority or proper permits, commenced excavation work on
plaintiffs' real property in an attempt to widen plaintiffs'
driveway and lower its grade for access to defendants'
housing development. In doing so, defendants excavated
portions of plaintiffs' real property, dumped dirt and gravel
on plaintiffs' real property, damaged plaintiffs' fence, gate,
lock, tree and other parts of plaintiffs' property.
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p.
15, Finding of Fact ~ 44; p. 25, Conclusion of Law ~1O. Defendants
argue that since they have an easement they have the right to
maintain the easement. (Defendants') Brief on Remand, p. 9.
Defendants make the same claim regarding the right to make
"improvements" on the easement. Id p. 15. Defendants cited no
case law to support this position. There is no case law which allows
what defendants were trying to do: establish a 60-foot-wide right of
way and reduce the grade of a steep hill so they could get approval
for a subdivision over a strip ofland that at best they had
questionable easement rights upon. January 2,2003, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 18, Findings of Fact ~ 51-53.
That conduct is far beyond "maintenance". While such conduct
amounts to "improvements", it is not allowed under the law. Idaho
Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imporvement Dist., 112
Idaho 512,515, 733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); Azteck Limited, Inc. v.
Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 568, 602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979);
Gibbensv. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977);
Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 628, 277
P. 542,545 (1929).
This Court has already dismissed defendants' arguments
regarding "improvements" or "maintenance" of the easement,
finding as a matter of law:
11. Defendants have a duty to maintain the easement, but do
not have a right to develop the easement beyond the
parameters as defined in the deed reserving the easement.
Defendants specifically do not have the right to widen the
driveway surface on plaintiffs' property, to reduce the grade
of plaintiffs' driveway or to lengthen plaintiffs' driveway.
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January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p.
25, Conclusion of Law ~ 11.
The Court has previously found as an established fact that
Mortensen's bad actions are not unusual in this case: "Defendant
Mortensen has violated the Subdivision Ordinance on prior
occasions and had thereby hanned innocent purchasers of property."
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p.
18, Finding of Fact ~ 50.
This Court has previously found that:
Mortensen knew he had access problems when he purchased
this land from Peplinskis. This Court finds credible William
Reynolds' testimony that Mr. Mortensen approached him to
sell an easement or trade some ground so Mr. Mortensen
could get into his land through the easement over the south
part of plaintiffs' land in Government Lot 2, but Reynolds
refused. On re-cross examination of Mr. Mortensen by his
own attorney, Mr. Mortensen first denied asking Reynolds if
he could buy some of his property, but then sort of admitted
William Reynolds could be telling the truth about that
conversation.
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p.
22, Conclusion of Law ~ 7.
This Court finds all damages previously awarded remain.
Specifically, all aspects of this Court's Memorandum Decision and
Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order filed April 1,2004, pp. 12-29 are re-affirmed.
Order on Remand, pp. 13-16.
The following factual summary written by Akers is completely accurate,
and this Court agrees with the conclusion that follows the accurate factual
recitation:
This Court found that Defendants, without authority or
proper permits, commenced excavation work on plaintiffs' real
property. Finding No. 44. Defendants were red tagged by Kootenai
County and issued a stop work order. Finding No. 45. Defendants
knew prior to excavation that the scope of the easement had been at
issue between Plaintiffs and Defendants' predecessor in interest.
Finding No. 46. Defendants intentionally ignored Plaintiffs'
requests not to trespass. Finding No. 47. Defendants were cited a
second time by Kootenai County for dumping fill dirt and
excavating without a proper site disturbance permit. Finding No.
49. Defendant Mortensen has violated the subdivision ordinance on
prior occasions and harmed innocent purchasers of property.
Finding No. 50
Nothing related to the location of the prescriptive easement
across Parcel B changes these findings.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 9.
Defendant Marti Mortensen cites Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143
Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006), for the proposition that "When a road easement is
developed, the land may be modified: trees may be cleared, gravel may be laid,
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and fences may be built." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2.
Marti Mortensen does not favor the Court with a page citation, but this is an
accurate quote found at 143 Idaho 641, 644, 152 P.3d 2, 4. As noted by Akers in
their briefing, Ransom dealt with an express easement, where this case deals with
an express easement over part of Akers' land, and then a prescriptive easement
over a different portion of Akers' land, and under Idaho law the possible
expansion of a prescriptive easement is much narrower than that allowed under an
express easement. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re:
Damages, pp. 2-3, citing Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61 [64-65], 190 P.3d
876, 880, 883-884 (2008). But even as to an express easement, with which one is
allowed to do much more than with a prescriptive easement, the Idaho Supreme
Court in Ransom noted what one cannot do (which actions also describe what
happened in the instant case):
While it's not clear from the parties' briefing on appeal or
the record, it appears that problems arose when, in creating the
road, Lower pushed dirt onto other property owned by Farr West
and made cuts onto Farr West's property, which had nothing to do
with the creation or maintenance of the road itself. Additionally,
during construction, Lower blocked off areas where water had
traditionally crossed Farr West's property, altering the natural flow
of the water runoff causing sink holes and sloughs.
143 Idaho 641, 642, 152 P.3d 2,3. And, as the Idaho Supreme Court in Beckstead
held:
Recognizing that "[p]rescription acts as a penalty against a
landowner[,]" this Court has stated prescriptive rights "should be
closely scrutinized and limited by the courts." Gibbens v.
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 638, 570 P.2d 870, 875 (1977). The
scope of a prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during
the prescriptive period. Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho
356,359,613 P.2d 367, 370 (1980); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638,
570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew v. Staheli, 86 Cal.App.2d
844, 195 P.2d 824, 829 (1948)). The holder of the prescriptive
easement "may not use it to impose a substantial increase or
change of burden on the servient tenement." Gibbens, 98 Idaho at
638,570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew, 195 P.2d at 829).
As to use, the Prices assert that during the prescriptive
period there was no continuous use of the various means of
transportation named in the Becksteads' complaint: trucks,
campers, livestock trailers, four-wheelers, pedestrian traffic, and
heavy equipment needed to improve the Beckstead Property. In the
past, this Court has not required the scope of the easement specifY
particular vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the easement;
rather, we have characterized easement uses as residential,
agricultural, or recreational. See Brown, 140 Idaho at 443-44,
95 P .3d at 61-62. Thus, the scope ofthe easement should include
any reasonable means of transportation for the character of use
made during the prescriptive period.
146 Idaho 57,64-65, 190 P.3d 876, 880, 883-84. (bold added). The first
paragraph of this quote from Beckstead shows the restrictive nature of a
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prescriptive easement, which is all Mortensens and Whites have across the
western portion of Akers' land, the terminus end of the easement. At most, the
historical use of this prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers'
land was for very occasional use for agricultural purposes only. "The scope of a
prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive period." Id.
But Mortensens and Whites completely ignored this. Mortensens and Whites
knew that, at best, all they had was a prescriptive easement across the western
portion of Akers' land. Mortensens and Whites knew there was a serious question
as to their ability to access their land across Akers' land because that is the sale
reason why Mortensen was able to buy this land so cheap. January 2,2003,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~ 31; p. 17, ~ 48; p. 22, ~
7. Vernon Mortensen testified proudly at trial that he had purchased the first 160
acres for $250,000, at "a fraction of the price", due to the existence of the prior
lawsuit Akers had with Peplinskis, from whom Mortensens bought this property.
Id., p. 12, ~ 31. After the sale to Moretensens the title company that wrote the
policy in Mortensens' favor wanted to obtain an express easement from Akers.
Id. They were unable to do so. Id. Mortensen then sued his own title company.
Id., ~ 33. Mortensens and Whites were all developers. Id., p. 14, ~ 34. Without
any required permits, Mortensens and Whites excavated to lower the percentage
of grade and tried to widen this easement across Akers' land to sixty feet, which
historically had only been 12.5 feet wide. Id., p. 15, ~ 44; p. 18, ~ 53; p. 16, ~ 10.
"The holder of the prescriptive easement "may not use it to impose a substantial
increase or change of burden on the servient tenement. '" 146 Idaho 57, 65, 190
P.3d 876, 880, 884. That is exactly what Mortensens and Whites tried to do.
Unable to get access legitimately, the Mortensens and Whites bullied their way
against Akers to create their own access. Their reason for doing this was to
subdivide at least the 80 acres which Whites bought from Mortensens into sixteen
five-acre parcels. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, p. 14, ~ 34.
This returns us back to the bolded portion of Beckstead, quoted above:
In the past this Court has not required the scope of the easement
specify particular vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the
easement; rather, we have characterized easement uses as
residential, agricultural, or recreational.
146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 880, 884. (bold added). Mortensens and Whites
attempted to take what was at best occasional, seasonal, agricultural use, and
attempted to turn it into full-time, year-round, fairly high volume, residential use.
Since Akers were unwilling to simply "give" Mortensens an easement over the
western portion of their land, Mortensens and Whites knew they would have to
litigate any prescriptive easement. However, instead of choosing the civil
alternative of filing a civil lawsuit, Mortensens and Whites chose to simply start
excavating and widening. Instead of acting civilly, Mortensens and Whites chose
to threaten and intimidate the Akers. And, at least for Mortensens, according to
the testimony of Scott Rasor, whom this Court found to be credible, this was
consistent with prior conduct. Vernon Mortensen had violated the subdivision
ordinances on prior occasions and doing so had harmed innocent purchasers of
other properties. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, p. 18, ~ 50; Tr. Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 -po 540, L. 20; Aprill, 2004,
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions
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of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court found that after the present lawsuit
began, Mortensen purchased sixty acres near Akers' property, subdivided that
property into five-acre parcels, sold four parcels and then found himself in a legal
dispute with the adjoining landowner regarding the legality of the subdivision and
access to that subdivision. April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and
Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This
Court wrote: "The easement-road dispute regarding access to these 60 acres is
substantially similar to the dispute in the present case in that Mortensen is
attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell parcels of land to
innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers with potential
disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District and the
Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426,
L. 7." Id The Court found:
Mortensen has utilized substantially the same development strategy
in the past. If not deterred, he is likely to engage in this conduct in
the future. Scott Rasor testified about Mortensen's prior land
development projects that harmed innocent Idaho land owners. Tr.
Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 540, L. 20. Mortensen admitted he is now
developing and selling forty acres near the subject property in spite
of another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr.
Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7. Even Mortensen's own
expert Kiebert testified that he has testified in litigation on
Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he has worked
on subdivision projects for Mortensen before and that some of
these projects the parcels Mortensen has sold have not been
surveyed, that Mortensen works too fast in selling lots before they
are surveyed, and that he has told Mortensen that it is not prudent
to do that.
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 24, ~ 31. Thus, this is not Vernon
Mortensen's first time to either the litigation rodeo, or the bullying rodeo.
Mortensens and Whites knew that if they litigated the issue of the prescriptive
easement across the western portion of Akers' land, the best they would have is a
12.5-foot-wide agricultural easement, and they needed much more than that to
accomplish their subdivision. BUllying was the only option that might prove to be
successful. It was a calculated risk by Mortensens and Whites, and had Akers not
filed this lawsuit, no doubt it would have been successful.
This Court agrees with Akers:
Before Defendant began digging and using heavy equipment across
the easement, the road was a well maintained road. After
Defendants "maintenance" efforts, the road was a disaster and
Akers['] property was flooding due to the change in drainage
patters caused by Defendants' excavation.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 3-4.
Without any support for its argument, Marti Mortensen makes the claim
that "allowed use of the determined easement would still have caused water
diversion." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2. From a factual
standpoint, this speculative claim finds absolutely no support in the record. From
a legal standpoint, Marti Mortensen is wrong. The quote from Ransom
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immediately above demonstrates that the owner of the dominant estate cannot
alter the easement so as to cause a water trespass on the servient estate. 143 Idaho
641,642, 152 P.3d 2, 3. Beckstead tells us the owner of the dominant estate has
" ... a duty to protect the easement so as not to create an additional burden on the
servient estate or an interference that would damage the land, such as flooding of
the servient estate. 146 Idaho 57,66-67,190 P.3d 876,880,885-86, citing
Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 455, 95 P.3d 69, 73 (2004).
Defendants exceeded the scope of their easement on the terminus end.
Accordingly, plaintiffs remain entitled to treble damages for "Defendant's willful
trespass ... pursuant to I.C. §6-202." January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 26, ~ 22. Marti Mortensen claims that "the
record does not show that notices were posted along the boundary of the
easements required [by I.C. § 6-202]." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re:
Damages, p. 3. Whites make the same argument. Whites' Reply Brief on
Remand, pp. 3-4. There is no requirement under I.C. § 6-202 that the "No
Trespassing" signs be posted along the boundary of the prescriptive easement or
that they be posted where the damage occurred. In Akers' response brief, Akers
note several points in the record showing the location of "No Trespassing" signs
in various locations: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 13; Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 84 and 176; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 8). Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 8. This Court has already
decided the issue more than eight years ago:
36. Plaintiffs revoked defendants' permission to use the curved approach
and the driveway west of Government Lot 2 in January 2002. Plaintiffs
posted same with "No Trespassing" signs within 660 feet of each
other.
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, Finding
of Fact ~ 36; see also p. 25, Conclusion of Law , ~ 13. (bold added). That finding
has never changed in the intervening eight years. Akers are correct that the
language of I.C. § 6-202 simply requires that the "No Trespassing" signs be
located 600' apart in order to allow for an award of damages. Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re:
Damages, pp. 3-4.
Marti Mortensen claims: "In this case the Court must determine that the
actions giving rise to punitive damages occurred outside of the now-determined
easement." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. No citation to
the record is given by Mortensen for this claim. There is no support in the record
for that bald assertion. None of the "acts" of Mortensens and Whites changed as a
result of this slightly different location of the easement at the terminus end. In
fact, most of the "acts" of Mortensens and Whites took place at the triangle end of
the easement. Thus, Akers remain entitled to punitive damages for Mortensens'
and Whites' outrageous conduct.
Whites argue that since the easement rights were uncertain in this case, the
Idaho Supreme Court has stated punitive damages are not appropriate, citing R. T
Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 114 Idaho [23,29,752 P.2d 625,631 (Ct.App. 1988)].
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 5-6. First of all, this was an Idaho Court of
Appeals decision, not an Idaho Supreme Court decision. Second, as noted by
Akers, what the Idaho Court of Appeals actually wrote was:
Although we do not suggest that interference with unadjudicated
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rights never can satisfy the criteria for punitive damages, we hold
that the record in this case falls short of showing the extreme
circumstances required for such an award.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second
Remand Re: Damages, pp. 5-6, citing R. T Nahas, 114 Idaho 23, 29, 752 P.2d
625,631. Whites' counsel has wholly overstated the holding in R. T Nahas Co.
v. Hulet.
While Akers did not cite to the record in making the following
recapitulation, the bracketed citations added by the Court show everything Akers
claim is accurate:
Defendants did much more than rely on their easement rights.
They disregarded a court injunction. [Imposed May 8, 2002, made
permanent by stipUlation on June 5, 2002, and order of the Court
June 14, 2002; April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order,
and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p.
19, , 13: "Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on
Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at
night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to intimidate and
frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers"]
They disregarded county ordinances. [January 2,2003, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15,'39] There were
threats of physical violence against Plaintiffs. [April 1, 2004,
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20,'18; p. 21,"19,20,
21,22; p. 22, "27,28,29] There were acts where Defendants
tried to incite Plaintiffs to engage in physical violence. [Id.] There
was purposeful damage to property not necessitated by
maintenance of the easement. [January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, " 40-45, p. 16, , 47] There
was an attempt to manipulate the county prosecutor. [April 1,
2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20, , 17: Defendant
Mortensen misrepresented facts to the Kootenai County prosecutor
(making false claims of material facts) in an effort to persuade the
prosecutor to prosecute Plaintiff Dennis Akers."] There was
intimidation of witnesses during trial. [April 1, 2004,
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 21,'24]
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second
Remand Re: Damages, pp. 6. Vernon Mortensen and David White behaved
incredibly boorishly, arrogantly, and intimidated the Akers and others. This Court
found that even at trial:
The Court has personally observed defendant David White while
on the stand testifying, raising his voice and addressing Plaintiffs
in anger and has heard testimony that he has yelled at Plaintiffs
during recesses in the trial while Plaintiffs were waiting in the
hallway in direct contravention of this Court's order prohibiting the
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parties from speaking with each other during the trial proceedings.
The Court has watched defendant Vernon Mortensen testify, and
has noticed time and time again, his inability to answer a question
put to him, either by the opposing attorney or his own attorney. At
trial on December 15, 2004, Mortensen was asked whether he sold
four properties knowing there was an ongoing dispute over access.
Mortensen went on a rant, claiming this was malicious prosecution,
that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed, and that he would not be
intimidated by any of this. He claimed plaintiffs' counsel was
trying to extort money from an insurance company and using us (he
and White) as pawns to do so.
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 22, ~ 26.
In spite of all that, Whites now claim that: "Early in the trial of this case
the Court observed that if an easement existed to White's property, 'there's not
going to be any punitive damages.' (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 364-365)" Whites' Reply Brief
on Remand, p. 6. That argument has no merit. A review of that entire passage
shows that it was simply the Court suggesting again to Akers' counsel, that the
issue of the easement and the issue of damages be bifurcated, because the nature
and extent of the easement has relevance to the issue of damages. Tr. Vol. I, p.
364, L. 19 - p. 365, L. 17. That same logic (that the location of the easement be
decided before the damage issues) was used by this Court in this most recent
round of litigation following remand from the Idaho Supreme Court.
Regarding the damages for the emotional distress of Sherrie Akers, Whites
argue:
The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a
confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in
which she claims the incident caused her distress. One who
intentionally creates a circumstance in which she finds herself
emotionally distressed by asserting an unlawful right cannot justly
contend that the person who is engaged in the lawful exercise of
their rights has negligently cause them emotional distress. In this
case, Sherrie Akers caused the circumstances that create any
distress that she may have suffered when she chose to obstruct a
vehicle operating on the express easement and when she chose to
testify falsely regarding the location of the easement road at the top
of the hill.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 4-5. Whites cite no legal authority for their
claim that if you bring yourself "into a confrontation", that you are then precluded
from emotional distress damages. Whites cite to no factual basis in the record for
this claim. Whites' claim that "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought
herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in
which she claims the incident cause her distress" is, quite simply, ludicrous. The
Court has reviewed its various findings of fact, and can find no finding that
indicates Sherrie Akers was the aggressor or brought herself into the
confrontation. In fact, it is just the opposite. This Court has found that:
"Defendants were confrontational with plaintiff Sherrie Akers on occasions when
she sought to prevent their trespass on her property" (April 4, 2004, Memorandum
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Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, p. 18, ~ 3); "Mr. White bullied, threatened and intimidated Sherrie Akers
as she tried to assist the police in their investigation of an occasion when
Defendants trespassed" (Jd, ~ 4); D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator
purposely ran its dump truck toward Sherrie Akers and within two feet of her
body, acting as though he were going to run over Sherrie Akers on an occasion
when Defendants trespassed" (Jd, ~ 5); "During the same time period as above,
D.L. White Construction, Inc.' s operator threatened to run Sherrie Akers off her
property and threatened to dig a three-foot ditch across Plaintiffs' driveway to
impede her use of the driveway" (Id, ~ 6); "Defendants actually impeded Sherrie
Akers's access to her work (she is a cardiac nurse at a Spokane hospital) by
intentionally dumping dirt across Plaintiffs' driveway, which served no purpose
other than to block Plaintiffs' ingress and egress" (Jd, ~ 7). This Court found:
Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on
Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at
night, behind Plaintiffs' horne, in an effort to intimidate and
frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers.
Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the
last trial days, David White was found off the easement, clearly on
Akers' land, thirty feet from their house, that Dennis Akers ran
after him and saw White get in his truck, and when Akers told him
"I've caught you again trespassing", white responded "Go to hell."
This is in violation of this Court's prior orders. This Court finds
not credible David White's testimony that he was not on the
Akers['] property or the road on that night, that instead he was up
on the other side of the bam on his own property. Dennis Akers
testified that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop Road
and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. Dennis
Akers testified that several times during this protracted trial, there
were outbursts in the hallway by White and Mortensen. White did
not rebut this, nor did Mortensen."
Id, pp. 19-20, ~ 13. Whites' counsel to write: "The record reflects that Sherrie
Akers brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' employee in
each instance in which she claims the incident caused her distress", is so far from
the truth it amounts to sanctionable conduct under LR.C.P. 11(a)(1), against
Whites' attorney Robert Covington. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(1) reads
in pertinent part: "The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation." It is simply false for Whites'
attorney to write "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a
confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in which she
claims the incident caused her distress." Unfortunately, as shown in the next few
paragraphs of this opinion, there is more sanctionable conduct by Whites'
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attorney.
Whites attorney also writes:
... Akers established for this series of events a standard of conduct
that was equally or more as problematic as that of White. In a fist
fight as in this case, punitive damages are not appropriate against
one party engaged in conduct similar to that of his antagonist.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. While the second sentence of that passage
is simply argument (albeit without any merit), the first sentence is an assertion of
fact, which is not "well grounded in fact". For the same reasons found in the
record discussed immediately above, this Court finds this statement of fact by
Whites' counsel is completely false, unsupported by any legal argument, and
sanctionable.
Whites' attorney provided no citation to the record nor did he cite to any
portion of any of the Court's previous findings to support Whites' claim that: "she
[Sherrie Akers] chose to testify falsely regarding the location of the easement road
at the top of the hill." Likewise, Whites' attorney failed to provide any
explanation as to how, even if that were accurate that she testified falsely (it isn't),
how that false testimony could even remotely relate to the emotional distress
issue. This Court found" ... Sherrie Akers to be a very credible witness."
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, conclusions
of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 30. Counsel for Akers argues: "It is disappointing and
disturbing to see White's counsel advance this unwarranted attack on Mrs.
Akers." Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on
Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 5. It is an unwarranted attack. It is also a
completely unsubstantiated attack. It is additional sanctionable conduct under
LR.C.P. 11(a)(1), against Whites' attorney Robert Covington.
Whites attorney made the following shocking argument:
The Court improperly awarded Akers $1939 for damage to
his truck for an occurrence that took place within the easement
area. Defendants were engaged in lawful use of their easement
when Akers obstructed passage of a tracked vehicle driven by
Mortensen. Defendants were the owners of the dominant estate
and Akers was not permitted to use the easement in a manner that
interfered with use of the easement by owners of the dominant
estate. Akers is not entitled to recover damages that he caused by
obstructing lawful use of the easement. This component should not
be allowed to Akers.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. No legal citation is given for this
argument. The only source for this argument that this Court can think of is
"Might makes right." What difference does it make if Akers were parked in the
easement, on Millsap Road or the mall parking lot? You don't run into a truck
with a bulldozer, intentionally. Apparently, in the mind of Whites' attorney, if
you have a bulldozer, you can simply move someone else's pickup out of the way
if you don't like where it is parked. Whether this took place on the easement is
not relevant. Whether this took place on the portion that is an express easement
or this took place on the portion that is an easement by prescription is not relevant.
Whites' novel argument finds no support in the law, within the facts of this case
or within a civilized society. While the Court can understand Whites' counsel
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trying to minimize the damage for which his client has already been found
responsible, Whites' attorney's factual and legal claims must conform to LR.C.P.
11 (a)(l). In these instances discussed, they do not.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(1) makes imposition of a sanction
mandatory when the court finds, as this Court does, that an attorney has violated
the rule: "If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." The unfounded statements by Whites'
counsel that Akers' were the aggressors, that Sherrie Akers testified falsely, that
" ... Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites'
employee in each instance", are especially disturbing in light of the fact that
Whites' conduct contributed to Sherrie Akers' emotional distress. In making
these unsubstantiated statements, Whites' attorney is simply following suit on his
clients' bad acts which began nine years ago, continued through the trial, and is
perpetuated by counsel at present. The rule serves a separate cognizable purpose,
focusing upon discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct
within the overall course of a lawsuit. State ofAlaska ex reI. Sweat v. Hansen,
116 Idaho 927, 782 P.2d 50 (Ct.App. 1989). However, this Court must consider
the attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers, and not
acts which are part of the trial itself. Koehn v. Riggins, 126 Idaho 1017, 895 P.2d
1210 (1995). In evaluating an attorney's conduct in filing a pleading, the district
court must determine whether the attorney exercised reasonableness under the
circumstances and made a proper investigation upon reasonable inquiry into the
facts and legal theories before signing and filing the document. Chapple v.
Madison County Officials, 132 Idaho 26,80,967 P.2d 278, 282 (1998). This
Court finds Whites' counsel did not make a proper investigation prior to making
these false statements, nor did he exercise reasonableness in writing those false
statements and incorporating them into a brief which he signed. Largely due to
the number of these false statements, this Court finds they were interposed by
Whites' counsel for the improper purpose of harassment. The difficulty in
determining the appropriate sanction is these false statements by Whites' attorney
caused little, if any, delay, and caused little, if any, additional work by Akers'
attorney. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 835 P.2d 1331 (Ct.App. 1992).
Accordingly, the monetary amount of the sanction in this case should not be great.
This Court awards to the Akers the sum of $2,000.00, imposed against Whites'
attorney directly, as the sanction for the above described conduct.
Marti Mortensen now claims that punitive damages in this case
"duplicates" the treble damages allowed under the trespass action. Marti
Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. Marti Mortensen appropriately
cites Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (1993), where the
focus should be on whether the defendant has incurred multiple penalties for the
same wrongful act. Although Marti Mortensen does not direct the Court to a page
number in Bumgarner, she apparently is referring to 124 Idaho 629, 642, 862 P.2d
321,334. Marti Mortensen, again without citing to the record, argues: "There are
no 'distinct acts' here: all the trespass damages arise from the same conduct that
gives rise to the punitive damages." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re:
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Damages, p. 4. That claim is not supported by the record. As noted by Akers:
Defendants were not punished twice for the same wrongful
acts. As in Bumgarner, this Court in granting this [sic] the
punitive damages award focused on the Defendants' act of
subdividing and road building-undertaken in defiance of
applicable ordinances, which acts were distinct from the damage to
the road and property occasioned by the acts of trespass. The
Court also focused on Defendants' action taken in violation of this
Court's permanent injunction issued in the matter. Further
consideration was given to the fact that the Defendants tried to
bring prosecution to manipulate the legal system and intimidate
Akers and that a witness, Bill Reynolds, was threatened to
influence his testimony.
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 11. This
Court agrees. The amounts of punitive damages awarded in favor of Akers and
against Mortensens are different in amount from those awarded against Whites, to
take into account the quality and quantity of their actions. There are a plethora of
other actions by both Whites and Mortensens which warrant punitive damages,
but for which statutory damages under the trespass statute, I.C. § 6-202 are wholly
inappropriate. The trespass damages were purely compensatory. This Court held:
"The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above
damage cause by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is $17,002.85." April 1,
2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 27, ~ 2. The purpose of punitive damages is to
deter defendant's misconduct, not to compensate plaintiffs for their losses.
Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 642,862 P.2d 321, 334. That purpose was
specifically stated by the Court as follows:
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, and
award of punitive damage against Mortensen is appropriate. The
harm caused to Akers was physical, emotion, and not just
economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference to or
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others. Mortensen's
conduct was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and
even after Court order in this case, this was not an isolated
incident. The harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or
deceit. Finally, compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing
this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially
vulnerable in comparison. Campbell states " ... that a recidivist
may be punished more severely than a first offender [because]
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual
instance of malfeasance ... " ld. p. 13, citing BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 558, 577 (1996). The amount of
punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Mortensens from
engaging in like conduct in the future is $150,000.00.
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter
Defendant Whites from engaging in like conduct in the future is
$30,000.00.
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April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 28, ~~ 5, 6. Whites simply did not have
the track record of similar conduct in other real estate transactions. Whites were
not nearly so brazen in their attitude before the Court, as compared to Mortensens.
Whites seemed to be the follower, with Mortensens the leader. Thus, the
difference in the amount of the punitive damages awards against each couple.
Marti Mortensen claims that "large" (later referred to by Marti Mortensen
as "huge") punitive damage awards are not appropriate in cases such as this
because defendants are unlikely to perform similarly in the future, citing Cox v.
Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 688-89, 496 P.2d 682 (1972). Marti Mortensen's
Memorandum Re: Damages, pp. 5-6. First of all, Mortensens need deterrence,
because, as stated above, this has been Vernon Mortensen's modus operandi.
There is no indication in the record that Mortensen will change his conduct in the
future absent a punitive damage award. Indeed, there is every indication in the
record that the imposition of punitive damages in this case is simply a calculated
cost of doing business factored in with all of Mortensens' land acquisitions.
Second, Cox states: " ... the social purpose served by exemplary damages is the
deterrence of the defendant and others from like conduct." 94 Idaho 683,689,496
P .2d 682, 688. Thus, it is not just the conduct of Whites and Mortensens in this
case that is entirely at issue. It is also the conduct of those similarly situated
(buying land cheap because it has access problems), and similarly disposed (who,
subsequently to finding themselves unable to buy an easement, proceed to bully
and intimidate) which must be deterred. Third, the conduct of Mortensens and
Whites in this case are much different than the conduct of Stolworthy in Cox.
Stolworthy bulldozed part of Cox' fence down and Stolworthy ran his sheep
across Cox' land on one occasion. 94 Idaho 683, 684, 496 P.2d 682, 683.
Stolworthy at all times admitted the trespass but denied any malice. The jury
imposed $5,000 in punitive damages; the district court upheld that award and
refused a motion to reduce such. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the award of
punitive damages but felt the district court should have reduced that $5,000 award
down to $2,000 and remanded back to the district court for such result. 94 Idaho
683,692,496 P.2d 682,691. This Court agrees with Akers' argument: "As
outlined above, there were numerous acts in the present case that far exceeded
what appeared to be the relatively civil disagreement that was analyzed in Cox."
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 12. The
Idaho Supreme Court in Cox discussed the types of cases in which punitive
damage awards are typically found:
A pattern of factual situations may be discerned in the past
cases decided by this Court which appears to be closely related to
the size of the exemplary damage awards allowed on appeal. We
believe the pattern is quite significant and can be usefully
described for the guidance of the trial courts and will help
determine the case at bar. The pattern seems to encompass at least
three categories of situations.
The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business
schemes operated for profit and often victimizing numerous
members of the public aside from the plaintiff. Clearly in such
cases the award of exemplary damages should aim at making the
cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomical. Thus, for
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example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant
was one victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of
exemplary damages served to remove the profit factor from the
whole scheme. See, Comment, 'Automobile Dealership Fraud:
Punitive Damages,' 7 Idaho L.R. 117 (1970). Cf. Barth v. B. F.
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 228, 71 Cal.Rptr. 306 (1968).
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v.
Denison decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions
endangered the physical well-being and health of the several
hundred citizens of the town. Where actual physical harm is
threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the situation
rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the
plaintiffs physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive
damages award finds justification in the nature of the malicious
conduct itself as well as the quality ofthe injury sustained.
The case at bar fits neither of these categories. However, a
third category of cases does seem applicable. These cases typically
involve non-violent but nevertheless serious disputes between two
parties. Often the dispute centers on an interest in real or personal
property or an interference with a business operation. Here the
action concerned an act of trespass to the plaintiffs' real property
but no lives were endangered and there was no indication the
defendant made a practice of acting in this fashion.
In such situations in the past this Court has not looked
favorably on large punitive damage awards for the apparent reason
that the nature of the dispute did not warrant a severe penalty to the
wrongdoer-an award out of proportion both to the activity
complained of and the damages incurred.
Idaho 683, 691, 496 P.2d 682,690. It is only that third situation in which the
Idaho Supreme Court cautioned the amount of punitive damages should bear
some relationship with the amount of actual damages incurred. Two facts which
separate the present case from this third category must be noted. In that third
category, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "these cases typically involve nonviolent but nevertheless serious disputes between two parties." Id. No physical
violence was visited upon the bodies of the Akers, but emotional violence,
intimidation and threats by Mortensens and Whites was visited upon them, even
throughout the year long court trial. Second, the Idaho Supreme Court noted
that in that third category, " ... there was no indication the defendant made a
practice of acting in this fashion." Id. While there is no proof that Whites made a
practice of acting in this fashion in other cases, there is ample proof that David
White was consistent in his intimidation of the Akers in this case over the course
of a decade now, in this case. There is certainly proof that Mortensens were very
consistent in their intimidation in this case and in other cases prior to and during
this litigation. That is the primary reason the punitive damage awards are in
different amounts as between Mortensens and Whites. To sum up, there are
important facts that separate the instant case from the third category mentioned in
Cox, where the punitive damages should bear some relation to actual damages.
That being the case, this Court finds that in the instant case there is a reasonable
relation between punitive damages and actual damages. In the present case, the
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actual damages incurred were $17,002.85 costs of repairs for the multiple trespass
damages, trebeled to $51,008.55, and emotional distress damages to Sherrie Akers
in the amount of$10,000, while the amount of punitive damages were $30,000
against Whites and $150,000 against Mortensens.
Moreover, this Court finds the present case has earmarks of all three types
of cases discussed in Cox:
The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business
schemes operated for profit and often victimizing numerous
members of the public aside from the plaintiff. Clearly in such
cases the award of exemplary damages should aim at making the
cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomical. Thus, for
example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant
was one victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of
exemplary damages served to remove the profit factor from the
whole scheme.
Id. The present case fits this first category, as Mortensens and Whites conduct
was essentially part of a deceptive business scheme. Mortensens (and later
Whites) bought Peplinskis' property for cents on the dollar due to lack of access
or at least questionable legal access. After they bought the property they then
tried to buy access. Failing at that attempt to gain legal access, they began
intimidating Akers. While two people (the Akers) were primarily hurt by the
conduct of Mortensens and Whites, others were involved. Law enforcement was
brought in on more than one occasion, county officials were impacted as zoning
orders were violated, and witnesses were intimidated. Whites and Mortensens are
guilty of "repetitive antisocial conduct" prior to this litigation, which necessitated
this litigation, and which continued throughout this litigation. And, at least as to
Mortensens, that "repetitive antisocial conduct" has occurred in other litigation
and in other land transactions which did not result in litigation. This repetitive
antisocial conduct must be made "uneconomical" for punitive or exemplary
damages to have any of the desired effect. In this first category, damages should
be "large" or "huge" as now complained about by Marti Mortensen, as the Idaho
Supreme Court wrote: "A generous award of exemplary damages served to
remove the profit factor from the whole scheme." Id. This Court finds the
amount of punitive damages awarded against Mortensens was neither "large" nor
"huge", and probably not even "generous" given the protracted nature of
Mortensens' conduct, the severity and frequency of the intimidation. The award
of punitive damages against Mortensens was adequate. The same is true of the
award of punitive damages against Whites.
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v.
Denison decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions
endangered the physical well-being and health of the several
hundred citizens of the town. Where actual physical harm is
threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the situation
rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the
plaintiffs physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive
damages award finds justification in the nature of the malicious
conduct itself as well as the quality of the injury sustained.
Id. The present case fits this second category as well. Mortensens and Whites
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being and health of the several hundred citizens of the town", certainly that
conduct endangered the physical well-being and health of Sherrie Akers and, to a
lesser extent, Dennis Akers. This is a case "Where actual physical harm is
threatened ... " In these cases " ... a substantial punitive damages award finds
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of
the injury sustained." Id. As mentioned above, the award of punitive damages
against Moretensens was adequate; it was not "substantial". The same is true of
the award of punitive damages against Whites.
Finally, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Cox: "In arriving at such
a [punitive damage] figure it would seem to be reasonable and good social policy
in cases such as these to grant such an amount that a plaintiff would be
encouraged to bring the dispute to the courts for settlement." Id. This Court finds
the amount of punitive damages sufficient to do just that, and no more. The irony
is that had Mortensens and Whites brought litigation to have their easement rights
against Akers decided judicially, prior to their excavation and intimidation, this
could have ended peaceably almost a decade ago. However, peaceable litigation
would have ended with the same result, that being Mortensens and Whites having
a 12.5-foot easement, the use of which, on the prescriptive end at least, cannot be
expanded upon beyond its historical, agricultural, intermittent use. That outcome
would have been unacceptable to Mortensens and Whites given the subdivision
they desired to create and the financial reward they intended to reap from that
development.
Finally, Marti Mortensen argues, based on agency law: "Therefore
MORTENSENS should not be responsible for any punitive damages occasioned
by WHITE's conduct." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 6,
citing Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co, 94 Idaho 335, 487 P.2d 929 (1971).
(capitalization in original). Whites make the similar argument, but going the
opposite way:
Mortensen correctly drew the Court's attention to the well
settled principle that a principal is liable for punitive damages
based upon the acts of its agent only in circumstances in which the
principal participated, or in which the principal authorized or
ratified the agent's conduct. Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co,
94 Idaho 335 (1971). White personally should not be punished for
conduct by Mortensen or the employee ofD.L. White
Construction, Inc. where the Openshaw standard is not met.
The record does not indicate that White participated in or
authorized events described in findings of fact from the April 1,
2004 decision numbered 5,67,8,9,11,12,16,20,24. Punitive
damages arising from those findings fail the Openshaw test and
should not be awarded.
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 7. It is ironic that nine years after this all
started, the two who were specifically found by this Court to be acting in concert,
would now apparently like to divorce themselves from each other's conduct. This
protracted litigation was the result of the bullying tactics of Vernon Mortensen
and David White, and now that the litigation appears to be winding down, those
two appear to be turning on each other, distancing each other from the other, in an
obvious attempt to lessen responsibility for damages caused. In doing so they fail
to realize that damages were awarded for past actions. None of Whites and
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Mortensens current arguments change those past actions.
This Court has already found: "As set forth in the Conclusions of Law,
defendants Vernon Mortensen and David White at all pertinent times are jointly
and severally liable for compensatory damages to the Akers' property, for the
trebled damages, and for Sherrie Akers' emotional distress." April 4, 2004,
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, p. 18, Finding of Fact ~ 2.n. This was because: " ... this Court
finds at all pertinent times they were each 'acting in concert' as defined by [I.e. §
6-803], in that they were 'pursuing a common plan or design which result[ ed] in
the commission of an intentional or reckless tortuous act.'" Id., p. 28, Conclusion
of Law, ~ 4. This Court's decision is consistent with Openshaw. Regarding
punitive damages, this Court awarded an amount of punitive damage in favor of
Akers as against Mortensens which was different than the amount of punitive
damage in favor of Akers as against Whites. These amounts were not joint and
several as between Mortensens and Whites. This Court engaged in careful
analysis as to the factual and legal reasons given for the punitive damage award
against the Mortensens and the different award against the Whites. Seven years
ago, this Court found as a matter of fact:
41. Vemon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai
County ordinances and the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain,
specifically to increase the value of his land development projects.
In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has shown a conscious
disregard and disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent
North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by this conscious
disregard for the law. As such, it is highly likely that he will
continue to harm Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is
deterred from engage in like conduct in the future.
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 41. Nothing has
changed that finding of fact. This Court discussed Mortensen's assets at length.
Id., pp. 23-25, Findings of Fact ~~ 31-39. This Court then found as a matter of
law:
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, an
award of punitive damage against Mortensen is appropriate. The
harm caused to Akers was physical, emotional, and not just
economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference to or
reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. Mortensen's
conduct was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and
even after Court order in this case, this was not an isolated
incident. The harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or
deceit. Finally compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing
this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially
vulnerable in comparison. Campbell states" ... that a recidivist
may be punished more severely than a first offender [because]
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual
instance of malfeasance ... " Id., p. 13, citing BMW o.!North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.W. 559, 577 (1996). The amount of
punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Mortensens from
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engaging in like conduct in the future is $150,000.00.
Id, p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 5. On the other hand, as to the Whites, this Court
found as a matter of fact:
42. David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated
and disregarded Kootenai County ordinances and the orders of this
Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value of his
land development project. In his actions, testimony and demeanor
he has shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He
has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs,
by this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly likely
that he will continue to harm Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners
unless he is deterred from engaging in like conduct in the future.
Id, p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 42. Nothing has changed that finding of fact. This
Court separately discussed White's assets. ld, p. 40. This Court then found as a
matter of law:
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter
Defendant Whites from engaging in like conduct in the future is
$30,000.00.
Id, p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 6. Nothing in this Court's prior award, ratified
today by this decision, is inconsistent with Openshaw. In addition to the
multitude of occasions where Mortensens and Whites acted in concert, this Court
has also taken into account the situations where conduct was purely that of
Mortensens or purely that of Whites. This Court has assessed the differences in
their financial situation. This Court has assessed Mortensen differently as a
recidivist due to his conduct in other situations and other litigations. All of which
result in differing amounts of punitive damage awards.
Whites claim this Court:
... did not articulate specific reasons for its award of punitive
damages against Whites, stating only "That the amount of punitive
damages likely to deter Defendant Whites from engaging in like
conduct in the future is $30,000. The trial court did not specify a
clear and convincing standard of proof for its findings of fact with
respect to Whites or Mortensens, despite the requirements of Idaho
Code Section 6-1601 (9).
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 6. First of all, it is not I.C. § 6-1601 (9) that
sets forth the "clear and convincing standard of proof'. That standard is
articulated in I.e. § 6-1604(1). If in fact this Court seven years ago failed to
mention that standard, it does so now. This Court specifically finds that Akers
have proven, by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious
and outrageous conduct (they only needed to prove one type of conduct, they
proved them all) by both Mortensens and Whites, under I.C. § 6-1604(1). This
Court seven years ago, as reiterated in this decision, did articulate specific
reasons for its award of punitive damages against Whites. In addition to Finding
of Fact ~42 quoted entirely immediately above, the Court also found:
13. Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on
Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at
night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to intimidate and
frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers.
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Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the
last trial days, David White was found off the easement, clearly on
Akers' land, thirty feet from their house, that Dennis Akers ran
after him and saw White get in his truck, and when Akers told him
"I've caught you again trespassing", White responded "Go to hell."
This is in violation of the Court's prior orders. This Court finds
not credible David White's testimony that he was not on the Akers
property or the road on that night, that instead he was up on the
other side of the barn on his own property. Dennis Akers testified
that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop Road and
watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this.
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, pp. 19-20, Finding of Fact ~ 13.
Finally, at oral argument on January 26,2011, counsel for Whites, in
discussing his clients' financial situation relative to punitive damages, made the
claim that his clients have "been destroyed by this process." Counsel for Marti
Mortensen made a similar argument on January 26,2011, explaining the fact that
Marti Mortensen has divorced Vernon Mortensen in the intervening eight years
since trial, that "Marti Mortensen would tell you she's broke", and "Jerry
Mortensen is in a substantially bad financial condition." First, there is no proof
of this fact. No affidavits were submitted from the Whites. No affidavits were
submitted by Marti Mortensen. Vernon Mortensen filed a 32-page affidavit on
January 24,2011, but it does not reference his financial situation. Second, neither
counsel for the Whites nor counsel for Marti Mortensen, nor Vernon Mortensen,
pro se, have bothered to cite this Court to any legal authority that the financial
situation of the perpetrator at the time of remand proceedings is relevant as
compared to the perpetrator's financial situation at the time of the wrongful
conduct and the trial. If it is the conduct of the defendant that is to be deterred, it
makes no sense to consider that defendant's financial situation at any time other
than proximate to the conduct. It would make no sense to consider a defendant's
financial situation seven years before the bad conduct. Why then, as advocated by
Whites' counsel and Marti Mortensen's counsel, would it make any more sense to
consider a defendant's financial situation seven years after the bad conduct
occurred? There is nothing in Robinson v. State Farm Insurance, 137 Idaho 173,
45 P.3d 829 (2002), or IDJI 9.20.5 that would indicate such an absurd result.
III. ORDER.
IT IS ORDERED White's "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re:
Easement Location" is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants are liable for all damages as
previously set forth in the Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 1, 2004, pp. 12-29. The
prescriptive easement does not expand the express easement, and the prescriptive
easement over Akers' land in Parcel B is in a slightly different location than
defendants' excavated on that parcel. Additionally, defendants placed fill from their
excavation on Akers' Parcel B. Accordingly, even with the finding of an easement
by prescription, all previous findings regarding damages remain.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are the prevailing party as against
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING VERNON MORTENSEN'S MOTIONS

Page 24

Mortensens and Whites, and Akers are entitled to costs as proven at a later hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are entitled to attorney fees as set
forth above. The amount of prior attorney fees are as previously awarded. The
amount of attorney fees subsequent to the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent
Remittitur will be determined at a later hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Akers are awarded the sum of
$2,000.00, imposed against Whites' attorney directly, as the sanction for the
conduct described above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' attorney prepare ajudgment
consistent with the above Opinion and this Order.
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion
for Additional Evidence on Easement Location, pp. 11-40.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Vernon Mortensen sets forth no rule basis for his "Motion to Correct", nor is a rule
referenced in Mortensen's "Affidavit in Support of Motion to Correct Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04". Because Vernon Mortensen is requesting this
Court to revisit decisions from 2003 and 2004, his motion is untimely under LR.C.P. 60(b)(I)(2)
and (3). Vernon Mortensen is not making a motion to reconsider under LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) (void
judgment) or (5) judgment has been satisfied. Vernon Mortensen's motion could be viewed as
one made under LR.C.P. 60(b)(6) ("any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment"), but those "other reasons" cannot include the reasons found in subsection (1)
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"; subsection (2) "newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b)" or subsection (3) "fraud or other misconduct of an adverse party."
Whether to grant a motion to set aside a judgment, pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b), is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123
Idaho 141,143,845 P.2d 559, 561 (1992); Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414,599 P.2d 985
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(1979). Denial of an LR.C.P. 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Alderson v.
Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 743, 132 P.3d 1261, 1271 (Ct.App.2006). Where a motion invokes

discretionary grounds for relief from a judgment, the standard is review of discretion; however,
where the grounds are non-discretionary, as when a judgment is void, the question presented is
one of law over which reviewing courts exercise free review. Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109
Idaho 56, 704 P.2d 960 (Ct.App.1985).
"A motion to reconsider a dismissal order properly should be treated as a motion to alter
or amend ajudgment under LR.C.P. 59(e) if the motion was timely filed." Ross v. State, 141
Idaho 670, 671, 115 P.3d 761, 762 (Ct.App. 2005); Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d
754, 760 (2007). A motion to alter or amend ajudgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e) "shall be served
not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." LR.C.P.59(e). In Straub, the
Smiths made a motion to reconsider under LR.C.P. 11(a). The Idaho Supreme Court stated:
However, a party may only make a motion to reconsider interlocutory order or
orders entered after the entry of final judgment. LR.C.P. 11(a)(2). The dismissal
was a final judgment and, thus, the Smith's motion to reconsider should be treated
as a motion to modify or amend the order of dismissal.
Id. (emphasis added). It is Rule 59(e) under which this Court may correct any alleged legal and

factual errors before it. In Straub, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of
reconsideration, treating the motion as one to alter or amend under LR.C.P. 59(e). 145 Idaho 65,
71, 175 P .3d 754, 760. The Smiths had supported their motion with an affidavit alerting the
court to the fact that they had stipulated to dismissal with prejudice, but had not agreed to waive
costs. Id. "Thus, if the court entered the order denying costs and fees because it understood that
to be part of the stipulation terms, the Smiths' motion alerted it to the factual error and the
motion gave it the opportunity to correct that error." Id. Vernon Mortensen's instant motion
could be considered as one to alter or amend a judgment, but the Court will not consider new
evidence in motions to alter or amend under LR.C.P. 59(e).
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Rule 59(e) motions were discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Coeur d'Alene Mining
Co. v. First National Bank of Idaho, where the Court stated:

A Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the discretion of the
court. An order denying a motion made under rule 59(e) to alter or amend a
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a
manifest abuse of discretion. Rule 59(e) proceedings afford the trial court the
opportunity to correct both errors of fact and law that had occurred in its
proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action short of an
appeal. Such proceedings must of necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of
the case as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the
judgment is based.
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990) (quoting Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646
P.2d 1030,1034 (Ct.App. 1982».
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). A party
making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence, but is not required to
do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct.App. 2006).

III. ANALYSIS.
A. Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration
on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" Must be Dismissed.

1. Vernon Mortensen's Motion is Untimely.
Vernon Mortensen's motion must be dismissed as it is untimely. While Vernon
Mortensen does not favor the Court with a rule basis for his motion, no rule allows the relief he
requests. Vernon Mortensen is complaining about decisions and orders made by this Court back
in 2003 and 2004. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) requires such motion, when made under
subsections (1), (2) or (3) of that rule, must be made "not more than six (6) months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Thus, if Vernon Mortensen's motion is
made under I.R.C.P. (1), (2) or (3), it is time barred.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING VERNON MORTENSEN'S MOTIONS

Page 27

Subsections (4) (void judgment) and (5) (judgment has been satisfied) are not applicable.
Subsection (6), the "catchall" provision, could be applicable because as of July 1,2008,
subsection (6) is not limited by the six-month limitation. However, subsection (6) has a fatal
problem in its applicability to Vernon Mortensen in the present case. Subsection (6) allows relief
for "any other reason justifYing relief from the operation of the jUdgment." All of Vernon
Mortensen's complaints "sound" like motions made under LR.C.P. 60(b) subsection (1)
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"; subsection (2) "newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b)" or subsection (3) "fraud or other misconduct of an adverse party." rfVernon
Mortensen is moving to set aside prior orders entered by this Court years ago, pursuant to the
catch-all provision ofl.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), he is mistaken as to its applicability. As stated by the
Idaho Supreme Court, in Hopkins v. Troutner, Rule 60(b)(6) "obviously gives wide latitude to
the trial court in determining those circumstances under which to relieve a party from the effects
of an order." 134 Idaho 445,447,4 P.3d 557, 559 (2000). However, the Supreme Court has also
held, in Lease First v. Burns, that Rules (60(b)(1) and 60(b )(6) are mutually exclusive provisions.
131 Idaho 158, 163,953 P.2d 596, 603 (citing Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 100 Idaho 34, 37, 592
P.2d 849, 852, n. 2 (1979). Because the defendants in Lease First had not asserted additional
facts beyond those they offered in support of their Rule 60(b)(1) mistake/surprise/excusable
neglect/satisfaction argument, relief could not be granted for equitable reasons under 60(b)( 6).
This Court may "entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order, or proceeding." l.R.C.P. 60(b). Idaho courts have inherent powers to entertain an
independent action for equitable relief and these powers are not subj ect to Rule 60(b) or its time
restrictions. Harper v Harper, 122 Idaho 535,537,835 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Ct.App. 1992);
Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). Such an independent

action must be brought within a reasonable time. Id. In turn, what constitutes a reasonable time
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is a matter within the Court's sound legal discretion. Gregory v. Hancock, 81 Idaho 221, 227-28,
340 P.2d 108, 112 (1959). This Court does not find it proper to grant its discretion as Vernon
Mortensen's complaints are not brought within a reasonable time. The time to make these
arguments was to the Idaho Supreme Court on the prior appeals, not after the Court has reviewed
the matters on remand and issued a decision not to Vernon Mortensen's liking.

2. Even if Timely, Vernon Mortensen's Motion Lacks Merit.
While Vernon Mortensen in his "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial
Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed
4-1-04" agues the Court's findings are not supported by the evidence, the arguments Vernon
Mortensen uses in making that claim and his conduct at the March 22, 2011, hearing,
demonstrate his consistent behavior. While it is unexpected that Vernon Mortensen would
change his stripes after nearly a decade of litigating this case, it is also unexpected that this Court
would not give much credence to Mortensens' unsupported claims that he was treated unfairly.
Most of Mortensens' argument at the March 22,2011, hearing seemed to be focused on
this Court's finding that Mortensen was a "repeat offender". First, this Court has never used
"repeat offender" in any of its prior decisions in this case. Second, as to Mortensen's prior
conduct [to which he extrapolates the "repeat offender" moniker], as shown above in this Court's
March 18, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order
Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location, even the people who
have worked for Mortensen testified against Mortensen regarding his overreaching conduct on
other occasions.
Mortensens and Whites attempted to take what was at best occasional, seasonal,
agricultural use, and attempted to turn it into full-time, year-round, fairly high
volume, residential use. Since Akers were unwilling to simply "give" Mortensens
an easement over the western portion of their land, Mortensens and Whites knew
they would have to litigate any prescriptive easement. However, instead of
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choosing the civil alternative of filing a civil lawsuit, Mortensens and Whites
chose to simply start excavating and widening. Instead of acting civilly,
Mortensens and Whites chose to threaten and intimidate the Akers. And, at least
for Mortensens, according to the testimony of Scott Rasor, whom this Court found
to be credible, this was consistent with prior conduct. Vernon Mortensen had
violated the subdivision ordinances on prior occasions and doing so had harmed
innocent purchasers of other properties. January 2,2003, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 18, ~ 50; Tr. Vol. II, p. 539,1. 3 - p. 540,1.
20; April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court found that after the
present lawsuit began, Mortensen purchased sixty acres near Akers' property,
subdivided that property into five-acre parcels, sold four parcels and then found
himself in a legal dispute with the adjoining landowner regarding the legality of
the subdivision and access to that subdivision. April 1,2004, Memorandum
Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court wrote: "The easement-road dispute regarding
access to these 60 acres is substantially similar to the dispute in the present case in
that Mortensen is attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell
parcels of land to innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers
with potential disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire
District and the Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425,
1. 24 - p. 1426,1. 7." Id The Court found:
Mortensen has utilized substantially the same development strategy
in the past. If not deterred, he is likely to engage in this conduct in
the future. Scott Rasor testified about Mortensen's prior land
development projects that harmed innocent Idaho land owners. Tr.
Vol. II, p. 539,1. 3 - p. 540,1. 20. Mortensen admitted he is now
developing and selling forty acres near the subject property in spite
of another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr.
Vol. III, p. 1425,1. 24 - p. 1426,1. 7. Even Mortensen's own
expert Kiebert testified that he has testified in litigation on
Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he has worked
on subdivision projects for Mortensen before and that some of
these projects the parcels Mortensen has sold have not been
surveyed, that Mortensen works too fast in selling lots before they
are surveyed, and that he has told Mortensen that it is not prudent
to do that.
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 24, ~ 31. Thus, this is not Vernon
Mortensen's first time to either the litigation rodeo, or the bullying rodeo.
Mortensens and Whites knew that if they litigated the issue ofthe prescriptive
easement across the western portion of Akers' land, the best they would have is a
12.5-foot-wide agricultural easement, and they needed much more than that to
accomplish their subdivision. Bullying was the only option that might prove to be
successful. It was a calculated risk by Mortensens and Whites, and had Akers not
filed this lawsuit, no doubt it would have been successful.
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion
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for Additional Evidence on Easement Location, pp. 18-19. Most importantly, Vernon Mortensen
at trial produced no credible evidence to contradict this damaging testimony by the people who
had worked for Mortensen. For Vernon Mortensen to now argue: "I am demanding Susan
Weeks provide the case numbers [of this prior litigation]" entirely misses the point. It is not
plaintiffs' burden to now prove the truth of what Vernon Mortensen failed to rebut at trial.
At the March 22,2011, oral argument, Vernon Mortensen argued this Court's finding that
he had subdivided and sold properties is incorrect and that "no one had testified to that effect."
Vernon Mortensen ignores the fact that he testified to that effect. As shown above:
This Court wrote: "The easement-road dispute regarding access to these 60
acres is substantially similar to the dispute in the present case in that Mortensen is
attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell parcels of land to
innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers with potential
disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District and the
Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426,
L. 7." ld

ld, p. 18. The citation is wrong, it was in Volume II of the transcript, not Volume III. The
following excerpt of Vernon Mortensen's testimony provides the point in the record proving this
matter regarding the sixty acres, and provides a glimpse into Vernon Mortensen's reluctance to
answer any question directly:
Q. [by Mr. Vernon, plaintiffs' attorney] And you have not obtained a subdivision,
approval for subdivision for either of these parcels, correct?
A. [Vernon (Jerry) Mortensen] No, I have not. One wasn't required.
Q. And you've divided them into five-acre parcels to sell, correct?
A. I didn't do the divisions. The fellow who I bought them from had already
done them, and they had been grandfathered in.
Q. And there's a stop work order up there right now on some of this property?
A. I don't know that.
Mr. Reagan [defendant Vernon Mortensen's attorney]: Objection, Your Honor.
This far exceeds the scope of the examination.
The Witness: I have no problemsThe Court: Overruled.
Q. (by Mr. James) So you're not aware whether or not there's a stop work order
up there; is that correct?
A. I am not. I don't own the property. I'm not building the house.
Q. And are you aware that there is a stop - or that the county has stopped realtors
from selling any more of this property because of an illegal subdivision?
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A. I know that's not true because I'm the one who is in charge of selling it. The
realtors don't sell it. I have my own personal- I have my own personal people
who do that, and nobody's stopped them and nobody's notified me and nobody's
notified them, so I don't believe you.
Q. And is it fair to say you have no plans at this time to resolve the legal dispute
between you and Mr. Reynolds prior to selling more of the property? In other
words, you're gonna continue to sell the property?
Mr. Reagan: Objection again, your Honor?
The Witness: I, uh - with the informationThe Court: Wait. Stop. What's the nature of the objection?
Mr. Reagan: Again, we've far exceeded the scope of the examination, your
Honor.
The Court: Still dealing with the subject matter that you opened up so it's
overruled.
Q. (by Mr. James) You plan to continue to sell these parcels even though you
have a dispute going on with Mr. Reynolds, correct?
A. I'll give you, the Court and Judge Mitchell my personal pledge that I will not
sell another parcel until any questions that are in your mind or Judge Mitchell's
mind are resolved. I'll tell you right not that, uh, those issues don't exist in my
mind, but I will give you my pledge that I will do nothing to sell any property up
there until any misgivings have been removed from either of your minds.
Q. Okay. My question to you is do you plan to still sell this property, correct,
even though you have a dispute with Mr. Reynolds?
A. The question was Q. It's a simple question.
A. Would I do it knowing before the dispute's cleared up with Mr. Reynolds, and
my answer is no, I won't.
Q. Well, let's back up. You've had this property on the market since you've been
having this dispute with Mr. Reynolds. Isn't that fair to say?
A. Well it's - he hasn't filed a suit against me or anything or he hasn't - he
hasn't, uh - he hasn't filed a suit against me, hasn't put a lis pendens on there.
He's given me no notice that I don't have a right to do whatever I'm doing.
Q. Well, you just testified with all his interferences and his complaints and such
you have continued to sell this property, and you've testified that you've sent
people up there to view the property even though you have this ongoing dispute
with Mr. Reynolds. Isn't that fair to say?
A. Yes, that's fair to say that.
Q. Thank you. Are you gonna force him to sue you and go through a lawsuit then
before you will legally resolve the issues for these innocent purchasers corning up
to buy this property?
A. Now that you've brought this up the issue I think the sensible thing is - I think
they have something in the Court and, like I say, I'm not an attorney and I don't
spend, uh-I spend very little time in the courtroom, but I think there's actually a
mechanism where you go before the Court and they resolve it without a lawsuit,
or maybe you just sue them to resolve it.
I have no desire to sue, uh, Mr. Reynolds for any money, any damages,
anything. All I want is that issue of the gate, uh-I want the-I want it taken care
of, and I believe that, uh, I am not in the wrong at all, but I wish no malice on Mr.
Reynolds. I wish no harm for him. I wish no malice today, tomorrow, whatever.
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I just want to be left alone so I can conduct my business and do what, uh, I have
the legal rights to do.
Q. You've already sold four of these properties, Mr. Mortensen, to these people.
With an ongoing dispute with Mr. Reynolds, having already gone through
substantial litigation with my clients over similar issues, wouldn't you agree with
me that you're subjecting and continuing to subject innocent purchasers of
property to ongoing disputes with Mr. Reynolds as well as potentially the county
over their rights to build up there?
Mr. Reagan: Object to the form, your Honor.
The Court: What specifically?
Mr. Reagan: There's no evidence that any purchaser is an innocent purchaser.
The Court: Overruled.
The Witness: I believe that what is happening here is malicious prosecution, and
I'm not going to be intimidated on what I do in my life based on what I believe is
malicious prosecution, and I believe you have the duty of 11 (b) to do your
research and actually see whether or not I was trespassing in the first place before
you started this lawsuit because I feel it's really a matter of entrapment. You filed
the lawsuit against me for doing something I wasn't doing, and then you've
maneuvered things to try to, uh, create all kinds of damages, I won't be
intimidated by that.
If I were that type of person, I wouldn't be the author of Mortensen Math
that's made a gigantic impact all over the world, that's used in all of the schools
with the aborigines. It's used by the eskimos, Montessori schools, public schools.
If I were that mindset, that I was going to be fearful and intimidated from doing
anything, then I wouldn't be Jerry Mortensen, but on the other hand, I also am not
the type of person that needs to take out any vindictiveness on anyone, and if it
will make, uh, the people in this court feel better and Mr. Reynolds feel better, I'm
giving everyone my personal pledge that nothing will happen on that property
until things are solved with Mr. Reynolds.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 1434, L. 15 -po 1439, L. 24. Keep in mind this questioning was to try to get
Vernon Mortensen to admit he had in the past sold parcels which had a problem with access, in
an area adjacent to the land at dispute in this litigation. Vernon Mortensen would not answer the
question directly, but indirectly, by claiming he would no longer sell such in the future until he
resolves the issue between himself and Mr. Reynolds; Vernon Mortensen answered the question
as to past sales by him where he knew there was an access problem, in the affirmative.
Vernon Mortensen has done nothing in his "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", to cause this Court to reconsider its prior findings.
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Vernon Mortensen has acted in an overreaching, boorish, and intimidating way. Vernon
Mortensen's decision to unilaterally begin excavating onto plaintiffs' land (Tr. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 9
- p. 89, L. 20, Testimony of Shaun Montee) when at best he knew his easement rights were
unknown, and then intimidate when Akers resisted, is consistent with his other conduct discussed
above. Vernon Mortensen's behavior at the March 22,2011, argument on his "Motion to Correct
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and
Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" is certainly consistent with his prior conduct at
trial, and his prior conduct vis a vis the Akers.
None of Mortensen's arguments have any support in the facts or basis in the law.

B. Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order
on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional
Evidence on Easement Location" Must be Denied.
On April 5, 2011, Vernon Mortensen filed his "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum
Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional
Evidence on Easement Location." In the intervening seven weeks, Vernon Mortensen has yet to
schedule a hearing for this motion. The Court has reviewed such motion. Under LR.C.P.
7(b )(3)( C), the moving party must indicate on the face of the motion whether the party desires to
present oral argument. If the moving party (Vernon Mortensen) fails to request oral argument
upon the motion, the court may deny the motion without notice if the court deems the motion has
no merit. LR.C.P.7(b)(3)(D). This Court finds Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion
for Additional Evidence on Easement Location" has no merit. The motion is simply reiteration
of Vernon Mortensen's complaints set forth in his Motion to Correct Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and "Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING VERNON MORTENSEN'S MOTIONS
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Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", with the addition of Vernon Mortensen's
complaints as to what happened at the March 22, 2011, hearing on that motion. Motion to
Reconsider, pp. 1-7. Vernon Mortensen sets forth unsubstantiated and speculative argument
about what occurred in Stewart Title Company's involvement in this case. Jd., pp. 10, 20.
Vernon Mortensen now makes the claim that this Court" ... wrongfully swayed the [Idaho]
Supreme Court ... " Jd., p. 12. Vernon Mortensen then gave his version of the facts of this case
(Jd., pp. 12-18) before returning to his attack on the Court and counsel for plaintiffs. Jd., pp. 19-

23.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
For the reasons set forth above, Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", and Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion
for Additional Evidence on Easement Location" must be denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum
Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional
Evidence on Easement Location" is DENIED.
Entered this 23 rd day of May, 2011.

Mitchell, District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING VERNON MORTENSEN'S M

Page 35

Certificate of Service

cr

I certify that on the .:A
day of May, 2011, a true copy of the foregoing was
mailed postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following:
Leander James
Susan Weeks
208667-1684

Ho.AI1.-~

Robert Covington
208762-4546,/

Durl '{ered.-

Richard Deissner
509326-6978,,/

1]

1v{?iJ

Vernon J. Mortensen
P. O. Box 1922
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805

(~" '" . .~ ~ \d...
;S:>0(1jJ5 ~
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Susan P. Weeks, ISB # 4255
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
FAX: (208) 664-1684

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTE

FILED: ~-;;:::;-/'f-t-!~.2..2.....,.....--

Attorneys for: Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV-02-222

FOURTH AMENDED JUDGMENT
AND DECREE ON SECOND
REMAND

D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J.
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants.

The Court previously entered its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location and Memorandum Decision
and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for
Additional Evidence on Easement Location. The Court further heard Mortensens'
"Affidavit on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial
Issues and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages in
Order filed 4-1-04" and 2) Defendant Vemon Mortensens' Motion to Reconsider
FOURTH AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE ON SECOND REMAND - 1

Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying
White's Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location. For the reasons
stated in the previous memorandums and the Findings and Conclusions enunciated
therein;
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED: Defendants do not have any implied easement rights in Plaintiffs'

property.
1.

The Court hereby enters a decree granting an easement by prescription to
Defendants which is described as follows: a tvvelve point two foot (12.2')
wide strip located just inside the northeast comer of the Defendants'
land, turning south immediately west of the west boundary of
Government Lot 2 (where the express easement ends) and the east
boundary of Parcel B as depicted by "hatch" marks on Exhibit "B"
attached hereto. The legal description of the easement is attached hereto
as Exhibit "C".

2.

Plaintiffs are awarded compensatory damages for willful trespass in the
amount of $17,002.85, which amount of trespass damages are trebled
pursuant to I.e. §6-202 for the total amount of $51,008.55, which
amount

IS

awarded

against

Defendants

D.

L.

WHITE

CONSTRUCTION, INe.; DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, jointly and severally
pursuant to I.C. §6-803.
3.

ShelTi Akers is awarded compensatory damages for emotional distress in
the amount of $10,000.00 against Defendants D.
CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
WHITE, husband and wife;

L.

WHITE

DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and

MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, jointly and severally
pursuant to I.C. §6-803.

FOURTH AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE ON SECOND REMAND - 2

4.

Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages against Defendants Vernon J.
Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, in the amount of
$150,000.00.

5.

Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages against Defendants David L.
White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, in the amount of
$30,000.00.

6.

Plaintiffs' award of costs and attorney fees jointly and severally against
each defendant in the amount of One Hundred Five Thousand, Five
Hundred Thiliy-Four Dollars and Six Cents ($105,534.06) together with
interest at the applicable statutory rate is reinstated;

7.

Plaintiffs shall further be entitled to seek a judgment of costs and
attorney fees as permitted by rule or statute.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

M~k.;r,

I hereby certify that on the _/1_ day of
2011, I caused
to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon J. Mortensen
P.O. Box 1922
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805
Robert Covington
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A
Hayden Lake, ID 83835
Dustin Deissner
Van Camp & Deissner
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane, W A 99201
Susan P. Weeks
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

·11
0
0
0
0
0

~
0
0
0

'E1
0
0
0

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
T elecopy (FAX)
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 762-4546
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX) (509) 326-6978
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (F AX) (208) 664-1684
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STATI: IF !UAHO

'J

J

COUN YOf KOOTENAI " ~
FILED: C;q

ROBERT E. COVINGTON
Attorney at Law
8884 North Government Way, Suite A
Hayden, ID 83835
Tel, 208-762-4545
Fax 208-762-4546
IS8#2312

20 II UG 24 AM 1\ :

Attorney for D.L. White Construction, Ine., David L. White and
White

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOO ENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS. busband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)

)
)

VI.

CASE NO. CV -02- 22

MOTION TO REC NSTDER

)

)

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DA VID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

------------------------------------)
Comes now defendants David L. White and Michelle V. White

nd D.L.

White Construction, Inc., through their attorney Robert Covington and
move the Court pursuant to IRep II(a)(2)(8) for a reconsideration of its

determinations in the .Judgment entered on August 10, 2011 and pri r
interlocutory orders to the extent that they are embodied in the abo e
referenced Judgment. This motion includes, without limitation, the decision
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

1

:917917 G9L BOG

:'\8

.LN3~

of tht Court regarding the location of .be easement at the top of th

hill

8S

de8crihed in paragrapb 1 of tbe Judgment, tbe decision regarding t e scope
and willfulness of trespasses by tbe moving parties, the award of
compensatory damages to Sherri Akers for emotional distress, the
punitive damages against the moving parties and the award and am unt of
attorney fees to plaintiffs.
The moving parties will submit their initial brief in support of t is
motion on or before September 14, 2011 and request oral argument of this
motion,
DATED this 24th day of August, 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I bereby certify that on tbe 24tb day of August, 2011, I cause to be
st:rved a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by facs'mile
transmission to:
Leander James
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, Idabo 83814

Fax: 208-664-1684

Dustin Deissncr
Van Camp & Deissner
1707 W. Broadway Avenue
Spokane, W A 99201
Fax: 509-326-6978

And by mail to:
Vernon J. Mortensen
PO Box 330
Naples, TD 83847

2
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1
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Susan P. Weeks, ISB # 4255
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
FAX: (208) 664-l684

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

~#

t

Attorneys for: PlaIntiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husban.d and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION. INC.;
DAVID t. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J.
MORTENSEN and MARTT E. MORTENSEN,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-02-222

PLAINTIFFS'SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
(INCLUDING ATIORNEY FEES
INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24,
2011)

Defendants.

COME NOW Plaintiffs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 and hereby
submit Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs. Pursuant to
I.R.C.P. S4(d), Plaintiffs recite that to the best of Plaintiffs' knowledge
and belief, the items of costs set forth below (including attorney fees)

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (INCLUDING
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24,2011) - 1

08/24/2011

JAMES VERN
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PAGE

are correct a.nd that the costs claimed are in compliance with
I.R.C.P. S4(d):

I.

ADDITIONAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
S4(1)(d)(C)6: Reasonable costs of the preparation
of models, maps, pictures, etc.,

$

550.00

$

550.00

admitted at hearing (survey)

TOTAL SUPPLEMENTAL COSTS TO DATE
ALLOWABLE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT:
DI.
ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiffs have incurred attorney fees through August 24, 2011,

in the minimum amount as follows: J. 12.75 attorney hrs. x $175/hr.
:=

$18,620.00.

$18,620.00

TOTAL COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES

$19,170.00

DATED this 24th day of Augu~ 201 J.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

~ O.2i~

~ANP.WEEKS

Attorney for Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (INCLUDING
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before n1e this 24th day of August, 2011.

dL.lzu .~t

M,k'

Not~ Publi~O~ / /
~IJ
Residing at:
~~
Commission Expires: (~1/.P/
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 hereby certify that on the 24th day of August, 2011, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below,
and addr.essed to the following:
/

P.O. Box 1922
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805

Ii!
0
0
0

Robert Covington
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A
Hayden Lake, ID 83835

0

Vernon J. Mortensen

Dustin Deissner
VanCamp & Dej ssn.er.
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane, WA 99201

0

~

0
0
0

~/

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mai.l
Telecop):, (F AX~ (208} 762-4546
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Ovemi ght Mail
TeJecopy (FAX) (509) 326·6978
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& Surveying

04/04

. Meckel Engineering & Surveying
3906 North Schreiber Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815.
Office: 20B/667·4638 .. Fax: 208/664·3347

----------------,-------March 10, 2010

To: Dennis Akers
3003 S. Millsap Loop
Post Falls, 10 83854

Invoice Number
04.113-3
Project; Legal Description by request
of Susan Weeks

Invoice Period:

3/1/10·3/5110

Survey Description:

Legal Description

85.BO

CADD Exhibit for Legal Description

200.20

PLS Project Review, Analysis and Review
and Certification of Deliverables

264.00

Invoice Total:

Prior Invoices:
Total Project Costs To Date:

550.00

Payments Received:
Balance Due This Project:

0.00
550.00

$550.00

~====~==~~

0.00

Due and Payable Upon Receipt of This Invoice, Thank YOu
Accounts 30 Days P.Ir Due will be SUbject to , late chtll'(Je of 1.55 pet mtmth or an .nn/Jllt perclmtggf "r 1B%
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Susan P. Weeks, ISB # 4255
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
FAX: (208) 664·1684

CL1~.D.ISAICT COURl

rfJ!Jff

¥fJ¥

Attorneys for: Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife~
Plaintiffs,
VS.

Case No. CV·02-222
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) and (e)(5) AFFIDAVIT OF
SUSAN P. WEEKS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY

FEES ON SECOND RE:MAND
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.;

DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J.
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Kootenai

)

SS.

I, SUSAN P. WEEKS, first being du.ly sworn upon oath depose and say:
1.

T am. the attorney of record for the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned

action.
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2.

The infonnation contained herein is based upon. my own information

and is true and correct, and I am. competent to testify thereto.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct itemization of attorney
time expended on this case following the Supreme Court's flling of its opinion with the
District Court on January 26, 2009, together with the calculation of attorney fees.

4. The legal and factual bases of Plaintiffs' attorney tees claim are:
Legal: The Court's Order on Remand filed September 7~ 2006; Idaho Code
Section §6·202 (Actions for trespass), including all applicable case law, specifically

includi.ng Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1993);
Idaho Code §12·121 (Attorney's fees); Idaho Code §12-123 (Sanctions for frivolous
conduct in. a civil case), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure S4(e)(J) - 54(e)(5) and
54(e)

(7)~54(e)(9);

Idaho Ru1e of Civil Procedurell(a)(1); and all applicable case

law.
Factual bases:
a) The entire file in this case~ specifically including all prior :filings in
support of Plain.tiffs' claims for costs and attorney fees and the Court's prior findings
regarding Plaintiffs' claims for costs and attorney fees, including the testim.ony,
matters and exhibits set forth jn IR.C.P. 54(e)(3) Affidavit of Leander L. James in
Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attomey Fees, filed February 4, 2003, the
Supplemental Affidavit filed March 19,2003, Amended Affidavit filed March 7, 2004,
the Memorandunl of Cost and Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed October 18, 2006
following the first remand, together with all other affidavits ftled in support of
Plaintiff.~ ~

claims for attorney fees, in.corporated by reference herein.
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b) The conttactual relationship between the ftnn. and Plaintiffs which
provides in pertinent part:

2.
Client agrees to pay Attorneys for professional services
the greater of $175.00/hour or thirty-three and one-third percent (331/3%) of the gross recovery of any and all funds received in settlement
without an action having been filed in. any court or administrative
agency; forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery of any and aU funds
received in settlement or recovered after filing an action in any court or
admini.strative agency; or forty-five percent (45%) of said sums if said
matter is settled upon appeal or following post·verdict proceedings, and
said sums payable to Attorneys for professional services are to be a lien
upon any sums received in settlement or payment of any said claim, or
upon any judgment recovered. "Gross recovery!' shaH include any
atto01ey's fees and costs recovered from. any adverse .party.
5. Method of Calculating Attorney fees: Plaintiffs' attorney fees are calculated
pursuant to the attorney-client COl1tract with my clients, specifically paragraph

"2'~

cited above, by multiplying the hourly attorney work by $175/hr., which render.s a total
amount of additional fees claim.ed on the second. remand of $1.8,620.00. Attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of a summary of hours billed for work done on the
second remand, together with an additional two hours for preparation of the fourth
amended judgment, the m.emorandum of supplemental costs and the affidavit of
attorney fees following the second remand.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2011.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

SUSAN P. VJEEKS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day of Augm;t~ 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J hereby certify that on the 24tll day of August, 2011, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the fo Howing:
/

Vernon J. Mortensen
P.O. Box 1922
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805

~

CI
0
0

Robert Covingto11.
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A
Hayden Lake, 1D 83835

0
CI
0

Dustin Deissner

0

Van Camp & Dcissner
1707 W. Broadway Ave.

0

Spokane, VVA 99201

~

~

U.S. Mall
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy {FAX) ~2082 762-4546
U.S. Mall
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Te1ecopy (FAX) (509) 326·6978
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Matter History Report

Date:
Report Time:
Page:

08/24/201l
7:05AM
1 of 11

Requ.ested .By: Susan.p Weeks

Ja.mes, Vernon & Weeks, PA
Client Number 10041

Dennis Akers

MlItter Number: JVW~07"OI14
Akers, Dennis & Sherrie v. D.L. Vilhite Constructi.on
Matter Type:
Billin1l Mode: Hourly
Dateli 'neluded on Report: 0110112009 Thru 08/24/2011

Date'

T'keeper Description

Time Spent

Amount

FEES

03/09/2009

SPW

Telephone with Dennis regarding
Picken's petition for rehearing.

0.60

No Charge

04/3012009

SPW

Review and respond to
correspondence from Terrt Pickens
office regarding motion and affidavit.

0.20

$35.00

05/14/2009

SPW

Prepare reply bri.ef in Opposlti on to
disqualification ofjudge.

6.00

$1,050.00

05/19/2009

SPW

Telephone call with Dusti:o Dessnier
regarding settling Marty out of the
case; telephone call. with client
regarding same; review motion to
strike brief filed. by Plckens.

0.75

$131.25

0511912009

SPW

Telephon.e caJl from Dustin Dessnier
regarding moti(ln to dsisqualify Judge
Mitchell, bond release and request to
mediate.

0.25

$43.75

05120/2009

SPW

Prepare response in opposition to
motion to strike and affidavit in
support of opposition to motion to
strike.

1.50

$262.50

06/0112009

SPW

Telephone call from Court Clerk;
transm.it requested tTanseript pages for
judge.

0.25

$43.75

06/09/2009

LLJ

PIC iTom Mr. Dessner about bond and
settlement offer.

0.20

$35.00

06/11/2009

LLJ

Review correspondence and lltip tram
Mr. Dessner. Dictate response letter.

0.30

$52.50

06/12/2009

SPW

Review motions and letter from.
Dessnier regarding payment ftom
appcal bond.

0.25

$43.75

08/24/21311

12:39

21385545741
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Date:
Report Time:

Matter History Report

Page:
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Requested By: Susan P Weeks

.James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
Client Number

1004)

MAtter Number: JVW-07·0114

Denni1: Akers
Akers. Dennis & Sherrie v. D.t. White Construction
Billing Mode:
Hourly

MAtter Type:
Oates Included nn Report: 01/0112009 Thro 08/24/2011

Date'

T'keeper Description

06/17/2009

SPW

06117/2009

Time Spent

Amount

Review motion by Pickens forrelease
of bond to pay her attomey fees;
revi.ew Marti Mortensen's objection;
prepare Akers' objection to motion.

0.75

$131.25

LLJ

PIC with Bob Covington. regarding
status and his suggestion to mediate.

0.30

$52.50

07/17/2009

SPW

Review order denying motion to
release bond.

0.20

$35.00

08/20/2009

T..T...J

PIc from Dusty Dejsner requesting
response to $25K offer.

0.10

$17.50

08/20/2009

LLJ

Strategy conf. re:gardingjo.int and
several liablity and its effects Of) any
settlement with Marty Mort.

0.10

$] 7.50

08/2712009

SPW

Attend status conference with Judge
Hosack; review files wi.th client.

1.25

$218.75

08/28/2009

SPW

Meeting with Lce regarding status of
pending settlement offers.

0.25

$43.75

10/05/2009

LLJ

PIc from client

0.10

$17.50

10/0512009

LU

PIc with Dennis regarding couner
offer to Marti.

0.30

$52.50

10/08/2009

LLJ

Client consuJt, bearing and
negotiations,

1.50

$262.50

10/19/2009

SPW

Telephone call with client.

0.30

$52.50

11/09/2009

SPW

Review correspondence from Jerry
Mortensen regarding motion.

0.25

$43.75

J 1/1812009

SPW

Prepare med.iation statem.ent.

1.50

$262.50

11/19/2009

SPW

Telephone call with client.

0.25

$43.75

I""'''''
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212186646741
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Matter ,History Report

08/2412011
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Page:
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Requested By: Susan P Weeks
Time:

James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
Denni:; Akers
10041
Matter Number: JVW·07'()114
Akers.• Dennis & Sherrie v. D.L. White Construction
Billing Mode: HOllrly
Matter Type:
Dates Included nn ·R.eport: 0110112009 Thru 08/24/2011
Client Number

Date'

T'keeper Description

) 1/20/2009

LU

J 112012009

1;,}t,..I/..L...J

Time Spent

Amount

Mediation prep. and med.iation.

5.00

$875.00

SPW

Prepare for and attend media.tion. with
Cbuck Lempesis.

5.00

No Charge

11/23/2009

SPW

Retu.rn call to client regarding
mediation.; locati.on of easement and
procedure going forward.

0.30

$52.50

11125/2009

SpW

Meet with client; review road profile
question.

0.25

$43.75

11130/2009

SPW

Meet with Bob Covington and review
Exhibits 6 and 174 on road location
over prescriptive area as descn"bed by
Scott Rasor; attend hearing before
Judge Mitchell.

1.40

$245.00

12/21/2009

SPW

Telephone call with Bob Covington
regarding survey maps.

0.25

$43.75

0111112010

SPW

R.eview decision from court on bond
release.

0.30

$52.50

01112/2010

S.PW

Telephone call with Bob Covington
regarding extension of brief.

0.25

$43.75

01125/2010

SPW

Review correspondence from Jerry
Mortensen; review brief

0.50

$87.50

02/02/2010

SPW

Telephone call with Bob Covington
regarding site inspection. Telephone
caU to client regarding same.

0.25

$43.75

02/03/2010

SPW

Telephone call with Bob Covington;
rev;ew correspondence from
Covington regarding release ofboncl..

0.25

$43.75

02/0412010

SPW

Respond to CovIngton's motion
re.lease ofbond.

0.25

$43.75

fOT

08/24/2011

12: 3'3
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Date:
Time:

Matter ,History Report
Pagc;
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Requested By: Susan P Week;s

James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
Dennis Akers
Matter Number: JVW-07-0114
Akers, Dennis & Sherrie v. DJ.... White Construction
MAtter Type:
Billing Mode: Hourly
Dates Included nn Report: 01/01/2009 Thru 08/24/2011
Client Number

10041

T'keeper Description
02/05120] 0

SPW

Site visit with opposjng counsel and

Time Spent

Amount

3.50

$612.50

surveyor; meet with clients.
02/] 0120 I 0

SPW

TeJepbone call with client On.
photographs

0040

$70.00

02/1112010

SPW

Meet with client; review documents.

2.50

$437.50

02/2312010

SPW

Telephone call with Scott Rasor;
prepare fax to Scott for legal
description..

0.25

$43.75

03/0112010

SPW

Telephone call with Dennis about
briefing location of easement.

0.70

$122.50

03/04/2010

SPW

Meet with client.

2.00

$350.00

03/0812010

SPW

Review remand exhibit; Telephone
call with Ed Rintamaki regarding
same.

0.25

$43.75

03/16/2010

SPW

Telephone caU with Jerry Monensen
regarding briefing on remand.

0.25

$43.75

04/09/2010

SPW

'Telephone call with client.

0.25

$43.75

04/12/2010

SPW

Telephone calls wit.h Dennis;
Telephone call with court regarding
resclleduJing matter.

1.00

$175.00

04114/2010

SPW

Legal research on scope of remand;
prepare motion to strike; prepare
memorandum in support of motion to

4.00

$700.00

strike.
04/15/2010

SPW

Review Mortensen's boef on easement
location

1.50

$262.50

04/19/20 I0

SPW

Telephone call with elm regarding
hearing date for remand; prepare
notice ofhearin8

0.25

$43.75

08/24/2011

12:39

20855457
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Requested By: Susan P Weeks

James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
Dennis Akers
Akers. Dennis & Sherrie v. DJ... White Construction
Billing Mode: Hourly

Client Number 10041
Matter Number: JVW·07·01 14
Mauer Type:

DatCA .neluded on Report: 01/0)/2009 Thru 08124/2011

Date'

T'keeper .Description

04/2112010

SPW

Telephone call with .Bob Covington
regarding remand hearing date; meet
with Covington and review map from

Time Spent

Amount

0.50

$87.50

1975.

04/27/2010

SPW

Telephone call with clerk; Prepare
amended notice ofheari.ng on motion
to strU<e.

0.2.5

$43.75

04/28/2010

SPW

Prepare fOT and atte.nd hearing on
motion to strike.

1.25

$218.75

05/0312010

SPW

Review court decision on motion to
strike partial summary judgment filed
by Marti Mortensen.

0.7S

$131.2.5

05112/2010

SPW

Review exhibits at court.

3.00

$525.00

05/]3/2010

SPW

Read White's brief; outline reply
argument; Telephone call with Meckel
regarding correcting date on legal
description.

4.00

$700.00

0.5/]4/2010

SPW

Review updated exhibit &.om Meckel.

0.25

$43.75

05119/2010

SPW

Attend motion to strike

1.00

$175.00

06/11/2010

SPW

Telephone call with client regarding
billing.

0.50

No Charge

0611512010

Sl'W

Finalize testimony synopsis; begin
exhibit synopsis for use in remand
brief.

8.00

$1,400.00

06/16/2010

SPW

Work on remand brief.

5.00

$875.00

06/17/2010

SPW

Finalize remand memorandum.

4.00

$700.00

07/0112010

SPW

Telephone call with cUent; review
brief by Covington; pt'eparc for
hearing; attend hearing

3.00

$525.00

08/24/2011

12:39

2085645741

Matter History Report

Date:

08/24/2011

Report Tirne:

7:05AM

J~age:

6 of 1:1
Requested By: Susan? Weeks

.James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
Client Numher 10041
Dennis Akers
Matter Number: NW-07-0114
Akers. Dennis & Sherrie v. D.L. White Construction
M.lltter Type:
Billin~ Mode:
Hourly
Dates Included on Report: 01101/2009 Thl'll 08/24/20 II
Date'

T'keeper Description

09129/20J.0

SPW

09/30/2010

Time Spent

Amount

Review decision from court; leave
message for client.

0.75

$131.25

SPW

Telephone call with Dennis regarding
damage phase of litigation.

0.25

$43.75

11110/2010

SPW

Review record; prepare remand brief
on damages

3.50

$612.50

11/18/20JO

SPW

Review materials from Jerry
Mortenson.

0.25

$43.75

1111912010

SPW

Prepare am.ended notice ofheanng.

0.25

$43.75

01/13/2011

SPW

Telephone call from Jerry Mortensen
regardin.g 1126111 hearing and. motion
to strike and/or reconsider and.
extending offer (If settlement to

0.40

$70.00

clients.
01/18/20 J 1

SPW

Begiu working on damage reply brief
on remand.

3.00

$525.00

01/191201,.

SPW

Finaljze reply brief; telephone call
from Jerry Motcnsen regarding motion
for reconsideration.

2.00

$350.00

01120/2011

SPW

Telephone call with Jerry Mortensen
regarding hearing.

0.25

$43.75

01124/20J 1

SPW

Review late filed response ofWh.ite;
prepare motlot) to strike; begin. reply

2.00

$350.00

brief.
01126/2011

SPW

Prepare for and attend hearing on
motion for damages on remand.

l.50

$262.50

OJ128/2011

SPW

Review Mortensen's affidavit on
issues to be reconsidered.

0.50

$87 ..50

02/07/2011

SPW

Review correspondence fTOm
opposing parties regarding hearing
date on Mortensen's motion to correct.

0.25

$43.75

08/24/2011

12:39

2085545741
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Requestecl By: Susan P Weeks

James, Vern,on & Weeks, .PA
Dennis Akers
Akers, Dennis &. Sherrie v. D.1... White Construction
Billing Mode: Hourly
Matter Type:
Date$ Included on Report: 0 I10 1/2009 Thru 08/24/201.1
CI,,:nt Number 10041
Matter Number: JVW-07-0t14

Date'

T'keeper Description

02/09/2011

SPW

02/10/20J 1

Time Spent

Amount

Work on response to Jerry
Mortenson's motion for
reconsideration.

5.00

$8'75.00

SPW

Continue working on brief in
opposition to motion to correct; ii.le
motion for additional time to respond
with court

3.25

$568.75

02/11/2011

SPW

Fi.nalize response memorandum for
court and tile.

1.00

$175.00

02/16/20.11

SPW

Prepare response to request for
submission of additiolUll evidence.

1.25

$218.75

02118/20 t 1

SPW

Review Mortensen's reply brief on
reconsideration.

0.75

$131.25

03/02/2011

SPW

Telephone call with cliontregaroing
questions on bill. and procedures.

0.25

"No Charge

03/2112011

SPW

Telephone call from Jeannie at Judge
Mitchell's ohambers regarding
transmission of decision; prepare
correspondence to client regarding
same; leave message for client.

0.30

$52.50

03/22/201l

SPW

Prepare for anti attend Jerry
Mortensen's motion to amend/correct
and reconsider. discuss matter with
client following hearing.

1.50

$262.50

03/24/2011

SPW

Review decision.

U5

$218.75

04/06/2011

SPW

Review pleadings of Jerry Mortensen

0.50

$87.50

05/27/2011

SPW

Review file; Prepare Fourth Amended
Judgment

1.00

$175.00

SUMMARY· By Time Ticket Type

08/24/2011

12:39

2085545741
Date:
Report Time:
Page:

Matter History Report

08/24/2011
7:0S .A.M
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Requested By: Susan P Weeks

James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
Denn is Akers

Client Number 10041
Motter Number: JVW-07·0114
M.atter Type:

Akers, Dennis & Sheme v. D.1... Wltite Construction
Billing Mode: Hourly
Oatcf; Ineluded on Report: 01101/2009 Thru 08/24/2011
Date'

T'keeper Description

Time Spent

Amount

Bil.lable:

104.40

$18,270,00

Trial:

0.00
0,00

$0.00

$0.00

0.00

$0.00

No Charge:

6.35

~O.OO

Mise No Charge:

0.00

$0.00

Total:

110.75

$18,270.00

Billable Timekeeper Hours & Fees..

96.50

$16,887.50

tLJ

Billable Timekeeper Hours & Fees ..

7.90

$1,382.50

SPW

No Charge Hours ......... .

6.35

$0.00

Flat Charge:
Non-Billable;

SUMMARY· By Timekeeper
SPW

Misc. Fee Debits & Credits.... .

$0.00
'J-

TotaJ:

$18,270.00

lJO.75

350.~

+

I~ ~".oo
I

06/0112009

TeJephon,e Charges from June 09

1112012009

Mediati(ln Fee

$250.00

12107/2009

Balance Due from Akers v. White

$143.75

04/01/2010

Mediation
Telephone Charges from March

$1.00

04/01/201.0

Research on WestLaw from April

$4.34

08/0 lIZ01 0

Research on WestLaw from July

$1.50

$1.00

SubTotal:

$401.59

SOPT COSTS

0)/26/2009

Photocopies

01/26/2009

Postage

$0.42

01126/2009

Postage
Postage

$0.76

02/0312009

$1.40

$0.42
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, ROBERT E. COVINGTON
A ttorney at Law
8884 North Government Way, Suite A
Hayden, ID 83835
Tel. 208-762-4545
Fax 208-762-4546
ISB#2312
,

.~

Attorney fnr D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and M chelle
White

.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT F
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOO ENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DAVID L. WHITE lind MICHELLE V.
WHITE, busband and wife; and
VERNON .J. MORTENSEN aDd MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-02-2 2

OBJECTION TO
AND MOTION TO
DISALLOW CLAIM "D
ATTORNEY FEES

)
)

)
)
)

)

----------------------)
Come now Defendants D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L.

bite and

Michelle V. White by and througb their attorney of record, Robert
Covington, to object to attorney fees claimed by the plaintiff in this action
in the amounts of $105,534.06, $6,037.50 and $19,170 and move the uurt

OBJECTION TO CLAIMED ATTORNEY FEES

:S17SV G9L eOG

1

:AS

J.N3~

pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(6) and S4(e)(6) to disallow all or a portion f said
fees and costs on the following grounds and for the following feaso

J. Ph.intiffs are not entitled to an award of costs and attorney f es as a
matter of right for the reason that they are not the prevailing parties
in this litigation in comparison to the relief and damages they sought
in this litigation nor in comparison to the relief and damages ought
by Defendants White in this litigation.

2. Total awarded costs for maps, surveys, etc. may not exceed

$ ..

00.

3. Pursuant to I.C. 6-202 no attorney fees may be awarded wher "No
Trespassing" signs are not posted as therein required. The r
this case does not demonstrate that the required signage was

osted to

provide the notice to Defendants White that is cODtemplated
202. (n addition, tbe actions of Defendants White were found to
constitute a trespass not willfully or intentionally undertaken with
knowledge tbat a trespass was occurring. All such acts were
undertaken ill the reasonable belief that the conduct did not onstitute
a trespass or proteeted by order of the Court. Any conduct
Defendant Mortensen tbat may be willful or intentional may
attributed to Defendants White under

I.e. 6·202 unless

0

ot be

auth rized by

White or reasonably within the scope of autbority that may h ve be
granted by White to Mortensen. Attorney fees are not theref re
allowable pursuant to I.C. 6-202.

OBJECTION TO CLAIMED ATTORNEY FEES

I

I

~

,_

l~t""'I

2

~

Hl

11\1::1'

4. Alternately, tbe plaintiffs should only be aJlowed to recover a torney
fees that were reasonably incurred in that portion of tbe adio

tbat

provides a statutory basis for an award of attorney t'ces, Idah

Code

Section 6.202. The attorney fees that have been sought by pia 'ntitIs
fail to segregate those made necessary to establish the trespas daim
to the extent determined hy the Court. The Court should use U·
discretion to apportion tbe fees sought in a reasonable manne
between tbe established trespass daim and those daims that

ere not

establisbed, e.g. quiet title against the easement claim, and tb se for
whieh no there is no statutory or contractual basis for an awa d of
attorney fees, punitive damages and damages for emotional di tress.

S. Idaho Code Section 12-121 does not provide a basis on which

Horney

fees may be awarded in this ease as tbe defendants White pre

establishin~ tbat they bad an easement across the plaintiffs'

roperty

to access White's property and to the extent tbey defended ag inst the
plaintiffs' claims, none of sucb defenses were frivolous or wit
foundation nor unreasonably presented to tbe Court.

DA TED tbis 7th day of Septem

OBJECTION TO CLAJMED ATTORNEY FEES

3

C

t

1 t"I

I I\I"::1C

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify tbat on the 7tb day of September, 2011, I cau cd to be
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoi11g instrument by facs mile
transmission to:

Susan Weeks
JamcR, Vernon & Vernon P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax: 208-664-1684
Dustin Deissner
Van Camp & Deissner
1707 W. Broadway Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201
Fax: 509·326-6978

And by mail to:
Vernon J. Mortensen
PO Box 330
Naples, ID 83847

OBJECTION TO CLAJMRD ATTORNEY FEES

Cu, ,..",....,..,

••

t

1-'11'"'1.

4

,

• 10

IM::l(

Dustin Deissner
DEISSNER LAW OFFICE
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane WA 99201
509.326.6935 voice
509.326.6978 fax
deissnerlaw@aol.com email
ISB# 5937

STATE OF IDAHO

•

~0l!JHY OF KOOTENAli 55

flLt.O:
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2nn SfP -8 PM 4: 4 f

Attorneys for Defendant
Marti Mortensen
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
VERNON 1. and MARTI MORTENSEN,
Defendants,
and
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L.
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE,
Defendants.
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L.
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and
wife,
Defendants,
and
VERNON 1. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL p.l

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Case No. CV-2002-222
)
)
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Pursuant to Idaho Appeal Rule 17 MARTI MORTENSEN hereby appeals as
follows:
(a) Title. The title of the action or proceeding is set out above.
(b) Court or Agency Title. The title of the court which heard the trial or proceeding is
set out above, the Hon. JOHN T. MITCHELL, District Judge, Presiding.
© Case Number. The number assigned to the action is set out above.
(d) Parties. The names of the parties and the parties' attorneys:
Appellant:
Attorney:

MARTI MORTENSEN
Dustin Deissner
Deissner Law Office'
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane WA 99201
509-326-6935
Deissnerlaw@aol.com

Respondent:
Attorney:

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS
Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Co-Appellant:

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE
and MICHELLE V. WHITE
Robert Covington,
8884 N Government Way, Ste A
Hayden, ID 83835

Attorney:

Co-Appellant:

VERNON J. MORTENSEN
POBOX 1922
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805

Pro Se.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

p. 2

(e) Designation of Appeal. (1) A Designation of the Judgment or Order Appealed
From: Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, 8110/2011, All
interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree
appealed from, All final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order
appealed from for which the time for appeal has not expired, and All interlocutory or
final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from.
(f) Issues. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal:
(1)

Whether evidence supports the location and size of the easement
determined by the Court;

(2)

Whether the evidence supports the award of damages, punitive damages and
attorneys fees;

(3)

Whether MARTI Mortensen should be permitted to raise new issues as to
the applicability of punitive damages to her in light of her divorce from
Vernon Mortensen.

(4)

Whether Judge Mitchell should have disqualified himself.

(g) Jurisdictional Statement. A statement as to the basis for the right to
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the judgments or orders described in
paragraph 1 of the notice of appeal.
This appeal is from a final judgment and is permitted under IAR 4 relating to a
NOTICE OF APPEAL

p. 3

person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court, and IAR 11(a)(1), final judgment.
(h) Transcript. No transcript of arguments will be requested. There was no new
testimony taken.
(I) Record. A designation of documents, if any, to be included in the clerk's or agency's

record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to the following Rule 28:

05/04/2009 Memorandum In Support Of Motion to DQ
05/04/2009 Motion to Disqualify
0511512009 Memorandum in Response to DefVJ Mortensen's Motion to DQ for
Cause

05119/2009 Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to
V.J. Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify for Cause

05/20/2009 Memorandum in response to Defendant V.J. Mortensen's motion to
strike Plaintiffs response to V.J. Mortensen's motion to disqualify for cause

05/20/2009 Affidavit of weeks in support of opposition to motion to strike
05/29/2009 Order RE: Defendant VJ Mortensen's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause

06101/2009 Order on Defendat Vernon Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify
06/19/2009 Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Disqualify
06/30/2009 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Vernon Mortensen's
Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to

NOTICE OF APPEAL p. 4

Disqualify
10/22/2009 Brief of Defendants White Re: Proof of Easement Location
10/22/2009 Memorandum Re: Burden of Proof by MARTI Mortensen
10/30/2009 Brief of Defandant Vernon J Mortensen

12/0112009 Order Regarding Burdens of Proof, and Order Establishing Briefing
Schedule on Easement Location
01122/2010 Brief Of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location Of Easement
03/29/2010 Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location
03/30/2010 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Punitive Damages

Against MARTI Mortensen
03/30/2010 Affidavit of MARTI Mortensen
04114/2010 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike MARTI Mortensen's

Motion For Summary Judgment
04/27/2010 Response to Motion to Strike
05/03/2010 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to

Strike Defendant Marti Mortensen's Motion for Summary Judgment
0611712010 Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding Location of Easement
06/24/2010 Reply Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location
06/30/2010 Affidavit of Mike Hathaway
06/30/2010 Motion to Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement Location
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09/29/2010 Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Order RE: Easement Location
11 II 0/20 10 Plaintiffs Memorandum on Second Remand re Damages
11117/2010 MARTI Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages
01118/2011 Reply Brief Of Defendants White
01119/2011 Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway
01119/2011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum On Second Remand Re: Damages
01124/2011 Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order

Filed 01102/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order On Reconsideration, On New
Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages
and Order filed on 04/01104
01124/2011 Affidavit In Support of Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact,

Conclusions Of Law And Order Filed 01102/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order
On Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages and Order Filed on 04/01104
01125/2011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum To Defendants Whites' Reply Brief

On Second Remand RE Damages
01125/2011 Supplemental Affidavit Of Mike Hathaway
02/11/2011 Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact & Conclusions of

Law & Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact
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& Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages

02116/2011 Post-Hearing Memorandum RE White's Motion To Admit Additional

Evidence RE Easement Location
02/18/2011 Reply to Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to

Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location
03118/2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand RE: Damages, and

Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location
04/05/2011 Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand

Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement
Location
05/23/2011 Memo Decision & Order Denying: 1) Deft Vernon Mortensen's Affd

on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, Filed 1-2-3 &
Memo Decision & Order on Reconsideration of New Trial Issues & Additional Findings
of Fact, Conclusion of Law Regarding Damages & Order Filed 4-1-04 & 2) Deft Vernon
Mortensen's Motion to Reconsider Memo Decision & Order on Remand RE: Damages &
Order Denying White's Motion for Additional Evidence on Easment Location
08/10/2011 Fourth AMENDED Judgment and Decree on Second Remand
08/24/2011 Motion To Reconsider
08/24/2011 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Of Costs (Including Attorney

Fees Incurred Through August 24,2011)
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08/24/2011 IRCP 54( e)(3) and (e)( 5) Affidavit Of Susan P Weeks In Support of

Plaintiffs' Claims For Attorney Fees On Second Remand
09/07/2011 Objection to the Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees

U) Exhibits-Civil Cases. A designation of documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits in a trial or hearing to be copies and sent to the Supreme Court: All
exhibits referred to by the Court in its memorandum opinion filed 9/29/2010.
(k) Sealed Record. Not Applicable.

(1) Certification: Dustin Deissner Certifies:
(1) A copy of the of the notice of appeal has been served upon the reporter of the
trial or proceeding, JULIE FOLAND, PO Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000,
julie foland@yahoo.com.
(2) That appellant is exempt from payingthe clerk of the district court or
administrative agency the estimated fees for preparation of the designated reporter's
transcript because no transcript has been ordered
(3) That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record have
been paid, in the current amount of $100.00 pursuant to IAR 27(d).
(4) That all appellate filing fees have been paid.
(5) That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.
So Certified:
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September 8, 2011

'"
Dustin Deissner
Attorney for MARTI Mortensen
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Dustin Deissner certifies:
I have on this date served the foregoing document upon the following parties by
the following means:
TO:

BY:

VERNON J. MORTENSEN
POBOX 1922
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805

[X] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[] Email

Robert Covington,
8884 N Government Way, Ste A
Hayden, ID 83835

[x ] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[ ] Facsimile to: 208-762-4546

Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[X ] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[ ] Facsimile to: (208) 664-1684

JULIE FOLAND, PO Box 9000, Coeur
d'Alene, ID 83816-9000,
julie_ foland@yahoo.com

[X ] US Mail 15t Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[ ] Facsimile to:

Dated - - - -
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STA;E OF JOAHO
i
:qUJ~fY OF KOOTENArf 5S
r ILEu:

tjOc)&

Vernon Jerry Mortensen

r
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PO Box 330
Naples, Idaho 83847
208-946- 8274
Pro Se

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO AND IN THE COUNTY OF
KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE and SHERRIE L. AKERS
)

husband and wife
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 2002-229NOTICE of APPEAL

v.
VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN
Defendants,

)
)

Pursuant to Idaho Appeal Rule 17 VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN hereby
appeals as follows:
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Page 1

(a)

Title. The title of the action or proceeding is set out above.

(b)

Court or Agency Title. The title of the court which heard the trial or
proceeding is set out above, the Hon. JOHN T. MITCI{ELL, District Judge,
Presiding.

(c)

Case Number. The number assigned to the action is set out above.

(d)

Parties. The names of the parties and the parties' attorneys:

Appellant:

VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN
Attorney: pro se
PO Box 330
Naples, Idaho 83847
208-946-8275
jerrymortensen@hotmail.com

Respondent:

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SFIERRIE L. AKERS
Attorney: Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Co-Appellant: D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE
and MICFIELLE V. WHITE
Attorney: Robert Covington,
8884 N Government Way, Ste A
Hayden, ID 83835

Co-Appellant:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Marti Mortensen
Attorney: Dustin Deissner
Deissner Law Office
1707 W. Broadway Ave
Spokane WA 99201
509-326-6935
Page 2

Deissnerlaw@aol.com
(e)

Designation of Appeal. (1) A Designation of the Judgment or Order
~ppealed

From: Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second

IRemand, 8/1012011, All interlocutory judgments and orders entered
prior to the judgment, order or decree appealed from, All final
judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed
from for which the time for appeal has not expired, and All
interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the judgment
or order appealed from.

(fJ

Issues. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the
appellant then intends to assert in the appeal:

(1)

Whether evidence supports the location and size of the easement
determined by the Court.

(2)

Whether the evidence supports the award of damages, punitive
damages and attorney's fees.

(3)

Whether the Court's conclusions were tainted with errors,
supposed facts not supported by the trial transcript.

(4)

Whether the Court was biased.

(5)

Whether Judge Mitchell should have disqualified himself.
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(g)

Jurisdictional Statement. A statement as to the basis for the right to
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the judgments or orders
described in paragraph 1 of the notice of appeal.
This appeal is from a final judgment and is permitted under IAR 4
relating to a person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court, and
IAR 11(a)(1), final judgment.

(h)

Transcript. No transcript of arguments will be requested. There was no
new testimony taken.

(I)

Record. A designation of documents, if any, to be included in the clerk's
or agency's record in addition to those automatically included pursuant
to the following Rule 28:
05/04/2009

Memorandum In Support Of Motion to Disqualify

05/04/2009

Motion to Disqualify

05/15/2009

Memorandum in Response to Defendant VJ
Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify for Cause

05/19/2009

Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum
in Response to V.J. Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify
for Cause
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051/20/2009

Memorandum in response to Defendant V.J.
Mortensen's motion to strike Plaintiffs response to V.].
Mortensen's motion to disqualify for cause.

OS/20/2009

Affidavit of weeks in support of opposition to motion
to strike

OS/29/2009

Order RE: Defendant VJ Mortensen's Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to
Disqualify Judge for Cause

06/01/2009

Order on Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to
Disqualify

06/19/2009

Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to
Disqualify

06/30/2009

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant
Vernon Mortensen's Motion for Reconsideration of
Denial of Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to
Disqualify.

10/22/2009

Brief of Defendants White Re: Proof of Easement
Location

10/22/2009

Memorandum Re: Burden of Proof by MARTI
Mortensen.
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10/30/2009

Brief of Defendant Vernon J Mortensen

12/01/2009

Order Regarding Burdens of Proof, and Order
Establishing Briefing Schedule on Easement Location.

01/22/2010

Brief Of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location Of
Easement

03/29/2010

Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section24 Easement
Location

03/30/2010

Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Punitive
Damages against MARTI Mortensen

03/30/2010

Affidavit of MARTI Mortensen

04/14/2010

Memorandum In Support Of Motion to Strike MARTI
Mortensen's Motion for Summary Judgment

04/27/2010

Response to Motion to Strike

05/03/2010

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike Defendant Marti Mortensen's Motion
for Summary Judgment

06/17/2010

Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding
Location of Easement

06/24/2010

Reply Brief of Defendants White RE: Section24
Easement Location
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06/30/2010

Affidavit of Mike Hathaway

06/30/2010

Motion to Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement
Location

09/29/2010

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact Conclusions
of Law and Order RE: Easement Location

11/10/2010

Plaintiffs Memorandum on Second Remand re
Damages

11/17/2010

MARTI Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages

01/18/2011

Reply Brief Of Defendants White

01/19/2011

Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway

01/19/2011

Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum On Second Remand Re:
Damages

01/24/12011

Motion to Correct Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of
Law And Order Filed 01/02/03 AND Memorandum
Decision And Order On Reconsideration, On New
Trial Issues and Additional Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages and Order
filed on 04101/04
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01/24/2011

Affidavit In Support of Motion To Correct Findings Of
Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order Filed 01/02/03
AND Memorandum Decision And Order On
Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues And Additional
Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law Regarding
Damages and Order Filed on04/0l/04

01/25/2011

Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites'
Reply Brief on Second Remand RE Damages

01/25/2011

Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway

02/11/2011

Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law & Motion for Reconsideration on
New Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages

02/16/2011

Post-Hearing Memorandum RE White's Motion To
Admit Additional Evidence RE Easement Location

02/18/2011

Reply to Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re:
Whites' Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re:
Easement Location
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03/18/2011

Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand RE:
Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for
Additional Evidence on Easement Location

04/05/2011

Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and
Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying
Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement
Location

OS/23/2011

Memo Decision & Order Denying: (1) Deft Vernon
Mortensen's Affidavit on Motion to Correct Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, Filed 1-2-3 &
Memo Decision & Order on Reconsideration of New
Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusion
of Law Regarding Damages & Order Filed 4-1-04 &
(2)Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to
Reconsider Memo Decision & Order on Remand RE:
Damages & Order Denying White's Motion for
Additional Evidence on Easement Location
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08/10/2011

Fourth AMENDED Judgment and Decree on Second
Remand

08/24/2011

Motion to Reconsider

08/24/2011

Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs
(Including Attorney Fees Incurred Through August
24, 2011)

08/24/12011

IRCP Sa( e) (3) and (e) (5) Affidavit Of Susan P Weeks
In Support of Plaintiffs' Claims For Attorney Fees On
Second Remand

09/07/2011

Objection to the Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney
Fees

(D

Exhibits-Civil Cases. A designation of documents, charts, or pictures
offered or admitted as exhibits in a trial or hearing to be copies and sent
to the Supreme Court: All exhibits referred to by the Court in its
memorandum opinion filed 9/29/2010.

(k)

Sealed Record. Not Applicable.

(1)

Certification: Vernon Jerry Mortensen Certifies:
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Dustin Deissner
DEISSNER LAW OFFICE
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane WA 99201
509.326.6935 voice
509.326.6978 fax
deissnerlaw@aol.com email
ISB# 5937

2011 SEP 30 AM 10: 30

Attorneys for Defendant
Marti Mortensen
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS,
husband and wife,
Respondents,
v.
VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN,
Appellants,
and
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L.
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE,
Defendants
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS,
husband and wife,
Respondents,
v.
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L.
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and
wife,
Defendants,
and
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
Appellants.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Case No. CV-2002-222
)
)
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
) (AMENDED)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT(S), DENNIS LYLE AKERS and
SHERRIE L. AKERS, husband and wife, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS,
Susan Weeks AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1. The above named appellants VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN appeal
against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court frorrFourth
Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand,entered in the above entitled
action on the 10th day of August, 2011, Honorable Judge John T. Mitchell presiding; all
interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree
appealed from, All final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order
appealed from for which the time for appeal has not expired, and All interlocutory or
final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and
pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1) LA.R.
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on apeal which the appellant
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on
appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on
appeal:
(1)

Whether evidence supports the location and size of the easement determined
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by the Court;
(2)

Whether the evidence supports the award of damages, punitive damages and
attorneys fees;

(3)

Whether MARTI Mortensen should be permitted to raise new issues as to
the applicability of punitive damages to her in light of her divorce from
Vernon Mortensen.

(4)

Whether Judge Mitchell should have disqualified himself.

4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO
If so, what portion?
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? NO.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included
under Rule 28, LA.R.
05/04/2009 Memorandum In Support Of Motion to DQ
05/04/2009 Motion to Disqualify
0511512009 Memorandum in Response to DefVJ Mortensen's Motion to DQ for

Cause
05/19/2009 Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to

V.J. Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify for Cause
05/20/2009 Memorandum in response to Defendant V.J. Mortensen's motion to
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strike Plaintiffs response to V.J. Mortensen's motion to disqualify for cause

05/20/2009 Affidavit of weeks in support of opposition to motion to strike
05/29/2009 Order RE: Defendant VJ Mortensen's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause

06/01/2009 Order on Defendat Vernon Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify
06/19/2009 Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Disqualify
06/30/2009 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Vernon Mortensen's
Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to
Disqualify

10/22/2009 Brief of Defendants White Re: Proof of Easement Location
10122/2009 Memorandum Re: Burden of Proof by MARTI Mortensen
10/30/2009 Brief of Defandant Vernon J Mortensen
12/01/2009 Order Regarding Burdens of Proof, and Order Establishing Briefing
Schedule on Easement Location

01122/2010 Brief Of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location Of Easement
03/29/2010 Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location
03/30/2010 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Punitive Damages
Against MARTI Mortensen

03/30/2010 Affidavit of MARTI Mortensen
04/14/2010 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike MARTI Mortensen's
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Motion For Summary Judgment
04/27/2010 Response to Motion to Strike
05/03/2010 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to

Strike Defendant Marti Mortensen's Motion for Summary Judgment
0611 712010 Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding Location of Easement
06/2412010 Reply Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location
06/30/2010 Affidavit of Mike Hathaway
06/3012010 Motion to Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement Location
09/29/2010 Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Order RE: Easement Location
11/10/2010 Plaintiffs Memorandum on Second Remand re Damages
11/17/2010 MARTI Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages
0111812011 Reply Brief Of Defendants White
01119/2011 Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway
01119/2011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum On Second Remand Re: Damages
01/24/2011 Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order

Filed 01102/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order On Reconsideration, On New
Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages
and Order filed on 04/01/04
01/24/2011 Affidavit In Support of Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact,
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Conclusions Of Law And Order Filed 01/02/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order
On Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact, Conclusions
Of Law Regarding Damages and Order Filed on 04/01/04
0112512011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum To Defendants Whites' Reply Brief

On Second Remand RE Damages
01/25/2011 Supplemental Affidavit Of Mike Hathaway
02/11/2011 Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact & Conclusions of

Law & Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact
& Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages

02/1612011 Post-Hearing Memorandum RE White's Motion To Admit Additional

Evidence RE Easement Location
0211812011 Reply to Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to

Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location
03118/2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand RE: Damages, and

Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location
04/05/2011 Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand

Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement
Location
05/23/2011 Memo Decision & Order Denying: 1) Deft Vernon Mortensen's Affd

on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, Filed 1-2-3 &
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Memo Decision & Order on Reconsideration of New Trial Issues & Additional Findings
of Fact, Conclusion of Law Regarding Damages & Order Filed 4-1-04 & 2) Deft Vernon
Mortensen's Motion to Reconsider Memo Decision & Order on Remand RE: Damages &
Order Denying White's Motion for Additional Evidence on Easment Location
08110/2011 Fourth AMENDED Judgment and Decree on Second Remand
08/24/2011 Motion To Reconsider
08/24/2011 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Of Costs (Including Attorney

Fees Incurred Through August 24,2011)
08/24/2011 IRCP 54( e)(3) and (e)( 5) Affidavit Of Susan P Weeks In Support of

Plaintiffs' Claims For Attorney Fees On Second Remand
09/07/2011 Objection to the Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees

7. Civil Cases Only. The appellant requests the following documents,
charts, or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and
sent to the Supreme Court.
All exhibits referred to by the Court in its memorandum opinion filed 9/29/2010.
8. I certify:
( a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:

Reporter:

JULIE FOLAND,
PO Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000,
julie foland@yahoo.com.
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(b) (1) [X] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid
the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. THAT FEE WAS $ 0
BECAUSE NO TRANSCRIPT IS REQUESTED.
(c) (1) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has
been paid in the current amount of $1 00.00 pursuant to IAR 27( d).
(d) (1) [X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20:
Appellant:
Attorney:

MARTI MORTENSEN
Dustin Deissner
Deissner Law Office'
1707 W. Broadway Ave.
Spokane WA 99201
509-326-6935
Deissnerlaw@aol.com

Respondent:
Attorney:

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS
Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Co-Appellant:

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE and
MICHELLE V. WHITE
Robert Covington,
8884 N Government Way, Ste A
Hayden, ID 83835

Attorney:

Co-Appellant:

VERNON J. MORTENSEN
PO BOX 1922
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805
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Pro Se.
So Certified: September 29,2011

Dustm
Issner
Attorney for MARTI Mortensen
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Dustin Deissner certifies:
I have on this date served the foregoing document upon the following parties by
the following means:
TO:

BY:

VERNON J. MORTENSEN
POBOX 1922
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805

[X] US Mail 151 Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[] Email

Robert Covington,
8884 N Government Way, Ste A
Hayden, ID 83835

[x ] US Mail 151 Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[ ] Facsimile to: 208-762-4546

Susan Weeks
J ames, Vernon & Weeks, P. A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[X ] US Mail 1sl Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[] Facsimile to: (208) 664-1684

JULIE FOLAND, PO Box 9000, Coeur
d'Alene, ID 83816-9000,
julie_ foland@yahoo.com

[X ] US Mail 1sl Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[ ] Facsimile to:

Dated September 29, 2011

®

Dustm DeIssner
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--

SIAl:

ui- r(jili.if ;

ROBERT E. COVINGTON
Attorney at Law
8884 North Government Way, Suite A
Hayden, ID 83835
Tel. 208-762·4545
Fax 208·762·4546
ISB#2312

Attorney for D.L. White Construction, Int., David
Michelle V. White

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STA l'E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
KOOTENAI

DENNiS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

)
)

)
)
)
)

vs.

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DA VJD L. WHTTE Hnd MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband aDd wife; and
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wile,

Defendants.

.

COU.N.'TYsjiO'r,,'n:N" l (.
FILED ) SLf ~'c... f\).

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-02-222

MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF
OBJECT) ON TO
CLAIM FOR
A TTORNEY FEES

)

)
)
)
)
)

------------------------------------)
Defendants D.L. White Construction, Inc., David 1. White and
Michelle V. White, hereinafter "Whitcs'\ by and through their attorney,

Robert Covington. submit herewith their Memorandum Tn Support of
Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees submitted in this action by

Plaintiffs. Each of the remands in this proceeding has vacated the tria)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW
ATTORNEY'S FEES·!

1

court's entire award of attorney fees.

Though the trial court has

reinstated its previous awards of attorney fees, Whites object to an award
of attorney fees during the entire course of these proceedings, including

$105,534.06 prior to the initial appeal, $6,037.50 after the initial remand
and $19,170 after the second remand from the Supreme Court. Because
previous awards of attorney fees were entirely vacated, Whites submit
that the trial court must now review and determine what attorney fees, if
any, are appropriately awarded from the inception of this case to the
present tjme.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek award of a total of $130,741 in athlTneys' fees.
Defendants object to this request on the grounds and for reasons inc1uding
without limitation those set forth in Whites Objection to and Motion to
Disal10w C1aimed Attorney Fees.

1:.

Failure to Comply with l.R.C . .i!:.

In making an award of attorney fees, the court should consider
several factors in determining the amount of such fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
The attorneys' fees must be reasonably and necessarily incurred and the
fees must be commensurate with fees charged by other attorneys in the
area for litigation of this type.
The Plaintiffs did not address the factors that must be taken into
consideratjon in charging

attorneys~

fees. Those factors are: 1) the time

and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the
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skill requisite to perfornl the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 4) the prevailing
charges for like work; 5) whether the fee is fixed or contingtmt; 6) the

time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstance!'; or the case; 7)
the amount involved and the results obtained; 8) the undesirability of the
ca~e; 9) the nature and length of the professiona1 relationship with the

client; 10) awards in similar cases; and 11) the reasonable costs of
automated legal research.
After these factors are addressed, the party seeking fees must
verify, under ollth, that the fees were reasonably, necessarily and actual1y
incurred. Plaintiffs failed to follow all of the foregoing requirements and
therefore, this Court should disallow those attorneys fees altogether.

2.

Any Fees Should Be Apportjoned

A Judge may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and thus the judge may apportion the costs
between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after
considering all of the jssues al1d claims involved in

lh~

action and the

resultant judgment or judgments obtained. Smith v. MitlOn, 140 Jdaho 893,

104 P .3d 367 (2004). The Idabo Court of Appeals made it clear in Nalen
v. Jenkins.

113 ID 79 (Idaho App. ] 987). that in considering a claim for

attorney fees, '·It is important to keep in mind the di stinction between
multiple "claims" and multiple "theories". In this case, the Plaintiffs
made a variety of claims for relief, some of which are successful to this

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW
ATTORNEY'S FEES·3

point and some unsuccessful, to this point, e.g. trespass, emotional
distress, quiet title, punitive damages. The appropriateness of an award

of aLtorney fees to Plaintiffs depends upon careful application of relevant
criteria and appropriate law. Trespass claims under 6·202 have statutory

support for attorney fees; punitjye damages, quiet title, and emotional
distress have no such "UPPOTt. The trial count should award fees only
where supported by statute for claims under that Slalute. Thus, the
Plaintiffs claims for fees must be parsed among the vari()us claims. The
Plainti ffs have provided no basis to this point for such apportionment.

In this case, if Plaintiffs are entitled to any fees on the claims that
they prevailed, i.e. trespass, the fees should be apportiolled to the amount
of fees actual1y incurred prosecuting the succe8sful trespass claim. No
fees should be awarded for unsuccessfu1 trespass claims, e.g. over Parcel
B and within the 12.2 foot easement area. There is no basi sunder Tdaho

law t.o award fees associated with the emotional distress claim or punitive
damages claims. Thus, this Court should apportion the attorney fees
requested accordingJy.
The successful claim of Plaintiffs for lrespass occurred in the area
of the disputed triangle. A claim for attorney fees dependR entirely on
whether the Plaintiffs posted signa.ge to indicate that the disputed triangle
was thei r property. The photographic evidence in this case

shOWlil

only

that the Plaintiffs' signage claims property to their gate location which
did nut include the disputed triangle. Hence, no attorney fees for trespass

MF.MORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW
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under 6-202 are appropriate for trespass proved in the di sputed triangle.
Likewise, an award of attorney fees under 6-202 is appropriate only where
t.he conduct of Defendants was willful and intentional. Gi yen the course
of conveyancing. fencing and use in this case, it cannot be fairly
determined that Whites use of the disputed triangle was willful or
intentional within the meaning of 6·202. No trespass attorney fees are
therefore approprial~.
If any attol11ey fees are nevertheless to be awarded under 6-202.
they must be reasonably related to prevailing on the claim for trespass in
the disputed triangle. not in Parcel B and not on the express easement.
P1aintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating attorney fees incurn:d in
prosecuting that claim. The matters presented in support of Plaintiffs
claim for trespass in the disputed triangle do not identify time spent

specifically on such claim.
The Plaintiffs have been awarded damages for trespass of $51,008.
A reasonable attorney fee for prosecuting such claim under the relevant
fee agreement may be as much as 45% or $22.953. As the Court is aware,
in Good

VS.

Sic.helsticl, Koot~nai County Case No. 2010-1862, a trespass

case under 6-202 decided by the tria.l court in June, 2011. trespass
damages were found to be $49,769 and attorney fees awarded therein
based upon IRCP criteria were $21,944. Whites submit that an award of
$22,953 to Plaintiffs for successful prosecution of a trespass claim under
6-202 that generates damages of $51,008 represents a reasonable
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apportionment of fees in this case jf the other criteria of 6~202 are
satisfied. There should be no award of fees for successful prosecution of
claims for punitive damages, emotional distress and unsuccessful claims
that no easement exists in Parcel B.

J.:.

Prevailing Party Determination

Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, because Plaintiffs are not the prevailing
party as required by the rule and statute. The Jdaho Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically require the following analysis to determine who is

the prevailing party:

(B) Prevailing Party. Tn determining which party to an action is a
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial c~>urt shall in its
sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action
in relation to the relief sought by the respective parti es, whether
there were multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims~ third
party claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross issues between
the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each
of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion may
determine that a party to an actiun prevailed in part and did not
prevail in part, and upon so ttnding may apportion lhe costs
between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after
considering a11 of the issues and claims involved in the action and
the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
I.R.C.P. S4(d)(l)(B).
The determination of who is a prevailing party, for the purpose of
receiving an award of attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Israel v. Leachman, 72 P .3d 864 (Idaho 2003);

Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582, 634 P .2d 623 (1981). The rules
require the trial court to make an analysis of the entire action, including

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW
ATTORNEY'S FEES-6

the claims made and the relief obtained by the parties. brael, 72 P .3d at
867.

In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs sought to quiet title to Whites'

easement, and then sought damages for trespass and emotional distress.
However, Whites' casement was admitted by Plaintiffs and affirmed by

the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal and remanded to this Court. The final
judgment reflects that the Defendants have an easement from Mi11sap
Loop Road to the section line over and across Plaintiffs' property.
Furthermore, Plaintjffs sought welt over one million dollars in
damages against the Defendants, but this Court only awarded damages
eligible for an attorney fee award in the amount of $51 ,000 against
Defendants. When comparing the amount of relief sought by Plaintiffs for
which they may have a claim for attorney fees with the relief they actually
obtained from this Court, the Plaint.iffs are not the prevailing party.
Finally, given that the Plaintiffs admitted that Whites have an casement
across Parcel B only after claiming and litigating incredibly a cJaim that
the roadway never cTossed into Parc.el S, it would be reasonable and
appropriate to regard that portion of the lawsuit as frivolous and
unsuccessful. No a.ttorney fees should be awarded for Plaintiffs' claims
on the Parcel B easement issue.
CONCLUSION

Defendants object to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney's Fees because Plaintiffs failed to comply with the rules of civil
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procedure, P1aintiffs were not the prevaiJing party on a claim

fOT

which

attorney fees are arguable availabJe except as to a trespass claim in the
disputed triangle, and there is no basis in Idaho law to award attorney
fees. If any fees are to be awarded. the fees should be apportioned
accordingly.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2011.

~ERTIFICATE OJ~ SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of October, 2011, I caused to
be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by
facsimile transmission to:

Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Vernon P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' AJene, Idaho 83814
Fax: 208-664-1684
Dustin Deissner
Van Camp & Deissner
1707 W. Broadway Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201
Fax: S09-326~6978

And by mail to:
Vernon J. Mortensen
PO Box 330
Naples, TD
847
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Susan Po Weeks, ISB # 4255
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
FAX: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys for: Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAJ
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-02-222
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT
WHITE'S MOTION TO DISALLOW
ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiffs,
VS.

0.1. WHITE CONSTRUCTJON, INC.;
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE~ husband and wife; and VERNON 1.
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN,
husband and wife,
Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant White has moved to disa1Jow attorney fees in this matter on.
several grounds. The original Objection to attorney fees .filed September 7, 2011
raised five objections. A subsequent Memorandum in Support of the Objection
raised additional. grounds for o~jection.
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In reviewing a trial court's decision regarding attorneys, fees. an. abuse of
discretion standard is folJowed.

In determining whether a trial court properly

exercised its discretion in an award of attorney fees, the Supreme Court considers
(1) whether the trial court. correctly perceived the .issue as one of discretion; (2)

whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specifi.c choices ava.ilable to
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun

Valley Shopping Or., Inc.

\I.

Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,

1000 (1991).

White submits that this Court did not have the discretion based
remand to reinstate previously awarded attorney fees.

Up0l1

the

This argument is made

because White has not previously argued apportionment and wishes to do so now
without facing a challei1ge of waiver. Akers disagrees with this assessment and
believes White has waived thelr apportionment argument. However, to the extent
that the Court finds merit in White's argument that this matter is now before the
Court, Akers presents the following response on all attorney fee i.ssues.
IJ. PREVAILING PARTY STATUS
A.

Lega.l Standard

Tn the recent case of Shore 11. Peterson, .l46ldaho 903.914.204 P.3d 1J./4,
1125 (2009), the Supreme Court provided a comprehensive analysis of the

determination of a prevailing party in an action and he1 d:
A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter
of right and may, in. some cases, also be awar.ded discretionary costs
and attorney fees. Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(1). A determination on
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANJ: vtI-;qr,.e's MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES: 1
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prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141
Idaho 716, 718·19, 117 P.3d 130, ] 32-33 (2005), Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure S4(d)(1)(B) guides courts' inquir.ies on the prevailing party
question. Jd. at 719, 117 PJd at 133. That mle provides:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action
in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. TIle
trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party
to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in Palt, and
upon so finding may apportion the costs between alld
among the parties in a fail' and equitable man.ner. after
considering aU of the issues and claims involved in the
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
Idaho R. eiv. P. S4(d)(l)(B). In detel1l1ining which party prevailed
where there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties,
the court determines who prevailed "in the action"; that is, the
prevailing party question is examm.ed and detennined from an
overall view, not a claim~by·clair.:n analysis. Eighteen Mile, 141
Idaho at 719, 117 PJd at 133.
Only in rare cases has this Court or the Court of Appeals reversed a
trial court's determination of which party prevailed. In. Eighteen Mile,
we reversed the trial court's determination that although the
defendants had successfully defended against plaintiffs complah1t,
because they recovered only a small portion of what they desired on
their counterclaim, they were not prevailing parties. Jd. at 719, 117
P.3d at 133. In. that case we emphasized that a defendant's non~
liability is evidence that it is the prevailing party. In Daisy
Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball j..)jJorts, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d
914 (Ct.App.2000), the Court of Appeals observed: "The· 'result
obtained' in this case was a dismissal of [plaintiffs] action with
pr~iudice, the most favorable outcome that could possibly be
achieved by [a defendant]. [The plaintiff] gained no benefit as a
consequ.ence of the Iitigation." Id. at 262, 999 P.2d at 917, Those
cases illustrate that a defendant may be the prevailing party when he
or she is ultimately found not Hable.
When both parties are partially successful, however, it is within the
court's discretion to decline an. award of attorney fees to either side.
Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003). In
hrael, the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim tmder the Idaho
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WHITE'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES: 1
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Consumer Protection Act, but did not prevall on their claims for
breach of c011tract, statutory violations, and fraud. Id. at 25-26, 72
P.3d at 865~66. We affirmed the district court's decision to award no
attorney fees because it determined that both parties prevailed in part.
Id. at 28, 72 PJd 864, 72 PJd at 868.
The district court's determination of who is a preva.iling party will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Trilogy Network Sys .. Inc.
v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007). When
examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether the trial court: (l) perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion 8.11d
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specifi.c
choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by ill1 exercise of
reason.Id. (affirming the trial court's decision that each party bear its
own costs jn a case where a plaintiff successfully showed a breach of
contract, but failed to provide adequate evidence to show damages
that were not mere speculation.)
B.

Akers PrevaUed in this Matter

White claims Akers are not a prevailing party in this litigatio)1 in comparison
to the relief and damages they sougbt or ill comparison of the relief and. damages
sought by White in this litigation. Nothing could be farther from the tnlth.
Pursuant to this Court's conclusions oflaw, Plaintiffs are the prevailing
parties. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed Janu.ary 2, 2003,
paragraph 28).
In spite of the Court's specific ruling, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are
not the prevailing party. Plaintiffs sued Defendants for trespass and won. Plaintiffs
amended their complaint to include a claim for emotional distress damages and
won. Plaintiffs never did dispute there was an express easement that was the width
of the existing travel way. The Court decided with Plainti.ffs on these issues.
The Defendants gained no benefit as a result of their quiet title
PLAJNTIFFS~ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WHITE'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES: 1
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counterc.laims. The access road exists exactly as it did prior to the litigation.
Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties.
III. Total Costs Awarded

White correctly notes that the costs for maps, surveys, etc. may not exceed
$500. Akers requested the cost of the preparation of the legal description utilized by
th.e Court in its :5.nal judgnlent. The Court is mandated by Idallo case I.aw to have
such a descripti.on in defining an easement. The law is silent as to whose
responsibility it is to pay for that cost. Akers wou1d request the $50 excess be
awarded as a discretionary cost under 54(d)(1)(D). TIle Court was required to
obtain this legal. description. The cost was necessary for the court to discharge its
duties and therefore was reasonably incurred. The request for quiet title was
brought by Whites, not Akers. White should bear the cost of providing the Court
the infonn.ation required for the Court to meet its legal mandate. Thus, the excess
cost was an exceptional cost to Akers which in fairness should be bome by White.
IV. Attorney Fees

A.

Statutory Standards

Previously~

this COl.llt awarded attorney fees on. the basis of trespass.

Plall1tiffshave also requested attorney fees under I.C. § 12·123 ba.sed upon fiivolous
conduct by White and Mortensen.

Idaho Code §6·202 defines different types of trespasses that can occur.
They include, trespass against postings; timber trespass; and right of way trespass.
In Earl v. Fordice, 84 Idaho 542, 545, 374 P.2d 713, 714 (1962), the Supreme Court
also held that, "it is necessary to establish the trespass was willful and intentiol1aUy
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WHITE'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES: 1
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Intentional" is defined as II [d]one with the aim of carrying out the

act." Black',,! Law Dictionary 370 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). WHJfu] is defined as "
[vJoluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious." ld. at 779.
Additi.onally, in trespass cases, Our Suprem.e Court held in Weitz v. Green,
148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743, 756 (2010):
This Court strongly disfavors the resort to forceful self-help in resolving
property disputes. See Burke v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm., No. 02C59J.0~ 2004 WL
784073, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Jan.. 29, 2004) C' Self-help in litigation is not condoned by
the courts." ); Doles v. Doles. No. 17462,2000 WL 511693, at "'2 (Va.Cir.Ct. Mar.
10, 2000) (" [P]ublic policy favors the set11ement of disputes by litigation rather
than by self help force ... " ). When parties have entered into a confl.ict over rea1
property the rights are usually fixed fat in advance of the exchange of attorneys'
letters, or subsequent filing of a lawsuit, motions, deposition.s, and hearings. Making
a bold physical attempt to gain, or regain, possession or control of a real property
interest, by demolishing or erecting gates or fences, bulldozing land, etc., results in
no strategic advantage. Instead, passions become inflamed., positions become
e11trenched, damages are exacerbated rather than mitigated, and the parties end up
spending far more money in liti.gation than thejr supposed 111terest was worth to
begin with. Attorneys who counsel their clients to engage in self-help, without being
certain that the respective rights ~U1d responsibilities have been settled, do their
clients a disservice. Clients who ignore the advice of counsel and take mat1ers into
their own. hands do themselves a disservice. In short, parties who attempt to solve a
property dispute through their own. forceful action do so at their own peril.
B.

Akers are entitled to Attorney Fees pursuant to the Statute

White claim.s Akers may not recover because there is not evidence that the
property was posted with ":no trespassjng" signs. 111 making this argument, White
ignores that a portion of the damages awarded were for timber damage, which is
awarded regardless of trespass sign postings.
Further, it is undisputed White entered Akers property along a. road leading
off the public road. It is un.disputed that this road .paralleled the side of the south

boundary of the property, and this property sIde was less than 660 feet (See
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WHITE'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES: ).
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Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 6). The record is replete with photographs that this road
was posted in more than one location with ''No Trespassing" sign. Thus, there js
evidence in the record that Akers met the statutory requirement that its property was
posted. Further, there is evidence in the record that White was aware of these
postings. Wlllte celtainly can't argue that the intent an.d purpose of the statute was
not met in this case. He had actual knowledge of the posting.
Finally, t11e evidence before the court demonstrates that White and
Mortensen's acts were willful and jntention.a.l as defined by law. Therefore, this
Court's concluded that Defendants' willful trespass on Plaintiffs' property supports
an award of treble damages pursuant to I.C. §6-202. (Conclusions of Law,
paragraph 22) is supported by the facts. Further, this Court's award of attorney's
fees meets the Supreme Court's hol.ding that indivi.duals who take the law into their
hand in property disputes do so at their own peril. Therefore. Akers are entitled to
the "full reasonable attorney fee attributable to [their] successful trespass claim.'~

Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,644 (App. ] 993).
\\'bite also claims that apportionm.ent is appropriate in this matter. White
claims that the trespass was found to only have occurred in the triangle area
awarded to Akers. From this premise, White argues that the "no trespassing signs"
weren't directed to the disputed triangle area because one of them was hung on the
gate. (The other sign was posted at the top of the hill.)
White's argument is ftmdam.entally flawed. As the Court recalls, when the
dispute abetlt White and Mortensen working i.n the triangle area arose, White and

Mortensen advanced two theories 011 why they were not trespassing on Aker.s'
PLATNTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT \VIiITE'S MOTION TO
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property, which were: (1) it's a public right of way; or (2) if not a public right of
way, they obtained title to it through a deed obtained after the dispute arose. The
evidence is clear that White Bud Mortensen were well aware that Akers claimed title
to the disputed triangle area. As for the claim that the no trespassing posting was
.Iimited to the gate, thjs argument is without meri.!. TIle signs are for the entirc area
outside the existing travel way, not just for. the item which provided support for their
posting.
Further, White and Jerry Mortensen have actcd f'Tivolously on the remand of
this matter. They have asked this Court to rule on motiol1s that were previously
determined (i.e. the admissjon of additional evidence on remand). They have failed
to follow the directive of the Cou,rt on rem.snd to assist in obtaining a legal
description for the prescriptive easen:lent. Much of the time spent on remand has
been to these isslles, and not to the issues remain.ing following remand. Therefore,

an award of fees for such frivolous conduct is appropriate.
C.

The Amount Requested is Reasonable

White also c1ajms the attol11ey fee awarded is not reasonable. White bases
this argument upon an unre]ated case wherein the trial court's award of reasonable
attorney fees represented 45% of tota] amount given in damages. However, the trial
court's decision was not based upon any formula dictated by rule, case law or
statute. The trial court merely found that the amount was unreasonable under the
circumstances of that case.
White maintains it is reasonable to apportion the fees based upon work
dedicated to the easement issue, the trespass portion oftbe case and the emotional
PLAINTIFFS) RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT WI-IITE'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES; l
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distress and punitive damage components of proof. Akers would submit that these
issues are so intricately interwoven that they overlapped and can't be apportioned.

In such circumstances, it is not an abuse of discretion 0 award the fees that result
from overlapping legal work. See Bumgarner v. Bumgarner. supra.
The trespass complaint filed by Plaintiff alleged that White and Morten~en
were required to stay within the established travel way and had not done so. White
and Mortensen denied the allegation, claiming they had not strayed outside the
parameters of the easement. Even. if White and Mortensen had not counterclaimed
with other easement theories, estabHshing the dimension and location of the
easement was a necessary element of the trespass case as White and Mortensen
denied the locatioll and diltl.ension were as alleged by Akers. Thus, the work on this
portion of the case would have taken place.
Regarding the damage claim, as the Court recalls, this trial was bifurcated.
The damage portion was tried separate. The evidence that went to proving the
trespass damages also supported the punitive dam.age and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. It was the egregiou.s method of trespassing that supported the
pltnitive dan1age claim and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
As to the reasonableness of the amount of work invested by Plaintiff in this
matter, this CO\lrt is very familiar with the extraordinary amowlt of pleadil:lgs filed
by White and Mortensen which have escalated the fees in this litigation to
sta,ggering amounts. Plaintiffs have not done anything unnecessary in the
prosecution of this case. They have ll'I.ostly been in a defensive posture following
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the first remand, merely responding to the plethora of pleadings by opposing
counsel.

v.

Rule 54 Factors

In the su.bsequent Memorandum filed by White, an additional ground is
raised that Plaintiffs did not comply with the Rule 54(e)(3) in submitting their
claims as they failed to address the factors ofI.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Plaintiffs previously
made this argument to the Court. At the risk of being redWldant, Plaintiffhereby
reprodu.ces its previous response to Mortensen's exact same argwnents.
A.

Plair.diffs addressed the fQctors to be taken into consideration whe.D
granting an award of attorneY,'s fees.

Defendants incorrectly state: "The Plaintiffs did 110t address the factors that
must be taken 111to consideration in charging attorneys' fees." Defendants'
Memorandum, pg. 5. Defendants then. cite eleven items set forth under I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3). In doing so, Defendants have apparently overlooked the "l.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) Affidavit of Leatlder L. Jarn.cs in Support of Plaintiffs I Claim for At10mey
Fees" :filed after Plaintiffs prevailed in the first trial. of this case and the "Amended
l.RC.P. 54(e)(3) Affidavit of Leander L. Jam.es in. Support of Plaintiffs' Claims tor
Attorney's Fees" filed on May 7,2004.
Defendant's objection is without merit.
VI. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs should be awarded all costs and attorney fees claimed.
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2011.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

~~(£~La

SUSAN P. WEEKS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
MARTI MORTENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
VERNON J. MORTENSEN; D.L. WHITE
CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WHITE
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and
wife,
Defendants.
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife, and MARTI
MORTENSEN,
Defendants.
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)
)
)
)
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ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS
Supreme Court Docket No. 39182-2011
Kootenai ,County Docket No. 2002-222

-I
I

II

Supreme Court Docket No. 39293-2011
Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-222

ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS - Docket Nos. 39182-2011/39293-2011

It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of

judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 39182 and 39293 shall be
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 39182, but all documents filed shall bear
both docket numbers.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with a
copy of this Order.

'\

DATED this _,'31~
__ day of October 2011.
For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon,
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
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ST ATE OF IDAHO
County of KOOTENAI

)"

ll-ito-Il

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

D.L. WHITE CONST., INC., DAVID L. WHITE
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife;
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

Case No.

CV2002222

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING WHITES'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND
GRANTING AKERS' CLAIMS FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

)
)

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES.

Under consideration here are the Whites' Motion to Reconsider filed on August 24, 2011,
Whites' Objection and Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees filed on September 7,2011,
and Whites' Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees filed on October
25,2011. The Court is also considering the Akers' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs, LR.C.P.
54(e)(3) and (e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees
on Second Remand, both filed on August 24, 2011, Akers' Opposition to Motion to Reconsider
filed on October 6, 2011, and Akers' Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant White's Motion to
Disallow Attorney Fees filed on November 2,2011.
These filings follow extensive litigation begun in 2002. The Clerk now utilizes 16 files to
contain the record.
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Some of the major events in the case are outlined as follows: On January 10, 2002, the
Akers filed their civil complaint against the Whites, D.L. White Construction and the
Mortensens. A fourteen-day Court trial occurring over the course of twenty months followed,
with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by this Court on January 2,2003. The
defendants appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on May 28, 2004. The Idaho Supreme Court
issued an opinion on January 1,2006. A Remittitur followed and the case was remanded. This
Court issued an Amended Judgment and Decree on Remand and Second Amended Judgment and
Decree on Remand on October 6,2006. Judgments were entered, and the defendants again
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court filed an opinion on June 4,
2008. No Remittitur followed. On January 22,2009, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its
"substitute opinion." The case was once again remanded. This Court then issued its
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location
on September 29,2010. Additional briefing was received on the issue of damages to the Akers,
and on January 26, 2011, this Court heard oral argument of the issue of damages. On March 18,
2011, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages and
Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location." On May 23,
2011, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying: 1) Defendant Vernon
Mortensen's "Affidavit on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and
Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order Filed 4-1-04"
and 2) Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order
on Remand Re: Damages and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on
Easement Location.
On August 10,2011, this Court signed the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on
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Second Remand, as finally submitted by Akers' counsel. The parties filed the motions at issue
after entry of the August 10,2011, Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand.
Whites' Motion to Reconsider was filed on August 24, 2011, and Akers' Opposition to Motion to
Reconsider was filed on October 6, 2011. Akers filed Akers' Supplemental Memorandum of
Costs and Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees on
Second Remand filed on August 24,2011, to which Whites filed Whites' Objection and Motion
to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees on September 7,2011, and then Whites filed Whites'
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees on October 25,2011. Finally,
Akers filed Akers' Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant White's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees
filed on November 2, 2011. Oral argument on these motions was held on November 8, 2011,
following which, the Court took the motions under advisement.
The Whites' Motion to Reconsider concerns the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on
Second Remand. In the Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, the Court decreed
the following:
1. It granted a twelve point two (12.2') foot easement by prescription to the defendants, the
Whites and the Mortensens,just inside the northeast comer of the Defendants' land, turning south
immediately west of the west boundary of Government Lot 2 (where the express easement ends)
and the east boundary of Parcel B.
2. The Court awarded compensatory damages to the Akers for willful trespass in the
amount of $17,002.85, and trebled the damages pursuant to I.e. § 6-202 for a total amount of
$51,008.55 in trespass damages against D.L. White Construction Inc.; David L. White and
Michelle V. White, husband and wife; and Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband
and wife, jointly and severally pursuant to I.C. § 6-803.
3. The Court further awarded Sherri Akers compensatory damages for emotional distress in
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING WHITES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
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the amount of$10,000 against D.L. White Construction Inc.; David L. White and Michelle V.
White, husband and wife; and Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife,
jointly and severally pursuant to I.C. § 6-803.
4. The Court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages against Vernon 1. Mortensen and Marti
E. Mortensen in the amount of$150,000.
5. The Court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages against David L. White and Michelle
V. White in the amount of$30,000.
6. The Court awarded a total of$105,534.06 in costs and attorneys fees to the plaintiff,
together with interest at the applicable statutory rate, jointly and severally against each defendant.
7. The Court further ordered that the Akers are entitled to seek judgement of costs and
attorney fees as permitted by rule or statute.
Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, pp. 2-3.
Defendants David L. White, Michelle V. White and D.L. White Construction filed their
Motion to Reconsider the decree on August 24, 2011, citing I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B). Defendant's
Motion to Reconsider, p. 1. The Whites wish for the Court to reconsider (a) the location of the
easement; (b) the decision on the "scope and willfulness ofthe trespasses"; (c) the emotional
distress damages awarded to Sherri Akers; (d) the punitive damages awarded against the
defendants; and (e) the attorney fees awarded to the Akers. Id, pp. 1-2. The Whites further
stated to the Court and to the other parties that the Whites would submit a brief in support of
their motion to reconsider on or before September 14,2011. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider,
p.2. Whites have failed to submit any such brief.
The Akers filed an Opposition to Motion to Reconsider on October 6, 2011, stating that the
Whites had failed to file a brief in support of the motion to reconsider, and so they could not
address the motion. Opposition to Motion to Reconsider, pp. 1-2. Consequently, the Akers
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requested that the Whites' Motion to Reconsider be denied. ld., p. 2.
On August 24, 2011, the Akers filed a supplemental Memorandum of Costs pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs (Including Attorney Fees Incurred
through August 24, 2011), p. 1. The Akers' costs for preparation of models, maps, and pictures,
total $550, which the Akers state are allowable as a matter of right. ld., p. 2. The attorney fees
listed total $18,620, a figure compiled by calculating 112.75 attorney hours at a fee of$175 per
hour. ld. The amounts added together total $19,170.00. Id.
Also on August 24,2011, Akers' attorney, Susan Weeks, submitted an I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and
(e)( 5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees on Second
Remand. That Affidavit cited support from I.C. § 6-202; Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho
629,862 P.2d 321 (Ct.App. 1993); I.C. § 12-121; I.C. § 12-123; LR.C.P. 54(e)(1) - (5), and
54(e)(7) - (9); as well as I.R.c.P. l1(a)(1) and "all applicable case law." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and
(e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees on Second
Remand, p. 2. Akers seek attorney fees in the amount of$18,620.00 (112.75 hours at
$175.00/hour) and costs as a matter of right in the amount of$550.00 for preparation of the
survey admitted at the hearing. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs (Including
Attorney Fees Incurred Through August 24, 2011), p. 2.
The Whites responded with an Objection and Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees
filed on September 7,2011. They objected to the $19,170 the Akers requested in the
Supplemental Memorandum of Costs, as well as to earlier cost and fee awards of $1 05,534.06
and $6,037.50, pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(6) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). Objection to Claimed
Attorney Fees, p. 2.
In their objection, the Whites argue that the Akers "[a]re not entitled to an award of costs
and attorney fees as a matter of right" because the Akers are "not the prevailing parties in this
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING WHITES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
PAGE 5
GRANTING AKERS' CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY FEES

litigation in comparison to the relief and damages they sought in this litigation nor in comparison
to the relief and damages sought by Defendants White in this litigation." Objection to Claimed
Attorney Fees, p. 2. The Whites also claim that the total costs for items such as maps and
surveys may not be greater than $500. Id. Furthermore, the Whites argue that I.C. § 6-202 does
not allow attorney fees to be awarded in cases where a party does not post the required "No
Trespassing" signs. Id. In this case, the Whites state that they did not have the notice
"contemplated by I.C. 6-202," and were found not to have willfully or intentionally trespassed.

Id. The Whites further argue that Mortensens' willful or intentional conduct cannot be attributed
to them, unless they authorized it or gave him the authority to conduct such activity. Id.
The Whites argue alternatively that the Court should apportion attorney fees between the
established trespass claim and those claims that were not established, and further should award
no fees for claims for which there is no statutory or contractual basis. Objection to Claimed
Attorney Fees, p. 3; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 4.
Finally, the Whites argue that I.C. § 6-202 "does not provide a basis" for an attorney fee
award, since the Whites prevailed in establishing the existence of an easement across the Akers
property to access their own property, and because they did not present unreasonable or frivolous
arguments to the court. Objection to Claimed Attorney Fees, p. 3.
The Whites filed a Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees on
October 25, 2011. In the Memorandum, the Whites argue against the" award of attorney fees
during the entire course of these proceedings," referring again to the previously awarded
$105,534.06, $6,037.50 and the requested $19,170.00. Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 2.
Whites' first argument in the Memorandum states that the Akers did not comply with
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in seeking the fees. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING WHITES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
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Fees, pp. 2-3. Under the rule, the court must take 11 factors into consideration, the Whites state
in the Memorandum. Id. These include:
1) The time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability
of the attorney in the particular field of law; 4) the prevailing charges for like work;
5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 6) the time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances of the case; 7) the amount involved and the results
obtained; 8) the undesirability of the case; 9) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; 10) awards in similar cases; and 11) the
reasonable costs of automated legal research.

Id., p. 3; LR.C.P. 54(e)(3).
Whites next argue that the fees should be apportioned between parties because each
prevailed in part. Id. Further, Whites argue I.C. § 6-202 allows fees to be awarded only for
trespass claims, so the Akers should be entitled to fees only for their successful trespass claim in
the disputed triangle. Id., p. 4. Whites argue the Akers should not be awarded fees for their
unsuccessful trespass claim (since Whites did not trespass within the 12.2 foot easement over
Parcel B), nor should Akers receive attorney fees for claims in which such fees are unsupported
by statutory authority - which they claim in their motion are Akers' punitive damage, quiet title,
and emotional distress awards. Id. The Whites also contend that the attorney fees awarded
should pay only for the time spent on the prevailing claim. Id., p. 5.
Furthermore, the Whites allege that a successful claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 6-202
"depends entirely whether the Plaintiffs posted signage to indicate that the disputed triangle was
other property." Id. Whites claim the Akers did not post "No Trespassing" signs where required,
and therefore cannot claim attorney fees. Id. Furthermore, Whites claim their trespass was not
"willful or intentional." Id.
The questions presented by these motions are as follows
I. Should the Court reconsider the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second
Remand issued on August 10,2011, per Whites' Motion to Reconsider filed on August 24,2011?
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING WHITES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
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II. Should the Court uphold the Akers' costs and attorney fees awards of $105,534.06,
$6,037.50 and $19,170.00, when the Whites contend: (a) that the Akers are entitled to fees only
for claims on which they prevailed, (b) that the award of fees under I.C. § 6-202 depends on
whether the Akers posted trespass signs; and (c) that the awards of fees are not statutorily
authorized? The second question involves answering the following questions:
A. Did the Akers prevail?

B. Does the award of fees under I.C. § 6-202 depend upon whether the Akers posted "No
Trespassing" signs, or does other statutory authority allow the attorney fees award?
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,592,21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). Similarly, the
. district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, subject to the abuse of
discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 753, 86 P.3d 458,467 (2004).
III. ANALYSIS OF WHITES' MOTION TO RECONSIDER.

In their Motion to Reconsider, the Whites ask for the Court to reconsider (a) the location of
the easement; (b) the decision on the "scope and willfulness of the trespasses"; (c) the emotional
distress damages awarded to Sherri Akers; (d) the punitive damages awarded against the
defendants; and (e) the attorney fees awarded to the Akers. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider,
pp. 1-2. The Whites promised to submit a brief in support of the motion on or before September
14, 2011, but failed to do so. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, p. 2. In opposition, the Akers
pointed out that the Whites had not filed a brief in support of the motion. The Whites did not cite
authorities beyond I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), which merely sets forth the procedure for filing a Motion
for Reconsideration. I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B).
The Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have found that a judge may
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properly exercise its discretion in denying a Motion for Reconsideration when the moving party
"provide(s) no new facts to support its claim" and does not "direct the court to evidence in the
record that would create a genuine issue of fact." Blackmore v. RelMax Tri-Cities, LLC, 149
Idaho 558,564,237 P.3d 655, 661 (2010). This is because "the burden is on the moving party to
draw to the trial court's attention any new evidence that the movant may be relying upon," though
this does not preclude the court from reviewing its own orders for errors. Johnson v. Lambros,
143 Idaho 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct.App. 2006).
In this case, not only has the moving party not provided new facts, nor drawn attention to
facts in the record, it has failed to provide argument and authority in the form of the promised,
but undelivered, brief in support of the motion to reconsider. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider,
p. 2; Blackmore, 149 Idaho 558, 564,237 P.3d 655,661. Because the Whites did not draw the
Court's attention to new evidence upon which the Court can rely in reconsidering its decision, the
Court must deny Whites' Motion to Reconsider.
At oral argument, counsel for Whites made unsubstantiated claims that 1966 was not the
pertinent time period for the prescriptive period, but rather 1982 and 1975 were the relevant time
frames, and that Whites had briefed this issue "earlier", but did not disclose when or in what brief
Whites had made that argument. The rest of Whites' counsel's argument on the motion to
reconsider digressed into the attorney fee issue. Thus, oral argument provided no new evidence
and absolutely no valid argument upon which this Court could grant a motion to reconsider.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AKERS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY
FEES INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24, 2011).
A. Akers Are the Prevailing Parties.

Whites argue that the attorney fees should be apportioned between parties because each
prevailed in part. Objection to Claimed Attorney Fees, p. 2. They state that the Akers are
entitled to fees only for their successful trespass claim in the disputed triangle. Memorandum in
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Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 4. The Whites also contend that the Akers'
attorney fees award should only be for the time Akers' attorney spent on the claims upon which
Akers prevailed. ld., 5. Whites claim they themselves prevailed in establishing the existence of
an easement across the Akers property to access their own property. Objection to Claimed
Attorney Fees, p. 3. Whites also claim that since they did not present unreasonable or frivolous
arguments to the court, attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 are not available.
First, as noted by Akers, this Court has previously determined Akers are the prevailing
party. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed January 2, 2003,

~

28; Plaintiffs'

Response to Defendant White's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees, p. 3. Second, in the
intervening eight years, Akers remain the prevailing party. Akers sued Whites and Mortensens
for trespass, and won. As compared to Whites' claimed width of the easement, Akers prevailed
on the width of the travelled portion of that easement. Based on Whites' trespass, Akers sued for
emotional distress and punitive damages, and won. Whites lost on their quiet title counterclaims.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) governs the identification of the prevailing party. It
states:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in
its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues
and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
I.R.C.P.54(d)(1)(B). The courts have interpreted this to require an "overall view" rather than a
"claim-by-claim analysis." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914,204 PJd 1114, 1125 (2009).
"In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and counterclaims between
opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 'in the action'; that is, the prevailing party
question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis", the
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Idaho Supreme Court stated in Shore. Id., citing Eighteen Mile Ranch,

L~C

v. Nord Excavating

& Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d l30, 133 (2005). If the court determines that the

parties have each prevailed in part, it may exercise its discretion in apportioning costs among the
parties. Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 174, 219 P.3d 1188, 1190 (2009).
In the "overall view", the Akers clearly prevailed. The Fourth Amended Judgment and
Decree on Second Remand recognized a 12.2-foot prescriptive easement for the defendants,
which was much smaller than the 60-foot-wide right of way defendants wanted to establish.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, Findings of Fact, ~ 44; p. 25, Conclusion
of Law ~ 10. The Akers were awarded a total of $51,008.55 in trespass damages; $10,000.00 in
emotional distress damages; $150,000.00 in punitive damages against the Mortensens;
$30,000.00 in punitive damages against the Whites; and $105,534.06 in previous costs and
attorneys fees. Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, pp. 2-3. Whites have
received nothing. Whites proved none of their affirmative defenses. In the "overall view," the
Akers came out ahead. Shore, 146 Idaho 903, 914,204 P.3d 1114, 1125. While the Court
recognized the prescriptive 12.2-foot easement, that width was a fraction of what Whites
claimed. To consider the grant of a 12.2-foot prescriptive easement in favor of Whites as an issue
upon which White prevailed, would require this Court to ignore the "overall view" and instead,
engage in "claim by claim" analysis forbidden by the Idaho Supreme Court in Shore, 146 Idaho
903,914,204 P.3d 1114, 1125. And since Whites only received about 20 percent of the width
they sought, it would be a forbidden claim by claim analysis made with myopic lenses. The
Court will not exercise its discretion and consider that limited issue as significant enough to
constitute Whites as the prevailing party, given the "overall view" of this case. To do so would
make a mockery of the case law regarding who is the prevailing party in determining costs and
attorney fees. LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).
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B. If The Award of Attorney Fees Under I.e. § 6-202 Depends Upon Whether Akers
Posted "No Trespassing" Signs, the Uncontradicted Evidence Shows Akers
Posted Such Requisite "No Trespassing" Signs.

The Whites allege that a successful claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 6-202 "depends
entirely whether the Plaintiffs posted signage to indicate that the disputed triangle was their
property." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 4. Whites argue
Akers did not post "No Trespassing" signs where required, and therefore cannot claim attorney
fees. Jd Furthermore, the Whites' trespass was not "willful or intentional," they contend, and
their defense was not "frivolous." Jd, p. 5. Whites claim Akers should not be awarded fees for
their unsuccessful trespass claim. Jd, p. 4. Whites then argue that Akers should not receive fees
for claims in which such fees are unsupported by any other statutory authority, as Whites argue
their defense to Akers' claims for claims for punitive damages, quiet title, and emotional distress
was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Jd, p. 4.
Trial courts can award attorney fees only where a statute or contract authorizes such.
I.R.C.P.54(e)(l). Regarding Akers' trespass claim, Idaho Code § 6-202, authorizes attorney fee
awards as follows:
Any person who, without permission of the owner, or the owner's agent, enters
upon the real property of another person which property is posted with "No
Trespassing" signs or other notices of like meaning, spaced at intervals of not less
than one (1) notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along such real property; or
who cuts down or carries off any wood or underwood, tree or timber, or girdles, or
otherwise injures any tree or timber on the land of another person, or on the street
or highway of any person's house, village, or city lot, or cultivated grounds ... is
liable to the owner of such land ... for treble the amount of damages which may be
assessed therefor for fifty dollars ($50.00), plus a reasonable attorney's fee which
shall be taxed as costs, in any civil action brought to enforce the terms of this act
if the plaintiff prevails.
I.C. § 6-202. Akers proved compliance with I.C. § 6-202 as there is ample evidence in the record
that there was more than one "No Trespassing" sign and that the entire length of the disputed
easement was less than 660 feet. In fact, this Court nearly nine years ago decided this issue as a
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matter of fact and as a matter of law:
36. Plaintiffs revoked defendants' permission to use the curved approach and the
driveway west of Government Lot 2 in January 2002. Plaintiffs posted same
with "No Trespassing" signs within 660 feet of each other.
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, Finding of Fact ~ 36,
see also p. 25, Conclusion of Law ~ 13. (bold in oiginal). This established factual and legal
conclusion was reiterated by this Court in its March 18, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order
on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on
Easement Location, p. 21, and, in this Court's May 23, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, p. 11. Akers has met the statutory requirement that their
property be posted with "No Trespassing" signs. The statutory interval of not less than 660 feet
is not applicable, and even if it were applicable, the posting requirement was met and that has
been met for nearly nine years. Whites' argument that the statutory requirement has not been met
is simply absurd. Additionally, there is evidence in the record that David White was not simply
aware of those posted signs, he had actual knowledge of the posted signs.
White makes the claim that "If any attorney fees are nevertheless to be awarded under 6202, they must be reasonably related to prevailing on the claim for trespass in the disputed
triangle, not in Parcel B and not on the express easement." Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Disallow Attorney Fees, p. 5. Trespass did not occur simply in the disputed triangle area;
trespass occurred in exceeding the scope of the express easement and it occurred at the end of the
easement. This, too, has been discussed previously by the Court. Apparently, Whites' attorney is
not reading those previous opinions. This Court wrote in its March 18, 2011, Memorandum
Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional
Evidence on Easement Location, p. 12-13:
This disputed easement has two ends.
One end, the "triangle" area, or the east end, is where this easement begins
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at its intersection with Millsap Road. Much of the wrongful activity by
defendants against plaintiffs took place in this "triangle" area. The two Idaho
Supreme Court cases and this remand have nothing to do with the "triangle" area.
Thus, as to this area of the easement, none of the damage issues have changed.
The other end is where, after leaving Millsap Road, traveling west along
plaintiffs' southern boundary, the easement goes up a hill and then at its terminus,
bends into defendants' Mortensens' 260-acre parcel. January 2,2003, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~31, p. 13, ~32. In 2001, defendants
Whites purchased from Mortensens the northern 80 acres of Moretensens' 260
acre parcel, and that 80 acres was contiguous to the southern boundary of Akers'
land. Id., p. 14, ~34. On remand, this Court determined the location of the
easement at this "terminus" end changed slightly.
The fact that one small portion of the exact location of the easement across
Akers' land changed slightly due to this Court's decision on remand [the
September 29,2010, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order Re: Easement Location] does not change this Court's decision as
to damages suffered by the Akers. It is uncontroverted that White and Mortensen
excavated and deposited soil on plaintiffs' land in the area of this slight change.
In other words, the claim simply cannot be made that White and Mortensen
performed all their earthwork within the boundaries of the easement. Such a
claim would simply be an impossibility, and not in any way supported by the
evidence before this Court. Also, the work performed by defendants on this
terminus end caused specific damage to plaintiffs caused by defendants' actions in
changing the water drainage of the area. Thus, even if all the earthwork
performed by defendants were within the boundaries of the easement (again, an
impossibility), there was collateral damage caused by defendants' actions.
That finding was also reiterated in this Court's May 23,2011, Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, pp. 4-5.
Finally, citing and comparing the instant case to Good v. Sichelstiel, Kootenai County Case
No. CV 2010 1862, Whites make an incomprehensible argument that:
Whites submit that an award of $22,953 to Plaintiffs for successful prosecution of
a trespass claim under 6-202 that generates damages of $51,008 represents a
reasonable apportionment of the fees in this case if the other criteria of 6-202 are
satisfied. There should be no award of fees for successful prosecution of claims
for punitive damages, emotional distress and unsuccessful claims that no
easement exists in Parcel B.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, pp. 5-6. Is Whites' counsel
arguing that $22,953 is appropriate attorney fees when only $18,620.00 is sought by Akers'
counsel? In any event, this argument overlooks the obvious fact that the actions of defendants
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING WHITES
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constituting the trespass are the identical actions that resulted in punitive damages and damages
for Sherrie Akers' emotional distress. No apportionment is warranted.

C. Attorney Fees Under the Alternative Bases Sought by Akers.
Attorney fees are requested by Whites against defendants not only under I.C. § 6-202, but
also I.C. § 12-121, I.C. § 12-123, I.R.c.P. 54(e)(I) -(5), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(7)-(9), and I.R.C.P.
11(a)(1). I.R.c.P. 54(e)(3) and (e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims
for Attorney Fees on Second Remand, p. 2. This kitchen sink approach is not very helpful to the
Court. While Akers provide detailed analysis of why attorney fees should be awarded under I.C.

§ 6-202, Akers provide no real analysis to any of these additional theories.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)( 1) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It simply provides that attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party when
provided for by any statute, and that for attorney fees to be awarded under I. C. § 12-121, there
must, in addition to a prevailing party analysis, be a finding by the court that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It simply requires findings for the basis for awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12121.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It simply provides the criteria to be used by the court in determining the amount of
attorney fees. Those criteria apply in an award of attorney fees in any civil action, no matter the
statutory basis for those fees.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(4) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It applies only to attorney fees awarded in cases ending in default judgment, and
thus, is entirely inapplicable to the instant matter.
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)( 5) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It simply provides if attorney fees are allowed by contract or by some statute, that
attorney fees shall be awarded as costs and must be supported by an affidavit setting forth the
basis and method of computation of the attorney fees claimed, in addition to the requirement of a
prevailing party analysis.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(7) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It simply requires a hearing on attorney fees if there is an objection.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(8) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It merely states that I.R.C.P. 54 applies to all attorney fees awarded pursuant to any
statute.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(7) provides no independent basis for an award of
attorney fees. It simply states I.R.C.P. 54 applies to all actions filed after March 1, 1979.
Thus, as requested by Akers, none ofI.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)-(5) or I.R.C.P. 54(e)(7)-(9) provide
any basis for attorney fees.
Counsel for Akers also claim attorney fees under I.R.C.P. l1(a)(1). This rule allows
imposition of attorney fees against a party or that party's attorney where the party's attorney fails
to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing a pleading. Landvik by Landvik v.
Herbert, 130 Idaho 54,62,936 P.2d 607, 705 (Ct.App. 1997). Akers' counsel has set forth

absolutely no facts, no argument, as to which counsel has created what pleadings which were not
well grounded in fact and supported by law.
Counsel for Akers also claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121. This case is a civil action,
qualifying for an award of attorney fees under I.C § 12-121, if"the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).
There has certainly been unreasonable conduct by the defendants over the years, as memorialized
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by the compiled record, in which the Court concluded:
Vernon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai County Ordinances and
the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value of his
land development projects. In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has shown a
conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent North
Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by his conscious disregard for the law.
May 23,2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, p. 22
(quoting the April 1, 2004, Memorandum, and then stating that this fact has not changed). In
addition, in that same May 23, 2011, Order, the Court states of the Whites:
David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated and disregarded
Kootenai County ordinances and the orders of this court for pecuniary gain,
specifically to increase the value of his land development project. In his actions,
testimony and demeanor he has shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for the
law. He has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by his
conscious disregard for the law.
May 23,2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, p. 23
(quoting the April 1, 2004, Memorandum, and then stating that this fact has not changed).
However, the conduct of the parties, as opposed to the bringing, pursuing or defending of the
action, cannot be a basis for the award under I.C. § 12-121. Verway v. Blincoe Packing Co., Inc.,
108 Idaho 315, 319, 698 P.2d 377, 381 (Ct.App. 1985), unless it is followed by an unreasonable
prosecution or defense of the action. 0 'Boskey v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 112 Idaho 1002,
1009-10,739 P.2d 301, 308-09 (1987). While there may at times have been prosecutions of
counterclaims and defenses by defendants which are unreasonable, this Court cannot say that the
total defense of this case by any of the defendants was unreasonable or frivolous. That is what
the Court would be required to find under Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v.

Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 563, 808 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1991), see also
Desfossess v. Desfossess, 122 Idaho 634,639,836, P.2d 1095, 1100 (1992).
Finally, Akers also claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-123. In Akers' Plaintiffs Response
to Defendant White's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees, Akers seem to limit their request for
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attorney fees (other than under I.C. § 6-202) to a claim under I.C. § 12-123. There is little case
law interpreting I.C. § 12-123, and it can only be assumed that it has been little used since its
enactment in 1987. An explanation for that underutilization might be the fact that I.e. § 12-123
has a protocol specific to that statute which must be followed. Idaho Code § 12-123 allows
attorney fees for frivolous conduct. I.e. § 12-123(1)(b). Frivolous conduct is conduct by a party
or his attorney that obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the
civil action, or is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law. I.C. § 12-123(1 )(b )(i)(ii).
But to obtain an award under I.e. § 12-123, the party requesting the fees must file a motion, and
then the Court must set a date for hearing to determine whether the particular conduct was
frivolous, giving notice of the date of the hearing to each party or counsel of record who
allegedly engaged in frivolous conduct. I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(i)(ii). Then, the Court must conduct
the hearing to determine if the conduct was frivolous, and whether any party was adversely
affected by the conduct if it is found to be frivolous. I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(iii). There must be an
itemized list of legal services that were necessitated by the frivolous conduct. Id, I.C. § 12123(2)(c). None of these procedures have been followed by Akers in the instant case.
Accordingly, while attorney fees are awarded under I.C. § 6-202 against defendants and in
favor of Akers, all other bases requested by Akers for imposition of attorney fees against
defendants are denied.

D. The Amount of Attorney's Fees Sought are Reasonable.
Akers seek attorney fees in the amount of $18,620.00 (112.75 hours at $175.00/hour) and
costs as a matter of right in the amount of $550.00 for preparation of the survey admitted at the
hearing. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs (Including Attorney Fees Incurred
Through August 24, 2011), p. 2. The costs of the preparation of the survey are costs as a matter
of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(6). However, that rule limits the amount to $500.00. Akers
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have not sought the additional $50.00 as a discretionary cost in their pleading. A pitch was made
to add that $50.00 as a discretionary cost by Akers' counsel at hearing on November 8, 2011.
However, that provides no notice to Whites' counsel. As such, costs as a matter of right in the
amount of $500.00 are awarded in favor of Akers against Whites.
Akers seek attorney fees against defendants for time spent by their attorney since March 9,
2009. LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) and (e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims
for Attorney Fees on Second Remand, Exhibit A. No explanation is given by Akers as to why
March 9, 2009, is the beginning date.
The amount of attorney fees sought in favor of Akers against Whites is reasonable in light
of the factors enumerated in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A)-(L). The Court has considered all those factors
and finds absolutely no reason for any downward departure from the amount sought, $18,620.00.
The hourly rate of Akers counsel of $175.00 per hour is very reasonable given the skill requisite
to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of Akers' counsel, and given
the prevailing charges for like work. The amount of time spent by Akers' counsel was
documented and is reasonable as well. This is an undesirable case, and it has lasted nearly a
decade. All of those factors indicate an upward departure from the amount sought is appropriate.
Accordingly, this Court finds $22,000.00 to be the reasonable attorney fee awarded in favor of
Akers against defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
For the reasons stated above, this Court exercises its discretion and denies Whites'
Motion to Reconsider and Whites' Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees, and this Court exercises
its discretion and finds Akers to be the prevailing party, and that Akers are entitled to their
attorney fees in the amount of $22,000.00 and costs as a matter of right in the amount of $500.00,
against defendants under I.C. § 6-202. All other basis for attorney fees sought by Akers against
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defendants are denied.
IT IS ORDERED Whites' "Motion to Reconsider" is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Akers are the prevailing parties.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the amount of $22,000.00 is a reasonable amount given the

factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A)-(L) in light of the amounts sought in Akers' Supplemental
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for
Attorney Fees on Second Remand filed on August 24,2011, and the amount of $22,000.00 is
GRANTED in favor of Akers against defendants under I.C. § 6-202.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED all other basis for attorney fees sought by Akers against

defendants are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the amount of $500.00 in costs as a matter of right is

GRANTED in favor of Akers against defendants. The additional $50.00 sought as a
discretionary cost is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' attorney prepare a judgment consistent with

the above Opinion and this Order.
Entered this 16th day of November, 2011.

itchell, District Judge
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D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. White
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,

)

)

CASE NO. CV -02-222

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

vs.

)

D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife; and
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,

)
)
)

)
)

)
)

Defendants.

)

------------------------------------)
TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, DENNIS LYLE AKERS
AKERS, husband and wife, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS,
SUSAN WEEKS of the firm JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellants, D.L. White Construction, Inc.,
David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife,
appeal against the above-named Respondents, Dennis Lyle Akers

NOTICE OF APPEAL-l

and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, to the Idaho Supreme
court from the Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand
filed on March 18,2011, the Fourth Amended Judgment and
Decree on Second Remand entered in the above-entitled action
on or about the August 10, 2011, Honorable John T. Mitchell,
presiding; all interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior
to the judgment or decree appealed from, all final judgments
and orders entered prior to the judgment appealed from,
specifically including, without limitation the order of the Court
dated November 16,2011 denying appellants' Motion to
Reconsider and Granting Akers' Claims for Attorney Fees
awarded in connection with the proceedings on remand and all
those proceedings prior to the Second Remand from the Supreme
Court, the Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re:
Damages and Order Denying Whites Motion to Consider
Additional Evidence on Easement Location filed on March 18,
2011 and Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order Re: Easement Location.
2.

Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court
and the judgment described in Paragraph 1 above is an
appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(I), Idaho
Appellate Rules.

NOTICE OF APPEAL-2

3.

The following is a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal
which the Appellants intend to assert; provided, such list of
issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from asserting
other issues on appeal:
a.

Did the District Court err in refusing to consider and
admit additional proffered evidence relevant to the
location of the easement in the area specified on the
second remand for the purpose of accurately and precisely
locating the easement?

b.

Did the District Court err in its decision regarding the size
and location of the prescriptive easement determined by
the Court?

c.

Did the District Court err in its award of damages, triple
damages, punitive damages, damages for emotional
distress and attorney fees?

d.

Did the District Court err in failing to apportion the
attorney fees that it awarded to Respondents?

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the
record.

5.

Other than the original record and record on second appeal,
Appellants White do not request a reporter's transcript

6.

The Appellants join in the requests of Appellants Mortensen for
inclusion of specific documents in the clerk's record. In

NOTICE OF APPEAL-3

addition, Appellants request inclusion of the following
documents:
Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim of
Attorney Fees da ted Octo ber 25, 2011.
Appellant's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement
Location dated June 30, 2011 including Exhibits A and B
thereto.
Affidavit of Mike Hathaway dated June 30, 2010 including
Exhibits A, A-I, B and B-1 thereto.
Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway dated January 18,
2011 and Exhibit B-2 thereto.
Brief of Defendant's White Re: Section 24 Easement Location
dated March 25,2010 and Exhibits thereto.
Reply Brief of Defendants White Re: Section 24 Easement
Location and Exhibits thereto.
Defendants White Objection to and Motion to Disallow Claimed
Attorney Fees dated Septem ber 7, 2011.
7.

Appellants White request that the Exhibits to the Affidavits of
Mike Hathaway referenced above be copies and sent to the
Supreme Court.

8.

I certify:
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a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the
reporter, Julie Foland, PO Box 9000, Coeur d' Alene,
Idaho, 83816

b.

No transcript fee has been paid as no transcript has been
requested.

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's
record has been paid as certified by counsel for
Defendants Mortensen in his Notice of Appeal dated
September 29, 2011.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be
served pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2011.

-?f-r{fe-.r-rt-~~i]J~--Attorney for Defendants White

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of November, 2011, I caused to be
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by placing the
same in the United States Mail, First Class, postage prepaid thereon, to the
following:
Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks,
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814
NOTICE OF APPEAL-S

Dustin Deissner
Deissner Law Office
1707 West Broadway Avenue
Spokane, WA 99201

Vernon J. Mortensen
PO Box 1922
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805

NOTICE OF APPEAL-6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant,
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID
L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband
and wife; and MARTI E. MORTENSEN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF
EXHIBITS
Supreme Court Docket
#39182-2011
#39293-2011
#39493-2011
Kootenai County Docket
#2002-222

I, CLIFFORD T. H.AYES, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list
of exhibits is a true and accurate copy ofthe exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme
Court of Appeals.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the
Record:
1. CD of multiple documents too large to mail:
a. DC 1 - Record of Survey, not admitted
b. DC2 - Boundary Line Adjustment - Record of Survey,
c. DC3 - Defendant's Exhibit Y - Geological Survey, admitted 12117/03
d. DC4 - Topographic Survey & Road Profile, no exhibit sticker
e. DC5 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, Record of Survey, admitted 9110102
f. DC6 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Geological Survey, admitted 911 0102
g. DC7 - Exhibit 13, Geological Survey, not admitted
h. DC8 - State Easement, exhibit sticker not legible, admitted 911 0102
1.
DC9 - Plaintiff's Exhibit, Topographic Survey, not admitted
J. DCI0 - Aerial Photo, admitted 12/22/03, no exhibit sticker

k. DC11 - Defendant's Exhibit 41, not admitted
1. DC12 - Defendant's Exhibit G, Land Classification & Density of
Standing Timber
m. DCl3 - Defendant's Exhibit F, Road RlW Layout, admitted 12116/03
n. DC14 -Plaintiff's Exhibit 104, Photo of Property, admitted 9/9/02
o. DC15 Plaintiff's Exhibit 76, Photo of Property, admitted 9/9/02
p. DC 16 - Plaintiff s Exhibit 31, Photo of Property, not admitted
q. DC17 - Defendant's Exhibit BB, Record of Survey, admitted 12/22/03
r. DC18 - Defendant's Exhibit Z, Record of Survey, admitted 12/22/03
s. DC19 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 323, Preliminary Map, admitted 12117/03
t. DC20 - Defendant's Exhibit B, Road Index Book, admitted 12116/03
u. DC21 - Defendant's Exhibit B, Road Index Book, copy of DC 20
v. DC22 - Defendant's Exhibit V, Record of Survey, not admitted
w. DC23 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Boundary & Topographic Survey Exhibit,
not admitted
x. DC24 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, Liberty Lake Quadrangle Topographic,
admitted 911 0102
y. DC25 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, Liberty Lake Quadrangle Topographic, not
admitted
z. DC26 - Defendant's Exhibit E, Area Map Based on 1998 Aerial Photo,
admitted 12/22/03
aa. DC27 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 331A, Road RlW Layout, admitted 12117/03
bb. DC28 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 179, Boundary & Topographic Survey,
admitted 12117/03
cc. DC 29 - Plaintiffs Exhibit AA, Boundary & Topographic Survey Exhibit,
admitted 12/22/03

2. List of Plaintiff's Exhibits
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110102
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Quit Claim Deed, admitted 9110/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, Boundary Line Adjustment Record of Survey, admitted
9/10/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, Segregation Revisions, admitted 9/1 0/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, Legal Description Exhibit for Kelch to Akers, admitted
911 0/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, Segregation Revisions, admitted 9/10/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14, Aerial Photo
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16, Viewers Report, admitted 9/11/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 18, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19, Affidavit of Dennis Akers in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20, Affidavit of Dennis Akers in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, not
admitted

Plaintiff s Exhibit 21, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 22, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 24, Photo, admitted 12/16/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 25, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 26, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 27, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 28, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 29, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 30, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 31, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 32, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 33, Photo, admitted 10/16/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 34, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 35, Photo, admitted 10/16/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 36, Photo, admitted 10116/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 37, Photo, admitted 10/16/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 38, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 39, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 40, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 41, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 42, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 43, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff s Exhibit 44, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 45, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 46, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 47, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 48, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 49, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 50, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 51, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 52, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 53, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 54, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 55, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 56, Photo, admitted 12116/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 57, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 58, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 59, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff s Exhibit 60, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff s Exhibit 61, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 62, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 63, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 64, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 65, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 66, Photo, admitted 10116/02

Plaintiff's Exhibit 67, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 68, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 69, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 70, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 71, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 72, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 73, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 74, Stop Work Order, admitted 10116/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 77, Hand Drawn Map, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 78, Hand Drawn Map, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 79, Photos, admitted 10116/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 80, Photos, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 81, Photos, admitted 10116/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 82, Photo, admitted 10116/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 83, Photo, admitted 10116/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 84, Photo, admitted 10116/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 86, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 87, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 88, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 89, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 90, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 91, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 92, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 93, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 94, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 95, Photo, admitted 9/1 0/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 96, Photo, admitted 9/10/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 97, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 98, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 99, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 100, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 101, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 102, Photos, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 103, Warranty Deed, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 106, Plat, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 107, Plat, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 108, List of Requirements, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 110, Hand Drawn Map, admitted 911 0/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 113, Receipt-Idaho Fence, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 114, Receipt-Rivercity Design, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 115, Receipt, admitted 10115/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 116, Receipt, admitted 10115/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 117, Receipt, admitted 10115/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 118, Receipt, admitted 10115/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 119, Receipt, admitted 10115/02

Plaintiffs Exhibit 120, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 121, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 122, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 123, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiff s Exhibit 124, Receipt, admitted 10115102
Plaintiffs Exhibit 125, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiff s Exhibit 126, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 127, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 128, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 129, Receipt, admitted 10/15102
Plaintiffs Exhibit 130, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 131, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 132, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit l33, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 134, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 135, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit l36, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 137, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit l38, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 139, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 140, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 141, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 142, Receipt, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 143, Check, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 144, Work Order, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 145, Check, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 155 ,Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 156, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 157, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 158, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 159, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 160, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff s Exhibit 161, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 162, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 163, Photo, admitted 10115/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 164, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 165, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 166, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 167, Photo, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 168, Photo, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 169, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 170, Photo, admitted 9/9/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 171, Photo, admitted 10/15/02
Plaintiffs Exhibit 172, Letter, not admitted

Plaintiff's Exhibit 173, Plaintiffs' Supplemental Responses to Defendants
Vernon 1. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen's Requests for Admissions, not
admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 173A, Hand Drawn Map, admitted 911 0/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 174, Hand Drawn Map, admitted 9/10/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 175, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 176, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 177, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 178, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 181, Photo, admitted 10/16/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 182, Quit Claim Deed, admitted 10/16/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 183, Photo, admitted 10/17/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 184, Photo, admitted 10/17/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 185, Copy of Complaint, admitted 10117/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 186, Agreement & Mutual Release, admitted 10117/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 187, Copy of Stipulation & Order, admitted 10/17/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 188, Photo, admitted 10/21/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 189, Copy of Stipulation & Order, admitted 10/21102
Plaintiff's Exhibit 190, Copy of Order of Judgment, admitted 10/21/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 191, Photo, admitted 10/21/02
Plaintiff's Exhibit 211, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 219, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 220, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 221, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 239, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 254, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 256, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 257, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 260, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 262, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 263, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 265, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 266, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 267, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 268, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 269, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 270, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 273, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 274, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 275, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 276, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 287, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 287B, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 295, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiff's Exhibit 296, Photo, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiff's Exhibit 297, Photo, admitted 9/8/03

Plaintiffs Exhibit 298, Photo, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 300, Receipt, not admitted
Plaintiffs Exhibit 301, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 302, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 303, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 304, Photo, admitted 9/9103
Plaintiffs Exhibit 305, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 306, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 307, Photo, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 308, Receipt, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 309, Check, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 310, Letter, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 311, Letter, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 312, Invoices, admitted 9/9/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 313, Post Falls Highway District
Minutes for December 2003, admitted 12/22/03
Plaintiff s Exhibit 318, Topographic map, admitted
12117/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 325, Plat of Survey, admitted 12117/03
Plaintiffs Exhibit 332, Copy of Minutes, admitted 12/22/03

3.

List of Defendant's Exhibits
Defendant's Exhibit A, Viewers Report, admitted 12/16/03
Defendant's Exhibit Bl, Aerial Map, admitted 12116/03
Defendant's Exhibit C, July 1908 Board Minutes, admitted 12116/03
Defendant's Exhibit D, Letter, admitted 12117/03
Defendant's Exhibit D, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit Dl, Warranty Deed, admitted 911 0/02
Defendant's Exhibit D2, Plat, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D3, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110102
Defendant's Exhibit D4, Warranty Deed, admitted 9/10/02
Defendant's Exhibit D5, Affidavit ofW.L. Millsaps, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D6, Record of Survey, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D7, Topography Survey, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D9, Record of Survey, admitted 9/10/02
Defendant's Exhibit DlO, Plat, admitted 9110102
Defendant's Exhibit D12, Plat, admitted 911 0102
Defendant's Exhibit D15, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D16, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D17, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D18, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D19, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D20, Warranty Deed, admitted 9/10/02
Defendant's Exhibit D21, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D22, Warranty Deed, admitted 9/10/02
Defendant's Exhibit D23, Quitclaim Deed, admitted 9110/02

Defendant's Exhibit D25, Promissory Note, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D26, Settlement Statement, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D27, Plaintiffs' Objections and Responses to
Defendant's Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortenson's Requests
for Admissions, admitted 911 0/02
Defendant's Exhibit D28, Promissory Note, admitted 911 0/02
Defendant's Exhibit D30, Receipt, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D31, Affidavit of Richard Peplinski, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D32, Affidavit of Floyd G. Peplinski, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D33, Affidavit ofV.J. Mortensen, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D34, Affidavit of David L. White in Support of
Motion for Tempolrary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, not
admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D35, Affidavit of David L. White in Support of
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D36, Affidavit of John F. Adams Jr. in Support of
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D37, Copy of Complaint, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D38, Copy of Answer & Counterclaim, admitted
9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D39, Record of Survey, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D40, Record of Survey, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D42, Aerial Map, admitted 9/10/02
Defendant's Exhibit D43, Topographical Map, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D45, Photo, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D46, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D47, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D48, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D49, Photo, admitted 9110/20
Defendant's Exhibit D50, Photo, admitted 10/15/02
Defendant's Exhibit D51, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D52, Photo, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit D53, Photo, admitted 10115/02
Defendant's Exhibit D54, Photo, admitted 10/15/02
Defendant's Exhibit D56, Photo, admitted 10115/02
Defendant's Exhibit D57, Photo, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit D58, Affidavit of David English, admitted 10116/02
Defendant's Exhibit E, Board Minutes from 1908, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit F, Warranty Deed, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit H, Aerial Photo, admitted 12/16/03
Defendant's Exhibit I, Aerial Photo, admitted 12/16/03
Defendant's Exhibit II, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03
Defendant's Exhibit J, Aerial Photo, admitted 12/16/03
Defendant's Exhibit 11, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03
Defendant's Exhibit K, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03

Defendant's Exhibit Kl, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03
Defendant's Exhibit L, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116103
Defendant's Exhibit M, Letter, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit N, Photos, admitted 9/9103
Defendant's Exhibit 0, Plat of Survey 1896, admitted 12116/03
Defendant's Exhibit P, Viewers Report, admitted 12116/03
Defendant's Exhibit Q, Plat of Survey, admitted 12117/03
Defendant's Exhibit R, Description of Parcel 1, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit S, Description of Parcel 2, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit T, Description of Parcel 3, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit U, Description of Parcel 4, not admitted
Defendant's Exhibit W, Aerial Photo, admitted 9110/02
Defendant's Exhibit X, Letter, admitted 12117/03
Defendant's Exhibit CC, Viewers Report, admitted, 12/22/03

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Volume t of Transcript on Appeal
Volume 2 of Transcript on Appeal
Deposition of Dennis Akers
Deposition of White
Deposition of Dennis Akers
Deposition of Mortensen
to. Deposition of Scott Rasor
t 1. Deposition of Earl Sanders
12. Deposition of Dennis Lyle Akers
(Any maps mentioned in the Depositions are on the CD provided)
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